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ABSTRACT 
This research is based on an economic analysis of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), formed in 1981 by six Arab Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE. The research has aimed to address and 
then find answers to the following two interrelated questions. First, whether 
there has been any significant improvement in the performance of these 
economies since the formation of the GCC. Second, using econometric 
estimation and forecasting techniques, the research examines whether the 
overall evidence are indicative of any positive moves towards full economic 
integration. Based on the main characteristics of these economies, the research 
has built a simple but applicable model of the customs union for the GCC. 
The findings derived from the estimated econometric models and our forecasts 
are generally statistically meaningful and stable. As the fmdings suggest 
diversification, industrialisation and general economic innovations have been 
rather limited in the GCC over the past two decades. Successful economic 
integration rests primarily upon the idea of trade complementarity and evidence 
of scale economies, both of which shown to have been limited and growing 
slowly. In short, it can be concluded that due to a whole host of problematic 
issues, it is rather unlikely to assume dramatic changes to take place over the 
next few years. It is concluded that the best the GCC can come up with is to 
set up its common external tariff in line with the WTO recommendation as 
effectively as possible. 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Majid 
Taghavi, without whom this work would not have accomplished. Throughout 
my studies, he was a great source of inspiration with his unique style of . 
supervision and most sincere desire to make this research a success. I truly feel 
greatly indebted to him. 
I am also grateful to Dr Ahmed Reza for his enduring support, valuable 
comments and encouragement during the early part of my studies. He is a true 
gentleman and a genuine friend. I should also thank Professor Mohammed 
Saleem for his continuous support and part-supervision of my research. 
Moreover, I am indebted to staff of the Economics Division of A]-Ain 
University for their teaching/research support at the early stage of my PhD 
programme. I would like to thank my colleagues/friends at both Abu Dhabi 
Chamber of Commerce and NGSCO for their continual support and 
encouragement througbout my studies. 
Thanks to my parents and my brothers who have always been valuable sources 
of inspiration and support. Finally, I would like to express my sincere thanks 
to my wife and our children for their patience, cooperation and encouragement 
throughout the course of this research. 
iii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1 Some Selected Economic Indicators: GCC 1998 34 
Table 2.2 Sectoral Contributions to GDP(O/o): GCC 35 
Table 2.3 Historical Performance of main Sectors: GCC 36 
Table 2.4 Demand Structure in GCC: 1975-95 37 
Table 2.5 Sources of Exports: GCC 1985 Prices 38 
Table 2.6 Analysis of Government Finance: GCC 1985 Prices 39 
Table 2.7 GCC Commercial Banks: Capital, Assets 40 
Table 2.8 Annual Growth Rates in Money Supply & Inflation 41 
Table 2.9 Direction of Trade: GCC 42 
Table 2.10 Contributions of Exports to non-oil intra-GCC 43 
Table 4.1 Unit-Root Tests: GCC 1970-98 95 
Table 4.2 Johansen Cointegration Test: GCC 1970-98 97 
Table 4.3 Estimates of Market Inertia Criteria: GCC 1970-98 109 
Table 4.4 Estimated Consumption Functions: GCC 1970-98 110 
Table 4.5 Estimated Production Functions: GCC 1970-98 112 
Table 4.6 Estimated Money Demand Functions: GCC 1970-98 113 
Table 4.7 Estimated Import Functions: GCC 1970-98 . 
114 
Table 5.1 Annual Average Growth Rates of Selected Macro 
indicators: GCC 1970-2010 144 
Table 5.2 Annual Average Growth Rates of Selected Macro 
Indicators as a result of 40% increase in crude oil 
Price: GCC 1995-2005 146 
Table 5.3 Annual Average Growth Rates of Selected Macro 
Indicators as a result of 25% decrease in crude oil 
Price: GCC 1995-2005 148 
Table 5.4 Annual Average Growth Rates of Selected Macro 
Indicators as a result of 10% fall in $US: 1990-2005 150 
Table 5.5 Annual Average Growth Rates of Selected Macro 
Indicators as a result of 10% increase in income tax: 
GCC 1990-2005. 152 
Table 6.1 Saudisation Target in the Sixth Development Plan 168 
Table 6.2 Crude Oil Reserves and Production: GCC 171 
Table 6.3 Crude Oil: Supply and Demand 172 
Table 6.4 Sectoral Shares of GDP: Saudi Arabia & UAE 178 
Table 6.5 The GCC Direction of Trade (%) 181 
iv 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 Bahrain: Government Balance as % of GDP 43 
Figure 2.2 Kuwait: Government Balance as % of GDP 43 
Figure 2.3 Oman : Government Balance as % of GDP 43 
Figure 2.4 Qatar : Government Balance as % of GDP 44 
Figure 2.5 Saudi Arabia: Government Balance as % of GDP 44 
Figure 2.6 UAE : Government Balance as % of GDP 44 
Figure 2.7 Share of MO from Broad Money: GCC 45 
Figure 2.8 Income Velocity of Money: GCC 45 
Figure 5.1 Crude Oil Price: Actual v Forecast 132 
Figure 6.1 Monthly Movements of Crude Oil Price 174 
V 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ADF Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
ARdMA Auto-regressive Integrated Moving Average 
CET Common External Tariff 
CM Common Market 
CU Customs Union 
DF Dickey-Fuller 
EEC European Economic Community 
EU European Union 
EMU European Monetary Union 
FTA Free Trading Area 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
LDC Less-Developed Countries 
NAFTA North America Free Trade Association 
TC Trade Creation 
TD Trade Diversion 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UEA Unified Economic Agreement 
VAR Vector Auto-regressive 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii 
LIST OF TABLES iii 
LIST OF FIGURES iv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS v 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTORDUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 4 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 6 
CHAPTER TWO 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE GCC 
2.1 Introduction 8 
2.2 An Overview of the GCC Economy 10 
2.3 Patterns of Structural Change in the GCC 12 
2.3.1 The Suply Side 13 
2.3.2 The Demand Side 17 
2.3.3 The Public Sector 22 
2.3.4 The Money Market 25 
2.3.5 International and Intra-GCC Trade 27 
2.4 Conclusions 30 
Endnotes 32 
Tables 34 
Figures 44 
vii 
CHAPTER THREE 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THEORY & MEASUREMENT 
3.1 Introduction 47 
3.2 Theory of Customs Union 52 
3.3 Customs Union v Common Market 56 
3.4 A Model of CU for GCC 60 
3.5 Specification of the Models 64 
3.5.1 Price Rigidity and Market Inertia 64 
3.5.2 Consumption Behaviour 66 
3.5.3 Production Function 67 
3.5.4 Money Demand Function 67 
3.5.5 Import Function 69 
3.6 Data: Sources and Definitions 70 
Endnotes 72 
CHAPTER FOUR 
TIME SERIES, ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION AND 
EVALUATION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction: Time Series Properties 73 
4.2 Econometric Estimation: Procedures and Findings 80 
4.2.1 Market Inertia 81 
4.2.2 Consumption Function 82 
4.2.3 Production Function 84 
4.2.4 Money Demand Function 86 
4.2.5 Import Function 88 
4.3 Summary and Conclusions 91 
Endnotes 93 
Tables 95 
viii 
CHAPTER FIVE 
FORECASTING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE GCC: 
STRUCTURAL AND BEHAVIOURAL MODELS 
5.1 Introduction 115 
5.2 Forecasting: An Overview of Methodological Issues 117 
5.3 Scenarios and Assumptions 122 
5.4 Evaluation of Findings 129 
5.4.1 Scenario 1: Variables Follow Past Patterns 129 
5.4.2 Scenario II: Oil Price Shocks 132 
5.4.3 Scenario III: US$ Shocks 136 
5.4.4 Scenario IV: Introduction of Income Tax 138 
5.5 Summary and Conclusions 140 
Endnotes 142 
Tables 143 
CHAPTER SIX 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: CURRENT & FUTURE PROSPECTS 
6.1 Introduction 153 
6.2 Socio-Political Factors 155 
6.2.1 Saudi Arabia: In Search of a Delicate Balance 157 
6.2.2 Other Political Issues 161 
6.3 Economic Factors 162 
6.3.1 Infrastructure and Resources 163 
6.3.2 Labour Market 165 
6.3.3 The Oil Dilemma 168 
6.3.4 Deregulatory Measures 173 
6.3.5 Industrialisation & Diversification Policy 175 
6.3.6 Intra-GCC Trade 177 
6.4 Summary and Conclusions 179 
Endnotes 181 
ix 
CHAPTERSEVEN 
SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS & 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary of the main Findings 
7.2 The Contributions of the Research 
7.3 The Limitations of the Research 
7.4 Conclusions 
183 
194 
196 
199 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 203 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION & PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
For nearly two centuries economists such as Smith, Ricardo, Mill, and 
more recently Heckscher and Ohlin have rejected the idea of protectionism 
as means of growth and hence have promoted the spirit of free trade as the 
only way to maximise the world welfare. The neo-classical trade theory 
postulates that trade expansion generates, inter alia, specialisation and 
scale economies, and that international competition enormously improves 
domestic economic efficiency. Furthermore, as Heckscher-Ohlin model of 
trade predicts, in a world with competitive markets, intemational trade 
would lead to long-run gains for all partners. Though it has been labelled 
as an 'engine of growtW, Kenwood and Lougheed (1992: 5) point out that 
it expanding international trade is both a cause and an effect of national 
econonuc growth. 
Ironically, serious steps towards promotion of free international trade only 
goes back to the late 1940s, when for the first time it was felt that an 
2 
international trade organisation would pave the way to eventual removal of 
trade barriers. Consequently, at Geneva in 1947, negotiations on 
international trade led to the establishment of General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with the prime objective of expanding 
multilateral trade via minimising trade barriers such as tariffs, quotas and 
preferential trade agreements. However, as basic forms of protection have 
been identified over time and some have been successfully removed from 
international scenes, new complex forms have then emerged. The 
advocates of protectionism have for long argued that full multilateralism is 
only an ideal, and hence being undoubtedly unattainable in an imperfect 
world. Some have gone further to argue that whilst free trade is beneficial 
for nations with similar economic strength, different means of protection 
must be employed by those developing economies experiencing the 
transition from agriculture to industry. 
I Indeed, such schools of thought 
have given rise to the growth of bilateralism. and regionalism, particularly 
since the World War II, almost alongside the growing GATT. It is 
therefore not surprising that the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the 
successor to the GATT, has now been warned to concentrate on the 
phenomena of preferential trading agreements and of regional/non-regional 
r__ 
Fiee Trade Areas (FTAs). It has been argued that a new equilibrim must 
3 
be sought between the WTO and these regional integrations; the fonner 
embodying non-discrimination among trading nations, whilst the latter are 
inherently preferential and discriminatory. 
The logic behind regionalism has been on the research agenda of social 
scientists for nearly 50 years. From political scientists point of view, 
regional integration is the only method available to states to secure peace 
and maximum welfare. Qvfitrany 1966: 27-32). Other institutional and 
political forces being equal, economists, on the other hand, tend to 
primarily focus on market relationships among goods and factors of 
production within a region. To economists, therefore, a successful 
integration leads to net poýtive trade creation and welfare maximisation. 
in particular, regional integration has been growing importance in Europe 
in the past four decades or so. The launching of the Single European 
Market Programme, better known as EC 1992, in 1985 and the difficulty 
in concluding the Uraguay Round have frequently been regarded as 
3 important factors behind the recent trend toward regionalism. The term 
European Union (EU) came into existence in 1993 after the Maastricht 
Treaty, aiming to promote the means of forming the full economic 
4 
mtegration, encompassing European Monetary Union (EMU) - single 
central bank and single cuffenCy. 4 Despite its successes in extending its 
membership and implementing some policies, the EU is likely to encounter 
considerable difficulties in finding solutions to the economic (e. g. Single 
monetary agency) and political (e. g. extent of differences in democracy 
exercised in different member states) problems that it faces. 
By definition, any international/regional integration aims to remove all 
discriminatory trade impediments between participating nations, moving 
towards certain elements of co-operation and co-ordination between them. 
However, in so doing, it is likely that negative externalities may be 
imposed on some or all the non-participants. The term positive 
mtegration is therefore referred to the case where, from Pareto 
improvement point of view, the welfare of the participating members has 
improved at no cost to the rest of the world; hence making it both efficient 
and workable. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
It is in this overall context that this research addresses the economic 
viability and efficiency of regional trading agreements widiin the WTO 
5 
framework. In the light of these developments, the research aims to 
investigate the potentials of a workable Customs Union model for the Arab 
Gulf countries, by making an extensive reference to other experiences. In 
testing for workability and economic viability of such a model, appropriate 
econometric models and simulation will be used extensively. In short, the 
research aims to find answers for the following two questions: 
Has there been any significant improvement in the 
performance of these economies since the formation of the 
GCC? 
(ii) Are the overall evidence indicative of any positive moves 
towards much greater economic unity? 
The emergence of the GCC between the six Arab Gulf oil producing 
countries - Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) - back in 1981 was a first step towards future 
economic and political unity. Since then several attempts have been made 
to bring the community closer to the ultimate objective, but have most 
proven to be less than satisfactory. Due to rather relatively insignificant 
degrees of complimentarity and dissimilarities in their economic activities, 
it is believed that unless fimdamental steps are taken towards 
diversification., the GCC's ultimate goal is somewhat far-fetched. 
Nevertheless, in the recent years, the GCC local demand has been 
expanding substantially giving rise to much greater diversity and hence 
6 
incentive to common market formation. Moreover, similarity in language 
and culture has provided the members with a unique natural tendency for 
unity. 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter Two provides detailed 
historical and some main issues relating to the Arab Gulf economies, by 
concentrating on relevant socio-economic indicators of the existing Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC). Chapter Three deals with general 
theoretical issues and methods of regional integration by making a special 
reference to building a model of regional integration for the GCC. Chapter 
Four reviews the existing time series and econometric models relevant to 
regional integration and attempts to apply such techniques to macro data 
corresponding to Arab Gulf countries. Chapter Five attempts to run a 
simulation on the basis of the findings from Chapter Four, aiming to test 
for workability of a model of a customs union for the GCC. Chapter Six 
offers some policy directives and their likely implications on the GCC, 
primarily based on the overall findings from previous chapters and the 
most recent developments in the GCC. Finally, Chapter Seven attempts to 
summarise the overall aims, achievments and contributions of the thesis 
7 
and hence offers some concluding remarks on the future of the GCC, and 
the research in this area. 
. 
ENDNOTES: 
1. Amongst many see Brown (1988), Anderson & Hayami (1986); and for a series of papers on 
different aspects of protectionism see Greenaway et. al. cds. (1991). 
2. See Bhagwati (1994), pp 9-11. 
3. See De la Torre and Kelly (1992). 
4. For a detailed and interesting baftrounds to EU and other related issues see McDonald (1999), pp 
1-33. 
CHAPTER TWO 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE GCC 
2.1 Introduction 
More than fifteen years after its official establishment in May 1981, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) - an organisation that groups Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
- appears to be developing and pursuing its ultimate goal of creating an 
integrated common market. 1 The power of economic integration is 
clearly outlined in the GCC's November 1981 Unified Economic 
Agreement (UEA), which superseded all previous bilateral and 
multilateral agreements among the members on economic issues. The 
UEA calls for intra-GCC freedom of movement of all factors of 
production, freedom of trade between member states and the building of a 
common economic infrastructure. 2 A potential natural affinity, sharing 
close proximity and a common language and religion and many attributes 
of a shared history, have been used by most officials in the Gulf to be the 
main reasons behind this unity. Whilst some Arab observers have seen 
the GCC as a naturally growing organisation, particularly in the economic 
field. 3 others have related its birth and its continued survival to mere 
potential threats coming from Iran and Iraq. 4 Whatever the underlying 
reason for its foundation, our aim in this chapter is to evaluate the 
economic performance of the GCC members in the light of their UEA, by 
making use of some general macroeconomic data. 5 
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Niblock (1980), amongst others, reasons the necessity for some, however 
limited., social and political coordination and integration amongst the 
smaller Gulf states. 6 However, as he foresees, this would only be a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for full economic unity. This is 
because the GCC is a unique economic case study when compared to 
most other regional integrating bodies. First, and foremost, the 
economies of all members of the GCC are heavily oil dependent. 7 
Second, migrant workers represent nearly half of the total working 
population of the GCC. Third, due to massive revenues earned from 
extraction industry, income tax and value-added tax represent a very 
small part of government revenue. Fourth, owing to their massive perto- 
dollar earnings, the GCC currencies are heavily linked with the US dollar 
and hence with one another, creating a rather stable intra-GCC currency 
markets. 
Heavy dependence on oil and the migrant workers have been matters of 
concern for most members of the GCC for some time. Theoretically, in 
the long run, full economic diversification and industrialisation would 
resolve these problems, paving the way forward towards a more effective 
common market. In reality, most member states have found this process 
rather slow and quite painful. 8 General decline and volatility in oil prices 
since the late 1980s have made these countries search for much greater 
and more efficient ways of achieving diversification. On the other hand, 
as has been argued in Ramazani (1988: 96), relying on their relatively 
much larger oil reserves, some members have been somewhat reluctant to 
move radically towards a coherent and sustain diversification strategy. 
Since certain criteria must be met prior to economic integration, in this 
chapter we attempt to identify areas of strengths and weaknesses by 
10 
analysing the overall macroeconomy of the GCC. Considering that 
aspects of diversification and industrialisation are the main ingredients 
for any economic integration, we attempt to examine the overall economy 
on this pillar. 
In part 2.2 we offer an overview of the economy of the GCC, by 
examining some general socio-economic indicators. Aspects of structural 
pattern of industrialisation and diversification will be discussed in part 
2.3. Finally, this chapter closes with some policy recommendation and 
conclusions in part 2.4. 
2.2 An Overview of the Economy 
Despite its very low population density, the GCC stands as one of the 
world's most economically influential organisations. In real terms, its 
overall GDP per capita currently stands at around $10,000, the highest in 
the Middle East. The GCC members together possess nearly half of the 
world's proven oil reserves, and are major actors in world trade and 
international finance. On the whole, the GCC's major goal is to diversify 
the six economies away from dependence on crude oil by industrialising 
both in petrochemical and in non-oil sectors. 
Oil production in the GCC countries amount to around 14 million barrels 
per day, generating - on the basis of $12 per barrel - about $65 billion a 
year, representing (at 1995 prices) nearly 35% of total GDP. Moreover, 
its oil reserves - according to the OPEC estimates for 1993 - stands at 
around 470 billion barrels, representing just under 60% of the OPEC total 
reserves and around nearly one-half of total world reserves. Given the 
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current rate of extraction, assuming no structural change in the pattern of 
demand for oil, it is therefore estimated that the GCC has as long as about 
100 years to rely on oil. Oil and gas revenues are also considered to 
represent between 70% and 80% of governments' revenues. 
Table 2.1 presents some general information on some socio-economic 
indicators for the six members. Although this table gives a snap-shot of a 
few indicators for the year 1998, several important points appear here to 
be wothnoting. First, Saudi Arabia is the major contributor to the GCC, 
with her GDP and population representing around 60% and 75% of those 
of the total GCC, respectively; giving her a natural potential for 
leadership. 9 Second, there is still a relatively good percentage of 
population living in rural areas - mainly tribal population - making 
industrialisation and mobilisation of labour somewhat difficult. This is 
being much more pronounced for Oman with 90% of its population living 
in rural areas. Third, about 63% of the GCC's work force come from 
outside the area; that being even much higher for UAE and Qatar. 
Fourth, the GCC members have enjoyed relatively low rates of inflation 
compared to the average EU and most OECD economies. Moreover, this 
has been the pattern for the past ten years in these countries. Except for 
Kuwait, the other men1bers exhibit inflation rates not significantly 
different from the average GCC. Fifth, despite its relatively large oil 
reserves, Bahrain has demonstrated significantly lower dependence on oil 
compared to the average GCC; mainly due to development of her 
petrochemical and aluminium industries. Sixth, one of most striking 
features of the GCC countries is the size of oil contribution toward 
general government revenues - on average 76% of the GCC government 
earnings come from oil and only less than a one-third is made up from 
taxes and other contribution. This is profoundly different from the 
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average EU or OECD country where between 80% and 90% of revenue is 
derived from income and value-added taxes. Seventh, government 
spending, on average represents only one-third of total GDP, slightly 
higher than that of the average OECD; and hence private demand has 
been allowed to constitute a much larger portion of the GDP. Eighth, the 
GCC countries together have exhibited a massive trade balance of $37 
billion in 1995, with Saudi Arabia constituting 55% of it. Ninth, the 
GCC together have a massive international reserves of around $52 
billion, with Saudi Arabia contributing up to 77% of it. Finally, the 
falling oil prices have led to sharp decline in oil revenues, causing a 
sizeable budget deficit in the GCC states; currently standing at around 
$6.5 billion - nearly 3% of the total GCC's output. 
2.3 Patterns of Structural Change in the GCC 
As discussed earlier, table 2.1 only provides some general information 
about GCC for the year 1995. In evaluating the GCC's economic 
performance one requires to examine more comprehensive time series 
macro-economic data. By economic performance we do not merely 
relate to the overall economic growth, but also to attempt to find answers 
to the following four fundamental questions: 
(1) Have the GCC countries been successful in reducing dependence on 
oil over the last decade or so? If so, in what sense? 
(2) Has any significant diversification occurred within the GCC over the 
last twenty years? If so, what sectoral patterns have been evolved? 
(3) Has there been any significant change in demand for goods and 
services produced in the GCC? 
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(4) Are the overall evidence indicative of any positive moves towards 
fiill economic integration? 
2.3.1 The Supply Side 
As a first step in answering these questions, tables 2.2 and 2.3 are 
presented showing the contribution of each sector to the GDP for these 
six countries for the years 1975,1985,1990 and 1995; and the overall 
growth rates of sectoral contribution over the periods 1975-85,1985-90, 
1990-95 and 1975-95, respectively. By examining the sectoral 
contribution over this 20 year period we will be able to draw some 
coherent and systematic conclusions on the overall performance and 
direction of the economy of the GCC countries. A careful examination of 
these tables provides us with the following conclusions: 
(i) As the overall picture for oil and mining suggests, up to the mid-1970s 
the reliance on oil is very much pronounced at the massive rate of 62.7% 
for the GCC. As the 1975 data show, unlike the others, Bahrain has 
demonstrated its much lower rate of dependence on oil at nearly one-half 
of the average - that being statistically significantly different from the 
average GCC at the 5% level of significance. However, as Bahrain 
continues to reduce its dependence on oil over time, the other members 
have also shown to do so at much faster growth rates. Over the period 
1975-85., as can be drawn from both tables, the GCC on the whole 
managed to reduce their oil dependence by around 25%, coming 
somewhat closer to that of Bahrain. Despite the fact that further negative 
growth rates in the oil sector were experienced by the GCC over the 
period 1985-90 and 1990-95, they were however at much lower rates 
compared to those of the 1975-85 period. As table 2.3 demonstrates, over 
the 20 year period, the GCC on the whole have managed to reduce their 
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dependence on oil by 30%. Although most economists argue that the 
decline in oil dependence has been merely due to the volatile oil markets 
and ever-declining oil prices - particularly over the late 1980s and early 
1990s - it must also be borne in mind that these countries have had a long 
term policy aiming at t4ckling the oil dependence dilemma for some 
time. 10 
(ii) The manufacturing sector generally constitutes around 8%-9% of total 
GDP. Once again, Bahrain's economy tends to be more manufacturing 
orientated than others. Given its multi billion dollar aluminium, 
petrochemical and refinery industries, Bahrain's manufacturing 
contributes to the GDP in the tune of 23% in 1975, significantly higher 
than that of the other members. Despite this, Bahrain's manufacturing has 
been declining since 1980s mainly due to competition from abroad. 
Considering that there has been a massive reduction in the share of oil in 
GDP, the manufacturing seems not to have grown as fast as anticipated. 
Over the period 1975-85, its share grew by about 6.5% for the entire 
GCC, giving a rather disappointing average annual growth rate of just 
above 0.5%. Over the last twenty years manufacturing sector has seen to 
increase its contribution to GDP by about 3% for the entire period, a 
somewhat disappointing performance given that the oil sector's-share has 
diminished by one-third. On the whole, the UAE and Qatar, given their 
relatively smaller scales of operation, have demonstrated much greater 
rates of growth of manufacturing of 9% and 8.6% respectively, over the 
entire period 1975-95, and those being significantly higher than the 
average GCC. 
(iii) In terms of its relative contribution to GDP given in table 2.2, the 
agriculture sector has hardly changed over the past twenty years. 
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Although Oman's agriculture has shown to maintain its share of around 
2%-3%51 it is not significantly different from the rest. Over the last five 
years both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have managed to increase their 
shares of agriculture from 0.8% and 1% respectively in 1975 to 3.2% and 
4% respectively in 1995. Production of dairy products and better use of 
cultivated land are the major reasons behind such growth rates in Saudi 
Arabia and UAE. 
(iv) Despite much publicity that has been given to expansion of the 
construction sector in the GCC, its share has hardly changed over time. 
A careful examination of table 2.2 suggests that Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE are by and large the main spenders in the construction sector of the 
GCC; but their shares are not, however, significantly different from the 
average GCC. Between 1985 and 1990, as Table 2.3 shows, the 
construction sector in alL GCC countries experienced negative growth 
rates in their share of GDP, mainly due to unstable international markets, 
Iran-Iraq war and declining oil prices. 
(v) In so far as the wholesale and retail trade are concerned, Oman 
appears to be ahead of others in relative terms, where on average over the 
period 1975-95, the sector has contributed to GDP in a tune of around 
13%. This sector has had its steady growth of 2.5% over the entire period 
in the GCC as a whole -a performance almost similar to that of the 
manufacturing sector. Since tourism in most GCC countries is in the 
early stage of development, it is therefore anticipated that its growth in 
the next decade or so will nearly double the size of the contribution of the 
retail and wholesale trade to GDP. That appears to be more so in Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE. 
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(vi) Since its independence in 1971, Bahrain has been identified as a 
major Middle Eastern centre for banking and other related services; its 
contribution to GDP in 1985 stood at around 18%,, somewhat similar to 
that of the oil sector. As tables 2.2 and 2.3 suggest, as Bahrain was by far 
ahead of the average GCC in 1975, the others have been able to expand 
their banking and finance sector almost equally. By the end of 1995, as 
table 2.2 shows, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the UAE have almost caught 
up with Bahrain in this area of activity. Over the entire period of 1975- 
95, as given in table 2.3, the sector on the whole has seen to enjoy growth 
rate smaller than that of others. As business tends to evolve and develop 
further in the Gulf, it is anticipated that banking and finance sector to be a 
growth area in the next decade or so. 
(vii) Other services, which in the main include government services, 
have been growing in importance in the GCC countries, from about 5% 
of total GDP in 1975 to almost 22% by 1995, with no country deviating 
significantly from it. According to EIU, a large proportion of this 
contribution is due to defence and military expenditure. 
(viii) Despite substantial reduction in oil dependence over the entire 
period, as shown in Table 2.3, GDP in real terms has grown by nearly 4% 
over the twenty year priod, giving a long-run average annual growth rate 
of 0.2%. As figures suggest, massive growth in average GDP of 6.4% 
has occurred over 1975-85, and then slowed down since the late 1980s. 
On the whole, over the entire period, it appears that the UAE, Oman and 
Bahrain have managed to perform better than the rest. 
The findings detailed above are, in general, very much in line with those 
of Looney (1994) in which data - based on GDP, non-oil GDP, exports 
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and non-oil exports, over the period 1975-1985 - for a large number of 
Middle Eastern and North African countries are considered. 
2.3.2 The Demand Side 
In order to analyse whether there has been any fundamental change in 
demand for goods and services in the GCC we present table 2.4 giving 
data on some domestic indicators of demand: population, working 
population, domestic absorption (gross fixed capital formation and 
private consumption), imports of goods and services and government 
spending, over 1975-95. The following important findings may be 
worthnoting from table 2.4. 
(i) The overall population of the GCC standing at 6.98 million in 1975 
has more than doubled over the period 1975-85, giving a massive average 
annual growth rate of 12.6%. Since the indigenous population annual 
growth has been estimated to be around 4% over the said period, it can 
therefore be argued that the migrant population - mainly from the other 
Arab countries and Asia - have been responsible in main for such massive 
growth rates. Over the mentioned period, Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
show to have more than doubled the size of their population, being higher 
than the rest. However, the period 1985-95 sees a rather slower rates of 
population growth compared to the previous period: the total population 
of the GCC grew by 4.5% per annum, as the number of immigrants have 
been dropped significantly. On the whole, over the last twenty years, the 
total population of the GCC has increased tremendously by more than 
three fold, giving an average annual growth rate of 11.4%. Once again, it 
must be borne in mind that more than half of the growth has been 
maintained by the immigrant working population and their families. 
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(ii) Although over the next twenty years or so the reliance on migrant 
workers have been reduced substantially, such workers, on average, still 
represent 63% of the total working population in the GCC. However, the 
indigenous working population has been growing over the twenty year 
period at the average rate of 4%-5% per annum. Despite this significant 
performance, there remain several obstacles, which need to be removed to 
allow further participation of indigenous population in economic 
activities. Training programmes, de-tribalisation, and emancipation of 
women are some of the main issues which need to be addressed in 
tackling this problem. Some of such issues have been carefully discussed 
in Looney (1994: 274-9). 
(iii) The private sector investment - gross fixed capital formation - which 
constitutes around 20% of total GDP has been growing over the entire 
period. As in the late 1970s and up to mid-1980s private investment has 
been growing annually at an unprecedented rate of 8% and 16% , 
respectively, it has somewhat slowed down to around 2.5% over the 
1985-95. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have been enjoying much greater 
rates of growth of investment over the latter period. Further examination 
of the findings in Table 2.4 suggests a rather steady rates of marginal 
propensity to invest of around 38% over the entire period for the GCC as 
a whole. In particular, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been the 
states which have shown much greater rates of improvement in 
investment development over the entire period. These countries have, in 
main, been able to attract a large quantity of foreign investments into the 
region. II 
(iv) The pattern of development of private consumption over the past 
twenty years is interesting in that its contribution to GDP has more than 
doubled. Moreover, over the period 1975-85, it grew in real terms by 
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around 20% per annum - six times that of the real GDP. However, like 
most sectors, the general private demand has been slowed down by a host 
of factors, detailed earlier; currently growing at a rate of around 2% per 
annum. Whilst over 1975-85 all GCC countries enjoyed increasing rates 
of consumption, for Kuwait and Oman the pattern changed dramatically 
over 1985-95. These countries experienced negative growth rates of 
consumption and sharp decline in shares of consumption from their 
respective GDP. Once again, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have 
demonstarted much larger increases in private consumption over the 
entire period, significantly different from the rest. 
(y) As far as the governments in the Arab Gulf states are concerned, their 
contributions through spending have been somewhat limited before the 
1970s. Two main reasons may be put forward for this: (1) Gulf states 
such as Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE were given independence from the 
UK in 1971; (2) massive oil revenues earned by the governments in the 
early 1970s increased their influence and responsibilities to spend on 
welfare. As table 2.4 shows., massive oil revenues made it Possible for 
the GCC governments to increase spending from $13.7 billion in 1975 
to $46.2 billion in 1995, a colossal average annual growth rate of around 
24%. As expected the share of government spending in the GCC from 
GDP has increased substantially from 11% in 1975 to around 34% in 
1995 -a respectable annual average growth rate of 10%. A similar 
picture seems to be emerging: countries with relatively larger oil revenues 
(Saudi Arabia and the UAE) have experienced much larger increases in 
shares of their government spending. 
(vi) The early 1970s oil revenues led to general rise in demand for goods 
and services in the GCC. Due to their limited industrial and production 
1 
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base, most of demand had to be imported from the industrial and 
developed economies. By the end of 1975 the total imports of the GCC 
stood at around $12 billion., representing just over 9% of the total GDP. 
Saudi Arabia alone was responsible for around 40% of the total imports. 
By the end of 1985, the total imports had climbed to about $40 billion, 
that is 22.5% of total GDP; with Saudi Arabia's share rising to a colossal 
52%. As the table suggests, on average, the total imports have risen, at 
least, by 24% per annum in the GCC; perhaps one of the largest rises in 
real imports experienced by any region over the period. Although by the 
end of 1995 the size of total imports has increaded to $62 billion, 
compared to the previous period the average annual percentage rate rose 
only by a moderate rate of 5.6%. Nevertheless, in relation to GDP, the 
findings suggest that the GCC have become more dependent on imports - 
its share from the GDP rose from 22.5% in 1985 to 30.5% by the end of 
1995. Main importers to theýGCC are the USA (15%), Japan (17%) and 
the EEC (80/6); mainly providing food and consumer goods. 
Table 2.5, on the other hand, shows the external demand for GCC 
products and services. Total exports has been rising over the entire 
period, but at much lower rates in the 1980s and 1990s compared to 
1970s. However, the share of total exports from GDP has risen from 
45% in 1975 to 62% in 1995; mostly being due to the contribution of 
crude oil exports., Although Saudi Arabia is responsible for a large 
portion of total exports of the GCC, her share has dropped significantly 
over time from 53% in 1975 to 35% in 1995. As argued earlier in this 
chapter, the degree of dependence on oil in the GCC has dramatically 
reduced over the last two decades. This is not so for the exports of crude 
oil over time: as % of GDP it has increased from 27% in 1975 to 36% in 
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1995, though as % of total exports it has dropped slightly from 60% to 
58%. 
Further examination of Table 2.5 suggests that though exports of 
argicultural products have increased by four folds over the twenty year 
peiod, this sector only contributes to total exports in a tune of less than 
1% by the end of 1995. The chemical and petrochemical sector has been 
the growth sector over the past few years; its contribution to total exports, 
though very limited, has been growing significantly over time, at an 
average rate of 20% per annum. It is anticipated that its share will be in 
the region of about 10% of total exports in the next ten years. Despite 
Bahrain's relative performance in the area of refinery and 
pertrochemicals, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a major contributor to this 
sector, contributing up to 80% of total exports of this sector. The exports 
of manufacturing sector has also experienced a sharp growth over the 
entire period; in real terms it has grown from $0.5 billion in 1975 to $2.2 
billion by the end of 1995. Its contribution to total exports hardly reaches 
2%, but prospects seem to be good for the early 21st century. Between 
1985 and 1995, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain appear to have been 
doing quite well in this area. Finally, just over one-third of the total 
exports of goods and services in the GCC is made up, in main, of 
contributions by banking/insurance and food, drink and tobacco 
industries. The UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait seem to have done better in 
these arears of activity. Whilst Abu Dhabi (the UAE's capital city) has 
become one of the major financial centres of the Middle East, UAE's 
food, drink and tobacco industry has relatively experienced much greater 
rates of growth over the past few years. Kuwait and Bahrain have also 
done extremely well in banking and insurance. Most exports of the GCC 
are destined to Japan (25%), the USA (15%) and the Far East (10%). 
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2.3.3 The Public Sector 
Ever since the of oil boom of the 1970s, the governments of the GCC 
countries have enjoyed massive revenues, which have been used to 
finance ambitious programme of infrastructural, industrial, health and 
education developments. As shown in table 2.4, on average, the 
contribution of government spending to GDP in the GCC countries has 
increased by more than five folds over the period 1975-95; currently 
representing nearly one-third of the GDP. Most of these programmes and 
budget allocation are set out in each and every member's development 
plans normally running for five years. 13 
While the simultaneous achievement of these goals appeared possible in 
the 1970s and the early 1980s, since the late 1980s lower oil prices have 
put increasing pressure on govemments' finances, resulting in rising debt. 
At the 1995 prices, the total GCC governments deficit stood at $6.5 
billion, representing nearly 3% of their total GDP. Although this figure 
does not appear to be worrying, the trend has been upward in the past few 
years. Table 2.6 gives detailed information relating to governments' 
revenues and expenditures, at the 1985 constant prices, over the period 
1975-95. A thorough examination of table 2.6 leads to the following 
points. 
(i) Total government spending has been upward for each and every GCC 
member over the period. On the whole, as indicated in this table, it has 
been growing at a massive average annual rate of 26% over 1973-75, 
24% over 1975-85, and at a much slower rate of 5% over 1985-95. As 
expected, Saudi Arabia is responsible for nearly two-thirds of total GCC 
spending, and that being significantly different from the average value. 
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Though very little information can be found on areas of spending in the 
GCC,, both S. Arabia and Oman tend to have allocated nearly one-third of 
their total spending to defence and security means since the mid 1970s. 
Generally, the GCC appears to spend around a quarter of its spending on 
health and education, that being almost twice that of the EU. 
(ii) Share of spending from GDP has also increased substantially: Bahrain 
from 13% in 1975 to 22% in 1995; Kuwait from 23% to 51%; Oman 
from 20% to 38%; Qatar from 21% to 40%; S Arabia from 10% to 40%; 
and UAE from 8% to 15%. Due to their much more comprehensive open 
market environment, both the UAE and Bahrain have maintained 
relatively much lower rates of government participation, and that has 
enabled the private sector to grow much more significantly than 
elsewhere in the Gulf. On the whole, at constant prices of 1985, the 
GCC spending to GDP Ias doubled over the 20 year period from 15% to 
34% - an average annual growth rate of 6%. 
(iii) Due to having full ownership of all natural resources - mainly oil and- 
gas - and most industrial operations, the revenues made by the GCC 
governments experienced sharp increases in the 1970s, when on average 
the revenues grew at an unprecedented rate of 12% per annum. This 
enabled development of massive infrastructural and industrial operations 
possible. However, as the oil boom was ending in the early 1980s, the 
average annual growth rate had declined to around 2% over 1985-95. 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have been the'major earners in the GCC, 
together they own by as much as 80% of total GCC revenues. Although 
its share from total revenue has declined substantially over time, oil 
revenues made by GCC governments still do represent a significant 
proportion of total revenues-currently at an average rate of 79%. There 
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is no reliable data on the breakdown of the other areas of government 
revenue in most Gulf states. Nevertheless, as the EIU country reports 
suggest, on average, income taxes represents only around 1% to 2% of 
total revenues. For example, in Saudi Arabia by the end of 1995,75% of 
revenues were earned from oil and gas, and around 13% had come from 
investment incomes through government's direct involvement in banking 
and insurance. Customs and other related revenues represented the 
remaining source of earnings. 
(iv) Once being states with healthy surplus in their balances back in the 
1970s, the GCC countries have been experiencing the pains of budget 
deficit for some time. In particular, since the early 1990s, mainly due to 
world-wide recession and depressed oil markets, the Gulf states' balances 
have deteriorated sharply. S Arabia and Kuwait, the big earners and 
spendersý have been4adversely affected, so that together are responsible 
for nearly 85% of total GCC deficit. In relative terms, these can be 
translated as 15% of Kuwait's GDP and 6% of S Arabia's GDP. On the 
whole as table 2.6 suggests, the current deficit stands at $13 billion - 6% 
of total GDP - though not very significantly out of norm, this is somewhat 
unprecendented for these nations wishing to maintain their massive 
development plans for the future. 
Figures 2.1 to 2.6 depict clear pictures of the extent of imbalances in 
budgets over the twenty year period, supporting the earlier arguments. In 
short, as shown by these figures, the GCC countries - the UAE excepted - 
had enjoyed surpluses up to mid 1980s, and have been experiencing 
relatively large deficits since then. 
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2.3.4 The Money Market 
Despite being newly developed economies, the Gulf states have managed 
to develop their money, banking and other financial markets very rapidly 
over the past twenty years. Oil revenues, in the main, have been 
responsible for such speed of development. Currency, banking and 
monetary management are controlled by each and every GCC member's 
central bank, better known as Monetary Agency (MA). Stock Exchange 
markets though exist in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, they have not 
yet fully developed. 
One of the main features of the GCC is that it is one of the most over- 
banked areas in the world. In particular, Bahrain has, since 1975, 
developed its offshore banking, and has become an alternative financial 
centre to the troubled Beirut. Currently there are 19 commercial banks 
and 47 offshore banking, units with the total asset of $100 billion. 
Equally, the UAE remains to be well over-banked, with 19 local and 28 
foreign banks, having a total of 230 and 119 branches respectively. Since 
the mid 1980s recession and the collapse of the BCCI, the central banks 
in most GCC countries have introduced some tight measures controlling 
commercial banks reserves and liabilities. 
Despite its relatively lower population urbanisation and the islamic based 
culture, the banks in the GCC have managed to attract depositors and 
investors over time in a more efficient manner. As table 2.7 shows, over 
the period 1985-95, the GCC commercial banks together have managed 
to increase their total deposits (consisting of demand deposits, 
government deposits and quasi money) from just around $70 billion to 
nearly $94 billion, a total growth of 35% over the ten year period, giving 
an average growth rate of just over 3.5% increase per annum. The Saudi 
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Arabian share of total deposits from the GCC has experienced a decline 
from 46% in 1985 to 41% in 1995. This is mainly because both the 
UAE's and Kuwait's banks have been able to attract relatively more 
deposits than others, as the former appears to be catching up with Saudi 
Arabia. By the same token, capital and reserves of commercial banks in 
the GCC has shown a sharp increase over the ten year period by 62%, 
giving an average annual growth rate of 6% per annum. The difference in 
size of capital and reserves of commercial banks are indicative of the 
number of such banks operating in these countries, but also determined 
by monetary agencies rules and regulations in different states. 14 As a 
source of security and health of banking system, liability-asset ratio is 
monitored by all the GCC countries. As shown in table 2.7, despite some 
tight measures introduced by GCC central banks, this ratio, though not 
dramatically, has increased for the GCC on the whole from 36% in 1985 
to 40% in 1995. Kuwait commercial banks tend to exhibit the largest 
ratio of around 60% over the period; that, however, not being 
significantly different from the average value. 
Theibroad money supply in the GCC countries has also experienced sharp 
rises, primarily due to massive rises in quasi-money deposits. Details of 
the growth of broad money supply and its determinants are given in table 
2.8. As this table suggests, with the exception of Bahrain, quasi-money 
(QM) in GCC has had the largest annual growth rates over each and 
every sub-period. Conversely, the growth of Mo has slowed down over 
the period, as more money has been absorbed in the banking system. 
Despite such massive growth in money supply, it is interesting to note 
that the retail price index has had a moderately low growth rates over the 
same sub-periods. 
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As banks have attracted more depositors over time, the share of 
currencies in the hands of individuals relative to broad money supply has 
fallen dramatically. As figure 2.7 shows, the share of Mo from broad 
money supply has generally dropped in the GCC, more pronouncedly in 
Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Political and economic stability as well 
as rises in urbanisation of population in the region can be regarded as 
other important factors behind this phenomenon. As can be seen from 
this figure, on the whole, the GCC share of Mo from broad money over 
the twenty year period has dropped from around 50% to less than 30%. 
Finally, it is worthnoting that due to massive rises in money supply, 
accompanied by much lower growth rates of GDP and inflation, the 
income velocity of money has been declining sharply in almost all GCC 
countries over the period. 15 This is clearly depicted in Figure 2.8, where 
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Oman tend to have experienced much 
greater rates of decline in their income velocity of money. 
2.3.5 Intemational and Intra-GCC Trade 
As mentioned earlier, the GCC countries have demonstrated their 
willingness and commitment to fully free international trade. According 
to IMF estimates of a measure of openness, the Arab Gulf countries are 
classed as most open economies in the world. 16 It may be argued that the 
reason behind high degrees of openness is due to massive oil exports 
made by these countries. The GCC countries are also main consumers of 
the OECD products: Japan, the USA and the EU are responsible for 
around 70% of the GCC's total imports; somewhere in the region of $25 
billion (nearly 20% of GCC's total external trade). Moreover, data 
relating to 1993 suggests that total customs revenue earned by the GCC 
governments represented only between 3-5 per cent of total revenues, 
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much lower than that of the average EU, Japan, and the USA. 17 Table 
2.9 gives the GCC's direcction of trade for 1985 and 1995. The findings 
in this table can be summarised as follows. 
The data relating to total exports and imports suggest that by the end of 
1995, exports of goods exceeded that of imports by two folds. However, 
over the period 1985-95, the imports have been rising by an average rate 
of 5.6% per annum twice as big as that of exports. 
Japan as a major trading partner, has maintained its large share of imports 
ftom the GCC of around 35% - Qatar and UAE being much more 
involved than the rest in providing their exports, mainly of oil, to Japan. 
By the end of 1985, Japan though having 17% of the total share of the 
GCC imports, this by far being smaller than her imports from the GCC. 
Moreover, by the end of 1995,, this share has also dropped to around 14%. 
Amongst others, Bahrain is the most prominent customer of Japanese 
products and has maintained this over the period. 
As for the USA, she takes relatively lower share of GCC's total exports: 
though this has trebled over the past ten years, it currently represents only 
8% of the GCC's total exports. Saudi Arabia has been the most 
successful country in the GCC to have infiltrated in USA markets: its 
exports to USA rose from 5.4% of its total exports in 1985 to 21.5% by 
the end of 1995. At the same time, Saudi Arabia is a major customer for 
US products: her share of imports from USA rose from 16.9% to 22.4% 
over the last ten years, a rate of growth much smaller than her exports to 
USA. On the whole, the GCC share of imports from USA is currently at 
around 13.6. an average rise of 6% per annum. Recently, as data 
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suggests, Kuwait has very significantly increased her share of imports 
from the USA to around 25%. 
Although representing only 14% of total share of the GCC's exports, the 
EU is responsible for just over 30% of total imports of the Gulf states; by 
far the largest single contributor to GCC's imports. Though no country 
shows shares significantly different from the average, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and the UAE tend to be and maintain larger shares of their 
imports from the EU. However, over the ten year period, as these figures 
suggest, there has been a relatively slight decline in the average share of 
the GCC's imports from the EU. 
A careful examination of the table suggest that although the extent of 
intra-GCC trade is generally small, it has grown on an average rate of 5% 
per annum over the, period - exports rising, by 6.5 % and imports by 2% 
per annum. Bahrain is by far the largest contributor to GCC-intra trade, 
with her shares of imports from and exports to GCC being significantly 
different from the average values at the 5% level of significance. 
Moreover, Bahrain's total trade with GCC has more than doubled over the 
ten year period, currently standing at around 40% of her total 
international trade. Oman is also a major contributor to total intra-GCC 
trade: her share of intra-GCC imports represents nearly one-quarter of her 
total imports. It is believed that a large proportion of this share is due to 
re-exports of goods from UAE and Bahrain. 18 
Over the past decade the GCC countries have made every attempt to 
develop their agriculture and promote agricultural exports. Although the 
value of argicultural exports has increased by five folds over the last 
decade, its contribution to total intra-GCC trade hardly goes beyond 5%. 
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As the GCC National Accounts statistics indicate, on average up to 80% 
of total exports within the GCC countries is comprised of 
manufacturing/industrial products; mainly being chemicals, 
petrochemical by-products, building materials, metal products, and small 
machinery and appliances. The contribution of exports of industrial 
products in relation to total exports for each GCC member, as well as to 
total intra-GCC trade are presented in Table 2.10. According to this 
table, the exports from Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE are very much 
industrial orientated. For example, whilst 41% of Saudi Arabiaýs total 
exports being manufactured products, those of Bahrain and Kuwait being 
well over 95%. Moreover, in this table total exports of manufactured 
products are shown to have increased by more than 1.5 times from $659 
Millipu tq, ý1.7 billion over the last ten years - giving an average annual 
grpw The last two columns of Table 2.10 show the t4 rate of 16%. 
contribution of exports of manufactured -products to total intra-GCC 
trade. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are currently the largest contributors., 
givipg rqtios of 30% and 29% respectively. On the whole, the average 
sýar'e of total manufactured exports from total intra-GCC trade has risen 
significantly over the ten-year period from 9.4% to 16.5% - giving an 
average growth rate of 7.5% per annum. 
2.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter attempts have been made to examine several economic 
issues relating to the operations and development of the GCC countries 
over the past decade or so. Having examined the demand and the supply 
sides of the GCC economies, the evidence suggest that new markets have 
evolved, general demand has risen and some forms of diversification 
have taken place over the period 1975-95. It has become evident that in 
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so far as the Gulf States are concerned, the major economic objective is to 
diversify away from oil, and become industrialised. As the data suggest, 
diversification has beq slow, but intm-GCC trade has increased 
significantly over the period, mainly due to development of giant 
petrochemical/refinery industry and some small manufacturing units. 
The path toward full economic integration is somewhat far-fetched at the 
moment, but some steps have been taken up as regards removal of all 
customs duties, unification of regulatory measures governing wholesale 
trade, and harmonisation of property rights amongst the members. 
Intra-GCC trade, though, has increased significantly, it currently 
represents only around 10% of total trade, and that has been the major 
reason for the slow progress in GCC full unification. As shown earlier, 
though oil dependence has fallen sharply over the period, oil revenues 
still constitute up to about 35% of total GDP of the GCC countries. 
In short, oil dependence has not fallen as much as anticipated, 
diversification has been rather sluggish, and labour mobilisation has not 
been successful over the given period, and these have been the main 
ingredients of slow progress toward full economic integration. Though 
some authors19 believe that the prospects for the GCC look fairly 
promising in the long term, further econometric investigation is required 
in estimating and evaluating the effects of relevent socio-economic 
factors in the process of diversification in the GCC. These will be the 
subject of our analysis in the next chapters. 
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has been estimated that whilst Japan and the USA showed openness ratios of around 201/o, that of the 
EEC was around 401/o, 501/o, and that of the GCC stood in the range of 900/o-130%. 
17. See EIU Country Report, S. Arabia, 1995. 
18. See EIU Country Report, UAE, p. 34. 
19. For example see A. I. El-Kuwaiz, 'Economic Integration of the Cooperation Council of the Arab 
States of the Gulf. challenges, achievements and future outlook', in J. A- Sandwick (ed. ), op. cit. pp. 71- 
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Fig2.1 Bahrain: Government Balance as %of GDP 
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Fig2.2 Kuwait: Government Balance as %of GDP 
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Fig2.3 Oman: Government Balance as %of GDP 
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Fig 2.4 Qatar: Government Balance as %of GDP 
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Fig 2.5 Saudi Arabia: Government Balance as %of 
GDP 
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Fig 2.6 UAE: Government Balance as % of GDP 
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Fig 2.8- Income Velocity of Money: GCC 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THEORY AND 
MEASUREMENT 
The purpose of a customs union or of a free- 
trade area should be to facilitate trade between 
the constituent terfitorles and not to raise 
barriers to the trade of other contracting parties 
with such territories. 
GATT Article MV (4) 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the past few years there has been a series of significant contributions 
to analysing the real impact of economic integration, primarily aimed at 
assessing the costs and benefits of moving towards a more advanced form 
of regional economic harmonisation. One of the most comprehensive and 
substantive works entitled The costs of non-Europe, was carried out by 
Emerson et al (1988) where a large number of attributes of integration in a 
more general equilibrium approach were investigated. Moreover, the 
European Commission (1990) One Market, One Money, though being less 
precise, still addresses the main problems involved. The M (1990, 
1992) contributions, inter alia, in evaluating the impact of fiscal and 
monetary coordination in the EC have been mainly based upon the use of 
Multimod - developed by Masson et al -a comprehensive system of 
48 
equations for the world economy. The latter attempts to measure a set of 
parameters or cross elasticities, which relate activity of one nation to 
another and then proceed with simulation on the basis of such estimates. 
This procedure would enable researchers to measure the real costs and 
benefits of integration relative to those of an interdependent world. 
The justification for any regional economic integration is primarily based 
on the very assumption that such formations lead to net positive trade 
creation at zero/negligible cost to the rest of the world. Trade creation 
(TC), in a sense, refers to the replacement of the expensive domestic 
production by cheaper imports from the partner. On the other hand, if the 
partner's imports are more expensive than those of the world's, then trade 
diversion (TD) has occurred. In short, any form of economic integration' 
should entail economic gains for participating parties: relative prices 
expected to fall and incomes expected to increase. This is to say that in 
the long run, the member countries are expected to enjoy lower and more 
stable inflation rates. However, in the short/meditun tenn, general prices 
may not necessarily fall, but depending on the nature of trade, some 
sectors of the economy in which tariffs are cut may experience lower 
prices relative to the rest. So, as pointed out by Kreinin (1961), unless 
49 
every sector's relative prices examined, the sole examination of general 
prices over time can be misleading and is subject to severe biases. 
Such favourable movements in the terms of trade and of scale economies 
are difficult to be disentangled from feedback on to income and activity. 
In other words, integration should enhance the real growth rate of GDP via 
increased productivity and increased investment, rather than giving a one- 
off shift in welfare gain. Once again, amongst many, investigations made 
by Krause (1968) and Mayes (1978) suggest that it is a rather difficult task 
to distinguish between changes in GDP attributable to integration and 
those attributable to other causes. 
If economic integration were treated like any other change in exogenous or 
policy variables in a macro model, then the correct econometric approach 
would be to estimate a large enough model to reflect all the relevant and 
important influences in the economy. Given a large number of 
observations, one would apply the model to both pre-and-post integration 
periods to estimate the structural parameters, and then observe any 
possible significant differences, which may have occurred on values of 
such parameters. The difference between the two estimates is then 
regarded as the identifiable effects of integration. Alternatively, if the 
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sample size is relatively small, a series of dummy variables may be used to 
take account of post integration period. In such a case, although the size 
of TC may not be measured, the statistical significance of post integration 
can be tested. Nevertheless., the major drawback to such large macro 
models is the problem of aggregation. As has been noted, amongst many, 
by Barker (1970), in an i-Adustrialised economy both price and substitution 
elasticities of demand for imports vary considerably over different 
commodities, running from near zero price elasticities for essential 
commodities which cannot be produced locally, to substantial values for 
manufactured products for which there are many close substitutes. 
Moreover, level of tariffs and changes in them may vary quite considerably 
from sector to sector, so by taking a uniform value across all trade could 
be seriously misleading. So, disaggregation is relevant to the problem, but 
in most cases lack of. data availability at sectoral level has discouraged 
researchers to pursue the problem any further. 
Alternatively, as used'by many2, a simple logariflunic import function in 
prices and incomes can, to a limited extent, show the direct price effect of 
integration, and can allow for substitution between imports from partners 
and non-members as well as substitution between imports and domestic 
products to be incorporated. However, as has been reiterated by Mayes 
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(1997), such simple models would fail to encapsulate the impact caused by 
other factors in the economy. For example, exports will in any case be 
affected by the change in tariffs in partner countries after the fonnation of, 
say, a Customs Union. This is because imports directed both to final and 
intermediate demand will tend to lower the rate of price inflation, and this 
in turn will have consequences for the wage rate through the usual 
inflationary spiral and for the price of exports and hence export demand. 
The model, therefore, must be able to take account of the effects of 
increased imports on domestic output, which will in turn have a 
deflationary effect on domestic demand. It is thus suggested that at the 
very least such models should incorporate some balance of payments / 
exchange rate relation. 
The advantages of simple models are clear and have been well 
doctunented by Kreinin (1979). Even with a more sophisticated model, as 
has been pointed out by IN4ayes (1997: 80), one can only get a rough idea 
of an order of magnitude not an accurate single number. Hence if it is 
possible to use only a relatively limited amount of readily available 
information to estimate the magnitude, one can make much more efficient 
use of resources by adopting the simple model. 
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In short, no matter what model is adopted, we need to be able to explain 
imports and exports disaggregated at the very least by trading area and 
usually by country as well if we are to obtain estimates of trade creation 
and trade diversion, and the effects on the balance of payments and 
welfare. Ideally, such models should be able to be applied at 
disaggregated level over sectors and commodities. 
3.2 Theory of Customs Union: A Review 
As has been argued by Brown (1961) and further enhanced by Balassa 
(1962) and EI-Agraa and Jones (1981), most LDCs tend to benefit most 
from economic integration, if the initial formation is based on a CU rather 
than a Common Market. As a common external tariff (CET) needs to be 
agreed by the members of CU, then an agreed set of fiscal coordination 
would enrich the working of the union. To elaborate this, let us summarise 
the example used by EI-Agraa and Jones (1981: 3546) in which TC and 
TD emerging from a three-country CU have been evaluated. Suppose, 
initially, that the following conditions hold for three countries trading with 
each other: 
PI < P3 (I+Tl) (3.1) 
PI<P2(1+Tl) (3.2) 
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P2 'ýý P3 (I +T2) (3.3) 
P2 < Pl (I+T2) (3.4) 
where Ps represent the unit price of a particular commodity in three 
exclusive and mutually exhaustive countries (areas) of the world, with I 
and 2 as potential CU partners and 3 as the rest of the world (W); and Ts 
are the ad valorem tariff rates levied on imported finished products by 
these three countries. The conditions (3.1) and (3.2) ensure that country I 
is producing enough to satisfy its domestic demand; where (3.3) and (3.4) 
ensure the same outcome for country 2. 
Suppose now that countries I and 2 form a CU and adopt a CET equal to 
the unweighted arithmetic average of their initial tariff rates, i. e. [(Tl+ 
T2)/2 = TCET]. If T2 is initially lower than TI, then the former must rise as 
a consequence of the adoption of TCET. Since, P2 is less than P3(1+T2) 
and less than PI, P2can never be higher than P3(1+TCET) at the same time. 
Hence., the only possible outcome is that country I will import this 
commodity from country ý after the formation of the CU. This is what we 
refer as trade creation. Similar outcome is obtained when T, < T2. 
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Now let us consider the case where conditions only (3.2) and (3.3) and the 
following condition hold initially: 
Pl ýý'P3 (I+Tl) (3.5) 
Once again, if countries 1 and 2 fonn a CU and Tj< T2 initially, then T, 
must rise and T2 MUStfall to the CET level. Under such circumstances, T2 
cannot fall to such an extent as to reverse condition (3.3), since this would 
imply that P2 >Pj, which is ruled out by condition (3.2). Hence condition 
(3.3) must still hold true. As it is clear, if subjecting T, and T2 to TCET 
does not lead to a reversal of either condition (3.5) or (3.3), trade diversion 
will take place particularly since PI > P3 (I+TCET), P2 < P3 (I+TCET) and 
P2 < Pl. A more interesting outcome is where a higher T, does not reverse 
condition (3.5) but the lower T2 reverses condition (3.3). In such 
circumstances, country I will continue to import from W and country 2 
will now give up its costly domestic production and import from W. This 
is so called external trade creation, which can only occur in the case of 
CU fonnation. 
Finally, if we asstune that only condition (3.5) and the following condition 
hold: 
P2 > P3 (I+T2) (3.6) 
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then in the case of T, > T2 the price of this commodity in country I will 
exceed that of country 2. In this case, as it is apparent both countries must 
be importing directly from W. However, if they wish to form. a CU, T, 
will have to fall and T2 will have to rise in order to have a CET. In this 
case, the price of this commodity in both countries will be identical, that is 
[ P, = P2 = P3 (I+TCET)]; indicating that both will continue to import this 
commodity directly from W. Interestingly, in the case where the two 
countries formed a FTA, then this phenomenon is termed as trade 
deflection, meaning that the country that initially imported directly from W 
now imports indirectly from the W via the partner with the lower tariff 
rate. As it is apparent, deflection of production and investment can also 
occur when both partners are producing the same commodity initially. It 
can therefore be argued that in one resPect the fonnation of a CU will 
eliminate tile tariff differential and will then dispose of the possibility of 
deflection. 
Besides the static effects already discussed, the CU establishment can also 
lead to dynamic effects. As argued earlier, CU may influence growth in 
member states through economies of scale, increased competition and 
stimulation of investment and technical change. These simple analyses, 
based on competitive market with no distortions, have been well collated 
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and illustrated in Mikic (1998: 445459). Once again, these influences 
would be expected to lead to higher growth and lower relative prices in the 
member states. 
As it is now apparent, agreement on formulating CETs for several 
commodities in a CU will entail a significant loss or redistribution of 
governments revenues, consumption and production. In the case where a 
large number of countries forming a CU then this procedure would 
necessitate a coherent and consistent fiscal coordination amongst the 
members, so that redistribution of wealth and welfare are maintained vis-a- 
vis the bctter-off and the worse-off partners. In short, although the CU 
theory is based on microeconornics foundations, it lends itself towards a 
more macroeconomic policy orientation. 
3.3 Customs Union vs Common Market 
Analysis of regional integration based on CU assumes immobility of 
factors of production outside national boundaries. A common market, 
CM, differs from CU in that it involves the full integration of both product 
and factor markets through regional trade liberalization and elimination of 
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obstacles to mobility of factors of production. The description of CM thus 
specifies the hannonisation of regulations pertaining to such factor 
mobility, as well as tax and other related policies. Heckscher-Ohlin model 
of international trade advocates that an effective way to achieve Pareto 
efficiency is through perfectly free trade of goods and services, provided 
that the equalisation of commodity prices leads to factor-price 
equalisation. Free trade is not free of distortion, and hence factor prices 
cannot be equalised through free trade alone. As has been argued in Mikic 
(1998: 462) any degree of factor price differential between member states 
will result in a call for increased factor mobility to equlaise factors' 
marginal productivities. It can therefore be argued that perfectly free 
international factor movements will lead to factor-price equalisation. The 
CM, thus, involves a variant of both of these processes. 
International capital mobility in Europe has a long history and goes back to 
the 1P century, when both governments and merchants were engaged in 
funding directly or providing capital for construction projects, public 
works, wars and voyages of discovery in different European countrics. 3 
The 1990s have seen most developed economics divorcing their domestic 
interest rates almost completely; hence international capital mobility has 
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increased to the point where the gap between many countries' short-term 
interest rates is often so small to ignore. In general, nowadays one 
country's short-term rate on government bonds tend to differ from 
another's only by a margin that matches foreign-exchange-market 
expectations of a change in the exchange rate between them. 
In the spirit of Heckscher-Ohlin, if country A offers higher rate of return 
on capital than B, then in the absence of tax or migration costs, capital will 
flow from B to A in search of higher return. The process will continue 
until rates of return on capital are equalised. There will be upward pressure 
on wage rates in A, as the additional capital stock improves labour 
productivity; and downward in B, where the opposite happens. It may 
therefore seem that the capital-importing country, A, gains a great deal and 
that B ends up being the loser. However, this impression is false, as the 
owners of capital in B will earn profits on the capital that they have 
transferred to A. In fact, the flow of profit income from A to B will be in 
excess of the loss the B's domestic oUtpUt. 4 In short, capital mobility will 
enhance both countries' national incomes. 
Historically, there has been relatively little migration of labour between 
the developed economies. The world's most significant migration has 
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been due to wars, religious/ethnic problems, or political pressures. As the 
history of West European labour mobility suggests, an overwhelming size 
of migration, whether primarily motivated by economic considerations or 
not, have taken the form of emigration to other continents, rather than from 
one European country to another. As has been stated in Brenton et al 
(1997: 227-8), a combination of push and pull - the attraction of higher 
incomes abroad and depressed conditions at home - were important factors 
behind substantial emigration from Europe to the United States and South 
America. Moreover, when West European states have attracted immigrant 
workers since the World War IL it has not been., in the main, from each 
other. The same picture appears to have emerged in the GCC states where 
intra, GCC labour mobility is highly insignificant compared to the size of 
inunigrant workers who come from Asia and North Africa. 
The theoretical analysis of international labour migration is similar to that 
of capital. In the absence of any capital movement, and no restriction on 
labour movements, we asstune that the wage rate in counfty B is initially 
higher than m A. fligher wages in B attract workers to migrate from A to 
The reduction in A's labour force means a fall in its domestic output. 
Other thing being equal, the employers in A are now prepared to offer 
higher wages reflecting labour scarcity. The opposite occurs in B. 
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Therefore, those who gain are A's emigrants, the workers who remain in 
A, and B's capitalists. On the other hand, B's indigenous workers and A's 
capitalists lose. It can be concluded that the reallocation of labour in 
equalising its marginal product leads to increased world income. Bowen 
et al (1998: 523-5) have demonstrated that similar long run outcomes 
would emerge when one assumes unemployment in one country or 
minimum wage in another. 
3.4 A Model of CU for GCC 
A large proportion of literature developed in the area of economic 
integration to date is biased towards common markets in the advanced or 
industrial economies. The first rigorous attempt at an ý examination and an 
application of economic integration in the context of development was 
made by Brown (1961) and then subsequently by Newlyn (1965), 
Hazelwood (1967,1975), and Robson (1983,1985). As far as the 
developing/less developed countries (LDC) are concerned, it is realised 
that the static resource reallocation effects of TC and TD have litnited 
relevance. Generally, the theory suggests that there would be more scope 
for TC if the countries concerned were initially very competitive in 
production but potentially very complementary and that a form of CU 
would best lead to trade creation if partners conducted most of their 
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foreign trade amongst themselves. Nevertheless, most of the effects of 
integration in the LDCs are bound to be trade diverting, since most LDCs 
seek to industrialise at a time when practically all their industrial products 
are imported from either the advanced nations or the newly industrialised 
economies. Moreover, as has been highlighted and elaborated by Robson 
(1983) and MetwallY (1979), an important obstacle to the development of 
industry in the LDCs is the inadequate size of their individual markets. It 
is therefore necessary for them to increase the market size so as to 
encourage optimum plant installations, hence the need for economic 
integration. 
Considering what has been said so far, the GCC as a whole represent a 
special case of an LDC where the dilemma of diversification and 
industrialisation is not primarily away from agriculture, but from 
dependence on oil. Given the unit price of oil being relatively higher than 
that of an average agricultural product, then it is anticipated that the GCC 
members are considerably wealthier than the other developing countries. 
Hence, unlike other developing economies, the GCC is not expected to 
face any severe constraints on financing either their balance of payments 
or govenunents balances. This follows that any possible loss of earnings 
by any member of the GCC through fixing CETs would be small in 
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relation to governments' earnings from oil. Moreover, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, the GCC's endowment of human capital is very limited, and 
hence the economy relies heavily on the contributions made by migrant 
work force. Nevertheless, it is believed that the international markets 
firom, which these workers being recruited are nearly perfectly competitive. 
In all the GCC countries income tax is zero and hence governments 
earnings are in main derýved from oil revenues and other governments' 
ventures and duties. 
As explained in Chapter Two, the GCC began their first steps towards It LO 
unification in 198 1. By the -early 1982 all the trade impediments and 
tariffi were removed amongst the members and a large number of CETs 
for different commodities were formulated. According to the EIU (1996) 
such rates average around 4% in a narrow range of 2.5%-5%, much lower 
than those of EFTA and EU. It can therefore be argued that since the 
early 1980s the GCC have established a CU, and in the mid 1980s giving a 
full intra-GCC freedom of movement of factors of production. However, 
in practice, since a large number of migrant workers are given restrictive 
work permits, the perfect mobility of labour within each country and 
across national borders has failed to work in most instances. 
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On the basis the above observations., our aim here is to build a practical, 
simple and yet useffil model of integration for the GCC which would 
enable us to examine any possible dynamic impact which have been 
caused by the integration. In addition, the estimated model should then be 
used for forecasting purposes, enabling one to predict whether any 
progression from CU to a form of a Common Market may be possible. In 
building such a model of five-country integration one needs to make the 
following assumptions about the GCC: 
(i) Factors of production are nearly perfectly mobile within each 
country, but lack the freedom to move across national borders. 
(ii) A large proportion of factors of production (labour mainly) are 
non-indigenous whom have been recruited from competitive 
international markets. So each member of the union has full access 
to this plentiful unutilised supply of factor of production. 
(iii) Both unported and exported products markets are competitive. 
This needs to be tested later on, to deterniine the extent of 
sluggishness and adjustment in several production sectors. 
(iv) There is zero income tax in each and every country of the union. 
Government earnings are thus derived from oil revenues, 
nationalised companies profits and excise duties. Thus, fiscal 
policies have very limited impact on the economy. 
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(v) Any product produced within the union is to be sold as a 
substitute for a product imported from the rest of the world; its price 
will be equal to the import price plus the CET. 
3.5 Specification of the Models 
Following what has been discussed earlier, the aim here is to measure the 
extent of the performance of the GCC over the period using simple but 
apPropriate models. The following models will be used for estimation 
purposes. 
3.5.1 Price Rigidily and Market Inertia 
For the purpose of evaluating the extent of sectoral. competition in each 
state of the GCC, a model of price rigidity and market inertia - following 
the methodological background in Stiglitz (1984) and formulated by 
Bergeijk et al (1994) - will be used of the form 
(3.7) Pt a, + a2 PMt + a3 Qt+ a4 AQt+ Ut 
where Q and AQ represent capacity utilization and change in capacity 
utilization, respectively; P and PM are the sector's price, and the 
competing import price indices, respectively. The white noise error term is 
shown as ut which follows all the classical features of a disturbance tenn. 
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By definition, the higher the relative size of the AQ parameter, the more 
sluggish is the market adjustment. More specifically, the market inertia 
criterion (mic) is given by the ratio a4/( a3+ a4) * 100. In the case of 
complete hysteresis (a3=-- 0; mic =1001/6), neither excess capacity nor 
excess demand influences the product's price. Consequently, a severely 
depressed economy may experience accelerating price rises if its capacity 
utilization improves, no matter how low the level of capacity utilization. 
This means that demand and supply on the goods market may not 
equilibrate by means of price adjustment, as competition being absent. As 
has been highlighted by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987,652-3) market 
inertia and malfunctioning influences key economic indicators such as 
prices, production, trade, investment and employment. As this is the 
consequence of a suboptimal allocation of resources. Moreover, a lack of 
price flrexibility influences the efficacy of policy instrwnents. These 
issues have been illustrated in Dixon and Rankin (1984) and Heijdra and 
Broer (1993). 
On the other hand, if changes in capacity utilization do not influence price 
movement at all (a4 = 0; mic =. 0) hysteresis is virtually absent and 
adjustment is rapid as the price level reacts quickly to the level of capacity 
utilization. In this case, -market flexibility is high and price allocates 
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resources in a very efficient way, and that being a central feature of a 
perfectly competitive environment. 
In applying such a technique to GCC one should exercise care in 
establishing the extent of price control in a given sector. This is to say that 
in a number of markets where governments' subsidies offered, prices are 
significantly lower than the average world price, and hence the estimated 
mic may not represent the true picture of the extent of inertia in such 
markets. 
3.5.2 Consumption Behaviour 
To examine whether the overall demand has significantly increased over 
the post-GCC period, a general form. of consumption function will be used 
of the following fonn 
c (Yd, 11, R) (3.8) 
where C is the real private consumption; Yd, 11 and R represent the real 
disposable income, the consumer price inflation and, the market rate of 
interest, respectively. Of particular interest is the estimates of marginal 
propensity to consume (mpc) for both durable and non-durable goods for 
each country. These estimates determine whether propensity to consume 
has generally changed over the period. The consumption sensitivity to 
inflation and interest rates will then be examined bY testing whether mpc 
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is correlated with I-I and P... In addition, in order to measure the impact 
caused by GCC formation on consumption behaviour, we attempt to 
introduce a dummy variable to take account of this potential contribution. 
3.5.3 Production Function 
To examine improvements in labour productivity and factor elasticity, a 
linear version of the variable elasticity of substitution (VES) production 
function will be employed and applied to some selected sectors of the 
GCC. The conventional neo-classical fonn of such fimction - derived by 
Hildebrand & Liu (1965) - may be given as 
q (W, K/L) (3.9) 
Where Q represents the logarithm of the average labour productivity; W 
and K/L are log of real wage rate, and log of capital labour ratio, 
respectively. 
Factor elasticity is a good indicator of growth of a sector in a developing 
economy, since it indicates that replacement of labour by capital is 
expected to improve labour productivity, and hence the higher will be the 
growth of the sector. So, it is expected that both W and KAL be positively 
correlated with output and labour productivity. A dummy variable for the 
potential contribution of GCC formation will be added to the equation to 
measure this effect. 
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3.5.4 Money Demand Function 
In order to examine whether demand for money in the GCC states has 
significantly changed, a conventional model of money demand based on 
neo-quantity theory is used. There are several factors, which are believed 
to affect money demand. Most researchers use real GDP as the constraint 
on private money holdings. In oil dominated economies, however, non-oil 
real GDP should be used instead, as oil revenues accrue to the GCC 
governments and thus have no direct impact upon the liquidity of the 
private sector. Domestic interest rates are also used to denote the 
opportunity cost of holding money. As discussed earlier, the GCC 
countries are open economies with relative capital mobility, and that 
means that international. OPPortunity costs of holding money may also 
influence domestic money holdings much in the same way as domestic 
opportunity costs do. In short, both foreign interest rates and movements 
in exchange rates should also be considered in our money demand 
fimction. Moreover, price inflation plays an important role in any decision 
relating to demand for money. So, in its broad form, our model of demand 
for money - in line with that of AI-Mutawa and Darrat (1995) - may be 
expressed as follows: 
MS =M (X, I-le , Rd, Rf, E) (3.10) 
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Where MS refers to the desired real broad money balances; x, ne , Rd, Rf 
and E are the non-oil real GDR, expected inflation rate5, domestic interest 
rates, foreign interest rates and the exchange rates, respectively. 
Theoretically, it is expected that MS be positively correlated with X, but 
negatively correlated Nýith the rest of the independent variables. A dummy 
variable taking account of CU formation will be taken up here and added 
to the right hand side of the model to measure the contribution made 
through GCC. 
3.4.5 Import Function 
As it was explained in the early part of this chapter, import fimctions have 
been commonly used to measure the extent of trade creation within an 
integrated area, and trade diversion in respect of the world. A simple 
import function may be given as: 
Mi =m (RP, E, Y) (3.11) 
where Mi is the country/region's non-oil imports from the other members 
of the GCC. RP, E and Y are index of relative prices, exchange rates and 
real GDP, respectively. Lower RP is expected to promote imports and so 
are higher real incomes and higher real exchange rates. So, we expect to 
obtain negative sign coefficient for RP and positive sign coefficients for 
the variables Y and E. A dwnmy variable will be introduced here to 
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measure the impact caused by GCC formation on trade creation. Equation 
(3.11) therefore measures the extent of GCC intra-trade over time. 
3.6 Data: Sources and Definitions 
The data used here are on annual basis running from 1970 to 1999. With 
the exception of Saudi Arabia, most macro data relating to GCC countries 
prior to 1970 are expected to be inconsistent and unreliable. As is typical 
in most developing economies, the GCC being of no exception, time series 
data on quarterly basis, if and when they exist, are of dubious quality. It is 
only recently that the GCC central banks and other data agencies have 
begun collecting and constructing quarterly data on some selected macro 
indicators. At micro level, the available sectoral/industrial data only go 
back to mid 1970s in most cases and these should be treated with caution. 
Several sources of data have been used in construction of our data set. 
The main source for macro indicators are the M Financial Statistics and 
the United Nations Annual Bulletin. In addition, central bank bulletins of 
each state as well as secondary source of Data-Stream have been 
examined and cross checked with the former sources. All the intra-GCC 
trade, consumer expenditure and two-digit production data are collected 
from National Accounts Statistics of respective countries. 
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Oman excepted, the data on real GDP and real non-oil GDP have been 
calculated on the basis of their respective price deflators. In the case of 
Oman, however, due to unavailability of consistent non-oil GDP deflator, 
CPI has been used to deflate the non-oil GDP data. The price inflation 
series are based on CPI in all cases. The data on exchange rates relate to 
the state's currency against a basket of three OECD currencies; namely the 
US Dollars, Japanese Yen, and Pound Sterling). The data on output, gross 
capital stock, labour input and real wages for the purpose of estimating 
production functions, and market inertia are based on the examination of 
four two-digit sectors' - (1) Food, Drink and Tobacco, (2) Oil and oil 
related activities, (3) Chemicals, and (4) other manufacturing products - in 
all the six states. For the purpose of estimating the money function, banks 
base rates have been used as a measure of domestic interest rates; whilst 
the average OECD base rates have been taken as a measure of the foreign 
interest rates. 
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ENDNOTES 
I. These include the following: 
(a) Free trade areas in which the member nations remove all trade impediments among themselves 
but retain freedom regarding their policies via-a-vis rest of the world; (b) Customs union which arc 
being very similar to free trade areas except that member nations must conduct and pursue common 
external commercial relations; (c) Common markets which arc customs union that also allow for 
factor mobility across national frontiers; (d) Complete economic unions which are common markets 
that ask for complete unification of monetary and fiscal policies; (c) Complete political integration 
where the participants form literally one nation, with one parliament and one nation's government. 
2. For example see Houthakkcr & Magee (1969), Mayes (1971), Verdoorn and Schwartz (1972) and 
Krcinin (1973). 
3. For the detailed historical evolution of capital mobility, see Brenton Mal (1998). 
4. The geometric illustration of such analyses are explored in Nfildc (1998, pp 462-5). 
5. The expected inflation rate was calculated by deducting the current inflation rates from the average 
long run inflation rate. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
TIME SERIES, ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION 
AND EVALUATION OF FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction: Time Series Properties 
Not until so long ago econometricians paid little attention to the 
specification of the dynamic structure of the time series. They had 
assumed that most time series economic data are non-stationary, that is 
they grow over time with non-constant variances, but have no effect on 
their empirical analyses. It was a great blow to traditional econometrics, 
when several time series based studies showed that statistics such as the t 
values, DW statistics, and measures of R-squared and F-statistics did not 
retain their conventional characteristics in the presence of non-stationary 
data. By definition, a series is referred to a stochastic process whose 
charactenstics are expected to change over time. In other words, such 
time varying series exhibit non-constant variance. 
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Moreover, these time series studies proved that running regressions with 
such data could produce spurious results (i. e. results which erroneously 
indicate, through misleading values of such statistics, that a meaningful 
relationship among the'regression variables exists). 
One consequence of such discoveries is that it has now become a common 
practice to test for non-stationarity of economic time series data prior to 
any econometric estimation. Thus, stationarity is an important 
characteristic of the stochastic processes that we attempt to model. In the 
case of economic time" series, as will be shown later on, first differencing 
would generate statiOnarity variables. However, as pointed out by 
Engle and Granger (1987), although first differencing may induce 
stationarity, first differenced regressions can also filter out long run 
information when the variables in levels are cointegrated. By 
definition, variables ate said to be cointegrated if they exhibit long run 
relationship. 
The process of arriving at stationarity is referred to as unit root test for 
non-stationary series. The unit root test proposed by Dickey-Fuller (1979) 
for stationarity postulates that most macro variables move over time with a 
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non-constant variance, making modelling a difficult task. Assume a 
variable X being modelled against time as: 
Xt =a+bt+ ut (4.1) 
where Ut = put -I + Et et - NID 
(0, CF2 (4.2) 
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1) and re-arranging gives the reduced fonn 
expression: 
Xt=(X+pt+yxt-l +F-t (4.3) 
In expression (4.3) if y--I, then X is said to be stationary of order I [i. e. X 
-1 (1)] that is: 
AXt = ct (4.4) 
With Ft being a white noise error term, AX will be a random walk variable 
with a finite variance. For any value of y less than unity, X will be 
stationary; while any value of y greater than unity will lead to an explosive 
variance of X. 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, on the other hand, tests the 
hypothesis that, in the general model, 
AXt =a+Pt+ Eyi Xt-i + st (4.5) 
yj == 1 for every lag of X. 
I 
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in short, m* the DF test the first difference of a variable is regressed on its 
own lag level, in addition to a drift and a detenninistic time trend, if 
required. In the ADF test lags on the dependent variable are included to 
ensure white noise errors. The test statistic in the DF and the ADF 
procedures is calculated ip the same way as to a t-ratio. However, due to 
the presence of non-normality, the corresponding critical values are not 
exactly Wistributed., and hence have been calculated and offered in Fuller 
(1976). 
The concept of cointegration follows from stationarity. Assume that there 
are two variables, X and Z, each being stationary of order 1. If there 
exists a linear combination so that 
Zt =a+b Xt + e, et - NID (0, cý ) (4.6) 
then X and Z are said to be cointegrated of order 1. In this case as 
developed by Engle and Granger (1987), a test for the presence of 
cointegration is performed by simply running an OLS regression of Z on X 
and subjecting the residual of equation (4.5) to a unit root test. In effect 
the cointegration test also involves a process of error correction! In 
general, variable Z could be regressed on k variables, producing a vector 
of k coefficients, better known as vector cointegration. In the spirit of 
Granger causality, in this case the cointegrating equation may not be 
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unique; that is other variables could also be regressed on Z and produce 
cointegrating equations. Following Hall (1986) and McMillin (1991), the 
optimal cointegrating equation is the one which maximizes the adjusted R- 
squared. The variables in question are said to be cointegrated if these 
residuals prove to be stationary. The residuals can then be tested using the 
DF and ADF tests procedure. 
However, if the findings suggest that there appear to be, generally, no such 
strong linear combinations amongst these variables, then one is led to 
adopt and apply the vector auto-regressive technique (VAR). This is 
because VAR is a system of simultaneous auto-regressive equations 
allowing for non-linear relationships amongst variables in a multi-variate 
sefting. A general form of an augmented VAR may be given as follows: 
Zt=ao+alt+E(DiZt-i+TXt +ut (4.7) 
where Z is an (m x 1) vector of jointly detennined dependent variables, 
and X is an (q x 1) vector of exogenous variables. Finally, the (m x 1) 
vector of disturbances, u, satisfies all the classical assumptions. 
Although the VAR technique is a reduced from procedure, it has several 
advantages over competing methods. As has been noted by Raynold et al 
(1991), the VAR technique imposes no spurious a priori constraints or 
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assumptions on variables, and hence allows the data to determine the 
model. Moreover, as has been pointed out by Fischer (1981), Runkle 
(1987) and Haffer and Shqehan (1991), since few restrictions are imposed 
on the way in which the system variables interact, the VAR appears to be 
well-suited for examination of the chwmels through which a variable 
operates. Nevertheless, economists tend to consider VAR as a last resort 
for modelling purposes since its atheoretical property is less appealing. 
Table 4.1 reports the results of unit root test based on one-period lag (all 
include time trend and the constant tenn) for all the variables for each and 
every GCC country. The values given in this table are equivalent of 
calculated student t test in level (L), first-differenced (A) and in second- 
differenced (A). If a variable is found to exhibit a calculated ADF value, 
say in level, larger than the critical value of Dickey-Fuller at the 5% 
significance, then the variable is said to be stationary at level; or to be 
integrated of order zero [1(0)]. As indicated by the test statistics for each 
variable, with the exception of money supply variable which exhibits 1(2) 
in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
is consistently rejected at the 5% expressed in first differenced. This 
would mean that the money demand function - equation (2.10) in Chapter 
Two - may exhibit no cointegration, as its independent variable is of 
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different level of integration. Moreover, as is usually anticipated, the price 
inflation variable, I-I, exhibits zero integration order. 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the cointegartion test for equations (3.7) 
to (3.11) for all the GCC economies. The Johansen test of cointegration 
here attempts to compare the size of the estimated LR against its critical 
values (nonnally at the 5% and the 11/6). Cointegrating hypothesis are 
rejected if the former estimates exceed their critical values. In the case of 
market inertia, consumption function and production function we have 
apPlied cointegration to four broad sectors of the GCC economies: Food, 
Beverages & Tobacco; Oil and related activities; Chemicals; and 
manufactured goods. A careful examination of Table 4.2 based on the LR 
tests suggest, with the exception of money demand equation for Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia, all other regression results are indicative of cointegration 
amongst relevant variables in the given equations, at various degrees .2 AS 
Table 4.2 suggests, cointegration results are indicative of the existence of 
two cointegrating equations amongst most models in different GCC 
countries. This finding seems to match, by and large, with most studies 
conducted in this area of research for the GCC economies. This would 
mean that the use of VAR technique is not to be required here. 
80 
4.2 Econometric Estimation: Procedures and Findings 
Having studied and examined the properties of our data, in this section we 
attempt to estimate our econometric models - given as equations (3.7) to 
(3.11) in Chapter Three - in conjunction with stationarity results and the 
cointegration residuals. As we can recall, with the exception of a few 
variables, most variables should be expressed in first differenced forin at 
this stage of estimation. In addition, in each equation there will appear a 
respective residual variable derived from the cointegrating equations. 
Following Darrat (1984) and AI-Mutawa & Daffat (1995), in the case of 
money demand equation for Saudi Arabia and Qatar where no 
cointegration. was- found, we propose to include a one-period lagged 
dependent variable to improve the precision of the estimators. 
As has been discussed elsewhere, our econometric estimation procedure 
here is based on two major tasks. First, we wish to estimate the equations 
over the entire sample period. Second, we wish to test whether there has 
been any significant structural changes since the introduction of GCC in 
1981. Given our limited size of observations, any test for structural 
change should be made with the use of appropriate dummy variables .3 
If 
the estimated coefficient of the dununy variable, in any given model, 
proves to be positive and statistically sigmficant, we can then argue that 
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the effect of the formation of GCC has improved conditions. We now 
proceed with the estimation procedures and the evaluation of the findings 
based on the order presented in Chapter Three. 
4.2.1 Estimated Market Inertia Eguation 
The aim here is to estimate mic as a measure of market inertia for the four 
sectors of the GCC states. The estimated equation (3.7) in conjunction 
with the error correction yielded meaningful and significant estimated 
coefficients for all the sectors of the GCC economies. On the basis of the 
estimated parameters a3 ýnd a4, the estimated mic for the four sectors are 
presented in Table 4.3. As the results suggest, Food & Beverages sector 
appears to exhibit the: lowest degree of market inertia in all the GCC 
countries compared with the other three sectors. As explained in Chapter 
Three on the issue of subsidies, it must be bome in mind that a large 
number of staple food are being heavily subsidised in most GCC 
countries. These distortions in prices may disturb the proper working of 
such markets, and hence the estimated low level of mic should be 
interpreted with caution. On the other hand, Oil and manufactured sectors 
give the highest estanates of mic. On the whole, UAE, Kuwait and 
Bahrain offer the lowest average estimates of mic, but not significantly 
different from the overD GCC average of 68%. The mic estimates though 
indicate some degrees of inertia in representative sectors of the GCC, they 
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are significantly lower than those observed in the European Union and in 
most other OECD countries. ' 
4.2.2 Estimated Consumption Functions 
In estimating the consumption function our aim is to find the size of MPC 
in the GCC countries and the contribution made to MPC as a result of the 
formation of GCC in 1981. In so doing, we need to introduce a dummy 
variable, taking zero values for the years 1970 to 1981 and unit values for 
1982 to 1998. There* are three ways of incorporating a dummy variable 
into a model: (a) through intercept term, (b) through the slope parameter 
5 
and (c) through both intercept and slope. Since we are interested in the 
estimate of mpc, we attempt, to include the dummy using method (b). The 
consumption fiaiction given as equation (3.8) can now be rewritten as: 
Alog(Ct) = Po + Pi Alog(Ydt) + P2 Alog(Rt)+ P3 rlt 
P4 Dt*Alog(Ydt) + 05 RESt-I + ct (4.8) 
Where D represents the GCC dummy and RES is the residual vector 
derived from the error correction mechanism through applying 
cointegration. As explained in Chapter Two, Yd, R and I-I are the real 
disposable income, market rate of interest and the price inflation, 
respectively. The Ps are the parameters to be estimated. The estimated 
value of Pi gives the size of mpc for the overall period (in isolation with 
the GCC formation) and P4 represents the size of the additional 
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contribution to mpc through GCC fonnation. If P4 is found to be positive 
and significantly different from zero, then we can say that the GCC 
formation has improved the size of mpc by as much as P4. For the 
estimation purpose, all the variables - rl, RESID and D excepted - are 
expressed in differenced fon-n. 
Table 4.4 presents the estimated consumption function - given as equation 
(4.8) - for the two classes of durables and non-durables in the six GCC 
6 
states. The estimated values of mpc, parameter Pi, varies between 0.412 
and 0.661 and are statistically significant in all the six states. With the 
exception of the Saudi Arabia, the estimated valuesOf 04indicate positive 
and statistically significant contribution to the conswnption pattern in the 
GCC. Those significant values Of 04 vary from as little as 0.207 in Qatar 
to as large as 0.421 in the UAE-1 On the whole the estimated parameters 
of 11 and R do comply with theoretical fi-amework and are generally 
significant in most cases. 8 The estimated parameter 05 indicates that in 
ahnost all cases the inclusion of the error correction residuals is fully 
justified. The overall goodness of fit of our estimated consumption 
functions is shown by the estimated R2 adjusted. Considering that our 
consumption functions being in differenced form, one should argue that the 
estimated R2 adjusted estimates are indicative of reasonably good fit. 
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4.2.3 Estimated Production Functions 
As discussed earlier in Chapter Three, the reason for estimating production 
functions here is primarily based on examining whether the formation of 
GCC has brought about any improvement in productivity in different 
sectors of these economics. Based on equation (3.9), our labour 
productivity model for the estimation purposes may be shown as follows: 
A109(Qt) ý CCO + Ctl AlOg(Wt) + a2 A109(Kt/Lt) +W Dt 
(X4 RESt-i + st (4.9) 
Here Q, W and K/L represent the average labour productivity, the real 
wage and the ratio of capital to labour, respectively? D is the dummy 
variable and RES is the estimated residuals derived from the cointegration 
procedure. Since the variables are expressed in logarithmic form, the as 
here represent the elasticity parameters relating the right-hand side 
variables to labour productivity. It can be argued that al+a2 represents 
the scale parameter giving the total contributions made by real wage and 
capital-labour substitution towards labour productivity; whereas a3 gives 
the additional contribution made to productivity through the GCC 
fonnation alone. Finally, F. is a white noise effor term. 
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The estimated equation (4.9) for four sectors of the six countries are 
offered in Table 4.5. A general examination of these findings suggests that 
the estimated W-ad usted values are indicative of reasonably good fit of j 
the estimated equations; and that most parameters are statistically 
significant. As expected, the estimated findings suggest that in the Oil and 
the Chemicals sectors the estimated parameter of KAL ratio represent 
higher magnitudes compared to those of other sectors of the GCC 
economies. In countries such as Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 
manufacturing sectors (sectors one and four) exhibit significant but less 
than unity scale parameters, whereas increasing returns to scale is 
observed in all sectors of the other economies. Of greater importance to 
us here is the examination of the estimated,, coefficient of the dummy 
variable. It can be generally noted that the estimated dummy coefficient 
indicates to the fact that the Oil and Chemicals sectors exhibit very small, 
and in most cases, insignificant values Of W, indicating that the GCC 
formation has hardly changed the productivity of these sectors. On the 
other hand, Oman excepted, the estimated coefficient of the dummy 
variable proves to be relatively high and significant in the other two 
sectors of the GCC ec: onomies. Food, Drink and Tobacco sector of the 
UAE and Bahrain appear to have received much greater contributions to 
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their productivity from the GCC formation than other sectors of these 
economies. 
In short, as Table 4.5 suggests, the contributions made to labour 
productivity through GCC forination appears to have benefited the 
manufactunng sectors of these economies much greater than their Oil and 
Chemicals sectors. Moreover, these findings also show that on the whole 
Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE appear to have benefited more productivity 
gains through GCC formation than others have. Finally, the estimated 
long-run elasticity of substitution (ES) for the GCC sectors suggest 
generally that oil and chemical sectors tend to have enjoyed greater factor 
elasticity than other sectors. This estimate varies in magnitude from as 
little as 0.345 in manufacturing sector in Qatar to as large as 2.092 in 
Saudi Arabia's chenucals. 
4.2.4 Estimated Money Demand Model 
The reason behind estimating money demand model, as explained earlier, 
is two folds. First, to determine which factors have given rise to demand 
for money in the GCC economies over the entire period; and second, to 
investigate whether the demand for money has changed significantly since 
the formation of the GCC in 1981. Based on the model of money demand 
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- expression (3.10) in Chapter Three - our specific money demand model 
may be given as: 
Alog(MSt) = yo+ yi Alog(Xt)+ y2 I-It+ y3 Alog(Rdt)+ 74 Alog(Rfi)+ 75 
Alog(Et)+ y6 Dt+ y7 RESt-1 + st (4.10) 
Where RES and D are the cointegrating residuals, and the GCC dummy 
variable, respectively. Variables, X, P, Rd, Rf and E are the non-oil real 
GDP, expected inflation rate, domestic interest rate (market rate of interest 
adopted here), foreign interest rates, and the exchange rates, respectively. 
The ys are the structural parameters of the money demand model to be 
estimated; and c is the usual white noise error. The other variables are the 
same as explained in Chapter Three. - It should be noted that apart from the 
inflation variable, 11, the other variables are in log-differenced fonn. 
The estimated results, given in Table 4.6, generally comply with the theory 
and offer reasonable fit based on W-adjusted for all the six countries. 
First of all, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Qatar which have 
exhibited no cointegration, it should be noted that the contribution of the 
error correction residuals, RES, appears to be significant in all other cases. 
Secondly, Kuwait excepted, in the other five countries the estimated 
coefficient of output - income elasticity of money demand - turned out to 
be positive and significant, vw*g between 18% and 46%. ThirdlY, with 
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the exception of Kuwait, inflation elasticity, Y2, proves to be negative and 
significant. Money demand in the UAE appears to be more sensitive to 
inflation than in the other GCC countries. Fourthly, the estimated findings 
for the coefficients of both domestic and foreign interest rates, y4 and y5 
respectively, give unclear picture. Whilst only Kuwait demonstrates 
meaningful and significant estimates for y4 and y5, the rest show less 
sensitivity to these domestic and foreign interest rates. Nevertheless, apart 
from Qatar, the other five countries give negative -though relatively small 
in magnitude- and significant estimates for the exchange rates variable. 
Finally, the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable, y6, shows that 
whilst the formation of GCC has made small and insignificant 
contributions in both Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti money markets, it has 
substantially enhanced the money demand in the remaining four countries, 
on average, by as much as 25%. 
4.2.5 Estimated Import Ftmction 
To demonstrate whether the formation of GCC has improved trade 
amongst members, w6 attempt to estimate an intra-GCC imports fimction 
over the entire period and allow for a dummY variable to take account of 
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the post GCC period. Based on equation (3.11), our intm-GCC aggregate 
imports function may be presented as: 
Alog(Mt) = 8o + 81 log(RPt) + 82 Alog(Et) + 83 Alog(Yt) + 84 Dt 
85 RESt-i + ct (4.11) 
where M is the real value of total imports of one member from the rest of 
the GCC. RP is the relative prices representing the ratio of a member's 
consumer price index to the average GCC's consumer price index. 10 The 
parameters 8s represent the elasticities relating factors to imports. The rest 
of the variables are the same as defmed in Chapter Two. The white noise 
error tenn is represented by ct. 
The estimated imports ftmction for each member of GCC is shown in 
Table 4.7. As the table indicates, the estimated relative price elasticity of 
imports is unexpectedly large and significantly different from zero in all 
the countries, indicating that despite the existence of CU in GCC, there 
still remains price differentials which form as a significant determinant of 
trade amongst the GCC members. As explained earlier, since we are 
examining the overall aggregate imports, theoretically, one expqýcts to see 
relative prices (here being the ratio of domestic price inflation to the 
average GCC price inflation) to become less significant as CU progresses 
towards removing all obstacles on trade amongst its members. However, 
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the evidence here suggests that the GCC has failed to reduce cost/price 
differentials amongst its members and hence such relative prices still 
remain significantly different from unity. 
On the other hand, the estimated coefficient of the exchange rates in four 
out of six countries is shown to be small and insignificant. TI-iis is due to 
the fact that the GCC's long run exchange rates have remained rather 
stable against a basket of OECD currencies. The estimated income 
elasticity of imports, 83, gives a clear indication of the importance and 
significance of income in determination of intra-GCC trade. As the 
estimated values of the coefficient of the dummy variable suggest, in only 
four countries have intra-trade improved rather significantly (on average 
around 0.4) since the formation of GCC. On the whole, as estimated intra- 
imports fimctions show, there appears to be rather limited evidence in 
support of trade improvement amongst the GCC members since formation 
of their CU. It should be noted that our imports models estimated here 
are based on total imports of on state from the others, and hence is subject 
to aggregation problem. Unfortunately due to lack of reliable data, we 
could not estimate our import functions for different types of 
products/services. 
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4.3 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has dealt with econometric estimation of the models 
explained in Chapter Three. To improve the degree of precision of our 
estimated results, we considered examining the time series properties of 
our variables using the hybrid unit root test for stationarity. 
Following from stationarity, it was argued that stationary variables of 
similar order may reveal long run equilibrium within a given econometric 
model. To that end, this chapter conducted tests for cointegration in all 
our models. The general finding was that in almost all cases there 
appeared to exist at least one cointegrating equation explaining long run 
relationship amongst variables within a given model. As the final 
estimation procedure, we included in our econometric models - given in 
Chapter Three - the cointegrating residuals to improve the degree of 
goodness of fit of our models. In general, most of our models exhibited 
both functional stability and meaningful statistical significance. 
The findings based on consumption behaviour are indicative of rather 
significant contributions to mpc through GCC formation. The estimated 
coefficient of the GCC dummy variables show that, on average, mpc has 
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been boosted by around 25% since the formation of GCC in 1981, giving 
an annual growth rate of nearly 1.5%. 
In so far as labour productivity is concerned, the estimated production 
P---- I nmctions suggest rather limited productivity gain being achieved through 
the CU formation. Pt: oductivity gains through capital-labour substitution 
proved to be more pronounced in oil and chemical sectors than other 
sectors of most GCC states. That fmding was further supported by the 
estimates of factor elasticity. 
The estimated money demand model has indicated that generally the GCC 
states' money markets are less prone to interest rates and rather more 
sensitive to their domestic inflation rates. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient of the dummy variable suggests that there is rather limited 
contributions made to money markets in the GCC through the CU 
formation. 
Finally, in examining the scale of trade creation through GCC formation 
we have estimated intra-GCC imports models for all the six states. Once 
again, the estimated results show that there has been a rather limited and 
less significant contributions made to intra-GCC trade through the CU 
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formation. In short, the size of trade creation is expected to have been 
rather small since the formation of GCC in 198 1. 
Endnotes 
1. Engle and Granger (1987) demonstrate that a system of cointegrated variables can be represented 
by a dynamic crror-coffection model, where residuals (lagged One period) is added to the model 
containing stationary variables. The coefficient of this cffor-coffcction rcflects the process by which 
the dependent variable adjusts in the short run to its long run position. 
2. We repeated the cointegration test based on a less powerful method suggested by Engle-Yoo, which 
exhibited rather unclear and inconclusive results in almost all cases. 
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3. The dummy variables are constructed so that they will take zero values for the period prior to 198 1, 
and unit values for the post 1981 period. 
4. For a thorough examination of the methodological background and the findings based on European 
economics' scctoral inertia see Bijongek ct al (1994). 
5. An estimation based on method (a) led to an insignificant shift cocfficicnt. 
6. Data for non-durables have been residually estimated by the author. There are no reliable data 
published on non-durables in the GCC countries. 
7. On the basis of simple multiplier, the inclusion of the GCC dummy, D, is seen to improve the 
multiplier by as little as 35% in the case of Qatar, and as much as 250% for the case of UAE. 
8. A test based on Kalmon Filter methodology was conducted to test whether P, is sensitive to 
movements in inflation and interest rates. The results were indicative of no significant relationship 
between these indicators. 
9. This function yields an elasticity of substitution (ES) which is non-linear in K/L ratio. For detailed 
derivation and uses of ES, see Taghavi (1983). 
10. Theoretically it can be argued here that as Customs Union moves towards removing cost 
differentials amongst member states, then the relative price ratio is expected to approach unity. This 
means that relative prices will then become less significant. 
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Table 4.1: Unit-Root Tests: Based on ADF Test 
GCC 1970-98 
Bahrain 
A2 
y -3.542 -4.091 * -4.998** 
p -1.453 -3.812* -5.012** 
ms -2.158 -3.802* -4.689* 
m -1.245 -3.802* -3.992* 
x -2.234 -3.993* -4.356* 
c -2.098 -3.891 * -4.213* 
R -2.001 -3.871 * -4.021 * 
E -1.788 -3.878* -4.481* 
ri -3.768* -6.321** -7.982** 
Kuwai 
A2 
y -3.341 -4.001* -4.810** 
p -2.513 -3.992* -4.912** 
ms -2.112 -2.909 -3.992* 
m -2.041 -3.992* -4.291 * 
x -2.131 -3.891 * -4.656** 
c -2.191 -3.993* -4.233* 
R -2.303 -3.878* -4.221** 
E -2.127 -3.901* -4.321** 
n -3.888* -5.214** -7.222** 
Onian 
A2 
y -3.354 -4.201* -4.810** 
p -2.413 -3.892* -4.516* 
ms -2.111 -3.867* -4.221 * 
m -2.246 -3.973* -4.391* 
x -2.333 -3.993* -4.856** 
c -2.295 -4.003* -4.733* 
R -2.205 -3.978* -4.521 * 
E -1.881 -3.803* -4.562* 
11 -4.128* -6.124** -7.999** 
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Table 4.1 continued 
Oatar 
A2 
y -2.345 -3.99 1* -4.825** 
p -1.153 -3.992* -6.112** 
ms -1.891 -3.782* -4.982** 
m -2.247 -3.982* -4.395* 
x -2.232 -3.998* -4.357* 
c -2.334 -3.873* -5.033** 
R -2.273 -3.918* -5.323** 
E -1.998 -3.972* -5.001** 
n -4.887** -6.244** -8.202** 
_SaudiArabia LA A2 
y -3.345 -4.05 1* -4.810** 
p -1.211 -4.452* -5.912** 
ms -2.112 -2.827 -3.981 * 
m -2.241 -3.987* -4.237* 
x -2.771 -3.961 * -4.613* 
c -2.295 -3.997* -4.504* 
R -2.213 -3.970* -4.345* 
E -1.919 -2.851 -3.879** 
ri -3.956* -5.414** -6.927** 
United Arab Emirates 
A2 
y -3.331 -4.111* -5.120** 
p -2.661 -3.997* -4.915** 
ms -1.897 -3.977* -4.619** 
m -2.991 -4.012* -5.546** 
x -2.167 -3.902* -4.116* 
c -2.201 -3.994* -4.698* 
R -2.038 -3.866* -4.422* 
E -2.211 -3.777* -4.656* 
ri -4.789** -7.145** -8.002** 
1% critical value =: ý-4.535 
5% crificavalue =>-3.674 
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Table 4.2: Johansen Cointegration Test: GCC 1970-98 
1. BAHRAIN 
Dgenvalue Likelihood M16 Critical 1% Critical Hypothetical 
Ratio Value Value number ofC. Es 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Market Inertia Equatio 
Sector One 
0.4456 35.12 29.68 35.65 none 
0.4654 16.15 15.41 20.04 at most I* 
0.2021 3.34 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Two 
0.5561 30.12 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3654 15.54 15.41 20.04 at most I* 
0.1102 2.87 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Three 
0.4591 16.30 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0987 1.89 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate 1 cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Four 
0.7517 57.01 47.21 54.46 none * 
0.5112 32.21 29.68 35.65 at most I* 
0.2877 18.98 15.41 20.04 at most 2* 
0.0776 3.04 3.76 6.65 at most 3 
LR tests indicate 3 cointegrating equati ons at 1%. 
f2MM2fiMjqjLafiM 
Durables 
0.5317 69.01 47.21 54.46 none 
0.5209 41.14 29.68 35.65 at most I 
0.3877 20.81 15.41 20.04 at most 2 
0.1187 3.35 3.76 6.65 at most 3 
LR tests indicate 3 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Non-Durables 
0.3212 16.09 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1043 2.98 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equations at 5%. 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Production Eguation 
Sector One 
0.5788 37.12 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3867 20.81 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.1087 3.35 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Two 
0.5561 30.12 29.68 35.65 none 
0.2654 18.15 15.41 20.04 at most I* 
0.0231 2.12 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Three 
0.3961 15.80 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1245 3.04 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 1%. 
Sector Four 
0.6317 22.01 15.41 20.04 none 
0.3112 3.21 3.76 6.65 at most 1 
LR tests indicate I cointcgrating equation at 1%. 
Mgney Equati(2n 
0.4324 57.44 47.21 54.46 none 
0.3372 42.22 29.68 35.65 at most I 
0.2109 19.99 15.41 20.04 at most 2 
0.0587 3.12 3.76 6.65 at most 3 
LR tests indicate 3 cointcgrating equations at 5%. 
impgrt&Equation 
0.5532 47.76 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3057 18.86 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.0987 2.98 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
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Table 4.2 continued 
2. KUWAIT 
Eigenvalue Likelihood -5% Critical 1% Critical Hypothetical 
Ratio Value Value number ofCEs 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Market Inertia Equatio 
Sector One 
0.4654 26.15 15.41 20.04 none 
0.2021 3.34 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Two 
0.5161 30.14 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3654 16.42 15.41 20.04 at most 
0.1032 2.87 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Three 
0.4393 16.50 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0897 1.99 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Four 
0.7517 57.01 47.21 54.46 none 
0.5112 32.21 29.68 35.65 at most I 
0.2877 18.98 15.41 20.04 at most 2 
0.0776 3.04 3.76 6.65 at most 3 
LR tests indicate 3 cointegrating equations at 1%. 
commPfiffligggim 
Durables 
0.6107 47.42 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3077 18.19 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.1187 2.54 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Non-Durables 
0.3452 16.09 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1004 2.84 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equations at 5%. 
agdýýý 
Sector One 
0.5788 37.12 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3867 21.12 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.1087 3.15 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Sector Two 
0.5160 32.25 29.68 35.65 none 
0.2654 16.52 15.41 20.04 at most I* 
0.0231 2.09 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Three 
0.3961 15.80 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1245 3.04 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 1%. 
Sector Four 
0.6317 22.01 15.41 20.04 none 
0.3112 3.21 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 1%. 
MM Eguatio 
0.5376 47.22 29.68 35.65 at most I 
0.2109 19.99 15.41 20.04 at most 2 
0.0587 3.12 3.76 6.65 at most 3 
LR tests indicate 3 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
impgrts Equation 
0.5734 47.99 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3057 17.62 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.0987 1.85 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
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Table 4.2 continued 
3. OMAN 
Eigenvalue Likelihood 5% Critical I% Critical Hypothetical 
Ratio 
------------------------------------ 
Value 
--------------------- 
Value 
------------------- 
number ofC. Es 
----------------------- 
Markct Inertia Eguatio 
Sector One 
0.4584 23.53 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1018 3.04 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate 1 cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Two 
0.5187 31.49 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3393 16.12 15.41 20.04 at most I* 
0.1103 2.98 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Three 
0.4296 16.33 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0897 2.09 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Four 
0.7416 56.17 47.21 54.46 none * 
0.5029 31.27 29.68 35.65 at most I* 
0.2767 17.83 15.41 20.04 at most 2* 
0.0676 2.94 3.76 6.65 at most 3 
LR tests indicate 3 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Cons mption Eguation 
Durables 
0.6077 17.93 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1377 2.79 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Non-Durables 
0.4426 16.39 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1107 3.14 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
production Eguation 
Sector One 
0.6871 19.23 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1072 3.15 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Sector Two 
0.6159 19.23 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0412 2.39 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate 1 cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Tbree 
0.5651 17.06 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1149 3.45 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegating equation at I%. 
Sector Four 
0.6472 28.16 15.41 20.04 none 
0.2123 3.61 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate 1 cointegrating equation at 1%. 
MgnZLEquafion 
0.6360 48.22 29.68 35.65 none ** 
0.2306 18.90 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.0873 3.26 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
im : s- Eouation 
0.5847 46.92 29.68 35.65 none ** 
0.3110 17.29 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.0897 2.05 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
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Table 4.2 continued 
QATAR 
Eigenvalue Likelihood 5% Critical 1% Critical Hypothetical 
Ratio 
------------------------------------ 
Value 
--------------------- 
Value 
------------------- 
number ofC. Es 
------------------------ 
Market Inertia Eguati 
Sector One 
0.4594 28.15 15.41 20.04 none 
0.2201 3.53 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Two 
0.5569 36.14 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3594 17.21 15.41 20.04 at most I* 
0.1238 2.99 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Three 
0.5330 17.09 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0797 2.08 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Four 
0.7517 57.01 47.21 54.46 none * 
0.5112 32.21 29.68 35.65 at most I* 
0.2877 18.98 15.41 20.04 at most 2* 
0.0776 3.04 3.76 6.65 at most 3 
LR tests indicate 3 cointe grating equations at 1%. 
Cons mpfigafaugim 
Durables 
0.6371 49.21 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3026 19.91 15.41 20.04 at most 1 
0.1073 2.94 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Non-Durables 
0.4450 18.01 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0949 2.94 3.76 6.65 at most 1 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equations at 5%. 
agdýýý 
Sector One 
0.5888 36.25 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3697 22.02 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.1087 3.45 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Sector Two 
0.5967 33.52 29.68 35.65 none 
0.2594 16.22 15.41 20.04 at most I* 
0.0338 2.78 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Three 
0.5916 15.90 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1146 3.48 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 1%. 
Sector Four 
0.6317 22.01 15.41 20.04 none 
0.3112 3.21 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate 1 cointcgrating equation at 1%. 
Mgna Equation 
0.3200 11.92 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0577 1.49 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate no cointcgrating equations at 5%. 
Lrnpgrts Eguati 
0.7070 19.29 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0987 2.85 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
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Table 4.2 continued 
5. SAUDIARABLk 
Eigenvalue Likelihood 5% Critical I% Critical Hypothetical 
Ratio 
------------------------------------ 
Value 
--------------------- 
Value 
------------------- 
number ofCEs 
--------------------- 
Market Inertia Equatio 
Sector One 
0.3549 14.15 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1919 3.39 3.76 6.65 at most 1 
LR tests indicate no cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Two 
0.5621 32.14 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3549 16.27 15.41 20.04 at most I* 
0.1032 2.99 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Three 
0.5339 16.90 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0897 2.07 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate 1 cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Four 
0.7129 38.21 29.68 35.65 none 
0.2478 16.08 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.0776 2.48 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegating equations at 1 %. 
fgnsum tion EE(Luation lit - 
Durables 
0.7079 47.28 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3076 16.95 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.1176 2.74 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Non-Durables 
0.5412 16.99 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1109 2.97 3.76 6.65 at most 1 
LR tests indicate 1 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
produotion Eguation 
Sector One 
0.5818 37.29 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3679 20.28 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.1007 3.25 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
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Table 4.2 continued 
Sector Two 
0.5620 33.52 29.68 35.65 none 
0.2054 15.52 15.41 20.04 at most I* 
0.0351 2.19 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector 
0.5532 33.33 29.68 35.65 none 
0.2912 15.70 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.1146 3.14 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 coint egrating equations at 1%. 
Sector Four 
0.6717 22.17 15.41 20.04 none 
0.2118 2.91 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 1%. 
Monný Eguation 
0.4706 14.02 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0109 2.13 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate no cointegrating equations at 5%. 
IpIp-orts EýLu_ation 
0.5704 47.91 29.68 35.65 none ** 
0.3072 17.02 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.0987 1.85 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
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Table 4.2 continued 
UAE 
Eigenvalue Likelihood 5% Critical I% 01tical Hypothetical 
Ratio 
-- ---- - ------------------------ 
Value 
--- - ---- ---- -- 
Value 
--------- --------- 
number ofCEs 
------------------------ 
Market Inertia Eguatio 
Sector One 
0.6054 28.25 15.41 20.04 none 
0.2013 3.40 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Two 
0.6054 18.42 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1135 2.37 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate 1 cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector Three 
0.4333 17.09 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0917 2.09 3.76 6.65 at most 1 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 5%. 
Sector 
0.7710 56.01 47.21 54.46 none * 
0.5010 30.19 29.68 35.65 at most I* 
0.2807 17.80 15.41 20.04 at most 2* 
0.0878 3.14 3.76 6.65 at most 3 
LR tests indicate 3 cointcgrating equations at 1%. 
commEfimimfim 
Durables 
0.6107 47.42 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3077 18.19 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.1187 2.54 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Non-Durables 
0.4859 19.99 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1107 2.94 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equations at 5%. 
agdýýý 
Sector One 
0.5780 37.12 29.68 35.65 none 
0.3697 21.12 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.1079 3.15 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
108 
Table 4.2 continued 
Sector Two 
0.6109 38.25 29.68 35.65 none 
0.2654 16.52 15.41 20.04 at most I* 
0.0231 2.09 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Sector Three 
0.4969 16.88 15.41 20.04 none 
0.1305 3.44 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 1%. 
Sector Four 
0.6407 23.51 15.41 20.04 none 
0.2912 3.31 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equation at 1%. 
Mo r Eguati 
0.5191 18.91 15.41 20.04 none 
0.0487 2.92 3.76 6.65 at most I 
LR tests indicate I cointegrating equations at 5%. 
Impgrts Eguatio 
0.7034 52.87 29.68 35.65 none 
0.2597 16.62 15.41 20.04 at most I 
0.0897 1.98 3.76 6.65 at most 2 
LR tests indicate 2 cointegrating equations at 5%. 
statistically significant at the 5% level 
statistically significant at the I% level 
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Table 4.4: Estimated Consumption Functions: GCC 1970-98 
Parameters 1? 2-adi 
Bahrain:. 
Durables 650.3* 0.453* -0.234* 0.043 0.321* -0.123* 0.542 
(12.32) (. 143) (. 013) (. 141) (. 098) (. 011) 
Non-Durables 432.1* 0.513* -0.011 -0.234* 0.145 -0.210* 0.488 (21.1) (. 174) (. 125) (. 021) (. 091) (. 087) 
Kuwait. 
Durables 870.1* 0.602* -1.031* -0.987* 0.211* 0.872* 0.632 
(90.2) (. 213) (. 234) (. 314) (. 052) (. 244) 
Non-Durables 910.2* 0.509* -0.876 -0.879* 0.302* 0.435* 0.612 
(98.2) (. 211) (. 563) (. 312) (. 022) (. 121) 
Oman., 
Durables 197.3* 0.412* -0.124 -0.665* 0.321* -0.321 0.553 (34.2) (. 122) (. 101) (. 143) (. 108) (. 198) 
Non-Durables 211.1* 0.501* -0.098 0.133 0.222* -0.422* 0.578 
(41.1) (. 101) (. 108) (. 107) (. 088) (. 116) 
Oatar : 
Durables 80.2* 0.456* 0.023 0.054 0.108 0.332* 0.444 
(13.32) (. 113) (. 044) (. 074) (. 099) (. 112) 
Non-Durables 77.7* 0.433* 0.044 0.077 0.207* 0.345* 0.462 
(19.9) (. 128) (. 041) (. 054) (. 082) (. 102) 
Sau ia ia: 
Durables 880.1* 0.568* -0.662* 0.066 0.101 -0.521* 0.678 (55.3) (. 219) (. 211) (. 078) (. 098) (. 231) 
Non-Durables 899.2* 0.664* -0.132 -0.786* 0.121 -0.423* 0.653 (62.2) (. 216) (. 112) (. 219) (. 099) (. 119) 
UAE- 
Durables 677.4* 0.512* -0.421* 0.221 0.401* 0.308* 0.712 
(33.3) (. 192) (. 088) (. 176) (. 134) (. 161) 
Non-Durables 890.1* 0.571* -0.134 -0.443* 0.308* 0.221 0.688 
(55.5) (. 209) (. 116) (. 208) (. 127) (. 197) 
Statistically sigftificant at the 5% level . 
III 
Table 4.5: Estimated Production Functions: GCC 1970-98 
Paramete ao ai q2 a3 a4 ES RI-adi 
Bahrain: 
Sector One 0.632 0.245* 0.167* 0.455* 0.442* 1.012 0.784 
(. 512) (. 045) (. 014) (. 211) (. 200) 
Sector Two 0.447 0.814* 0.547* 0.103 -0.602* 1.782 0.659 
(. 285) (. 203) (. 136) (. 124) (. 165) 
Sector Three 0.842* 0.651* 0.774* 0.156 0.512* 1.912 0.599 
(. 335) (. 213) (. 211) (. 091) (. 201) 
Sector Four 0.498* 0.385* 0.287* 0.287* 0.379* 0.765 0.659 
(. 181) (. 126) (. 086) (. 115) (. 142) 
Kuwait: 
Sector One 0.472 0.445* 0.710* 0.515* -0.343* 0.891 0.684 
(. 321) (. 151) (. 304) (. 222) (. 108) 
Sector Two 0.871* 0.644* 0.507* 0.013 -0.507* 1.023 0.759 
(. 358) (. 301) (. 161) (. 141) (. 225) 
Sector Three 1.422* 0.755* 0.684* 0.161 0.321* 1.334 0.609 
(. 425) (. 235) (. 233) (. 115) (. 108) 
Sector Four 0.584* 0.558* 0.579* 0.187 -0.479* 1.002 0.587 
(. 218) (. 164) (. 166) (. 151) (. 048) 
omanu 
Sector One 0.712* 0.545* 0.513* 0.115 -0.143 0.776 0.587 
(. 312) (. 252) (. 204) (. 122) (. 118) 
Sector Two 1.781* 0.543* 0.708* 0.123 -0.407* 1.221 0.719 
(. 458) (. 201) (. 313) (. 113) (. 125) 
Sector Three 0.444 0.525* 0.384 0.063 0.315* 1.766 0.622 
(. 225) (. 135) (. 231) (. 105) (. 118) 
Sector Four 0.854* 0.552* 0.279 0.189 -0.379 0.665 0.576 
(. 317) (. 204) (. 168) (. 141) (. 248) 
112 
Table 4.5 continued 
Qatar: 
Sector One 0.823 0.353* 0.267* 0.515* 0.142 0.704 0.584 
(. 412) (. 055) (. 094) (. 213) (. 114) 
Sector Two 0.873* 0.642* 0.457* -0.306* -0.421* 1.092 0.599 
(. 405) (. 232) (. 162) (. 122) (. 159) 
Sector Three 0.943* 0.715* 0.742* 0.256* 0.522* 1.066 0.691 
(. 325) (. 246) (. 313) (. 091) (. 201) 
Sector Four 0.918* 0.585* 0.477* 0.272* 0.294* 0.345 0.628 
(. 382) (. 216) (. 096) (. 112) (. 092) 
LI 
Saudi Arabia: 
Sector One 0.742* 0.545* 0.410 0.412* -0.443* 1.185 0.649 
(. 320) (. 167) (. 342) (. 122) (. 200) 
Sector Two 1.877* 0.648* 0.537* 0.219 -0.207* 1.982 0.793 
(. 558) (. 241) (. 197) (. 191) (. 105) 
Sector Three 1.242* 0.754* 0.604* 0.068 0.321* 2.092 0.694 
(. 529) (. 257) (. 223) (. 153) (. 118) 
Sector Four 0.844* 0.518* 0.592* 0.387* -0.578* 1.235 0.599 
(. 317) (. 197) (. 206) (. 147) (. 148) 
wý 
'*4 
UAE: 
Sector One 0.872 0.645* 0.777* 0.815* -0.435* 1.008 0.781 
(. 312) (. 251) (. 208) (. 312) (. 182) 
Sector Two 0.73 1* 0.699* 0.709* 0.019 0.578* 0.962 0.719 
(. 258) (. 209) (. 262) (. 121) (. 205) 
Sector Three 1.222* 0.555* 0.984* 0.461* 0.328* 1.211 0.667 
(. 514) (. 205) (. 323) (. 117) (. 111) 
Sector Four 0.814* 0.458* 0.598* 0.487* -0.179 1.201 0.684 
(. 317) (. 165) (. 264) (. 147) (. 148) 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level . 
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Table 4.6: Estimated Money demand Function: GCC 1970-98 
pgrameters 22 r-l 22 22 r4 22 r 6 22 
Bahrain 0.154 0.224* -0.301* -0.101 -0.085 -0.088* 0.215* -0.410* 0.701 
(. 101) (. 085) (. 108) (. 087) (. 077) (. 042) (. 102) (. 154) 
Kuwait 0.457* 0.178 -0.117 -0.324* -0.191* -0.102* 0.085 -0.338* 0.724 
(. 201) (. 121) (. 108) (. 119) (. 067) (. 033) (. 065) (. 114) 
Oman 0.557* 0.465* -0.241* -0.099 -0.151* -0.165* 0.313* -0.387* 0.647 
(. 217) (. 198) (. 069) (. 065) (. 054) (. 048) (. 111) (. 118) 
Qatar 0.157 0.451* -0.209* -0.164 -0.131 -0.088 0.304* -0.444* 0.601 
(. 121) (. 165) (. 101) (. 131) (. 099) (. 067) (. 134) (. 137) 
S. Arabia 0.101* 0.381* -0.288* -0.098 -0.157* -0.099* 0.057 -0.299* 0.611 
(. 042) (. 164) (. 115) (. 059) (. 077) (. 033) (. 038) (. 108) 
UAE 0.087* 0.365* -0.316* -0.078 -0.044 -0.091* 0.210* -0.218* 0.709 
(. 039) (. 121) (. 135) (. 049) (. 032) (. 041) (. 087) (. 101) 
* Statistically significant at the 5% lcvcl . 
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Table 4.7: Estimated Imports Function: GCC 1970-98 
Parameters 450 (51 (52 (53 & 455 R2 -adi 
BAHRAIN 
0.087 -0.821* 0.041 0.876* 0.365* -0.432* 0.765 
(. 055) (. 324) (. 044) (. 351) (. 102) (. 104) 
KUWAIT 
0.785* -0.758* 0.034 0.855* 0.124 -0.387* 0.676 
(. 217) (. 285) (. 022) (. 208) (. 084) (. 098) 
OMAN 
1.058* -0.774* 0.026 1.212* 0.512* 0.512* 0.698 
(. 245) (. 200) (. 029) (. 385) (. 109) (. 107) 
QATAR 
1.224* -0.955 0.068 1.205* 0.109 -0.357* 0.706 
(. 258) (. 312) (. 042) (. 267) (. 085) (. 099) 
SAUDI ARABI 
0.664 -0.697* 0.018 1.257* 0.524* -0.421* 0.699 
(. 441) (. 212) (. 044) (. 228) (. 089) (. 054) 
UAE 
0.138 -0.608* 0.071 1.099* 0.412* -0.385* 0.705 
(. 098) (. 201) (. 054) (. 286) (. 109) (. 114) 
* statistically significant at the 5% lcvcl. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
FORECASTING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF GCC: 
STRUCTURAL & BEHAVIOURAL MODELS 
I do not know which makes a man more conservative - 
to knowýnothing but the present, or nothing but the past. 
J. M. Kcyncs (1926) 
5.1 Introduction 
Although the derivation of reliable parameter estimates is often viewed as 
the primary goal of any econometric research, to many a goal of equal 
importance is the production of good economic forecasts. Based on the 
estimated models and'fffidings in Chapter Four, this chapter attempts to 
measure the future performance of the GCC under different set of 
assumptions and scenarios. 
Prior to elaborating the methodological issues and the derivation of such 
forecasts., it is important here to clarify few concepts. First, it is useftil to 
distinguish between two types of forecasting - ex post and ex ante. In 
terms of time series models, both forecasts predict values of a dependent 
variable beyond the time period in which the model is estimated. 
However, the ex post forecast is based on the period in which the values of 
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both dependent and independent variables are known with certainty. In 
short, ex post forecast is an extrapolated forecast based on a given model, 
providing a means of evaluating the extent of the goodness of the fit of the 
model. An ex ante forecast predicts values of the dependent variable 
beyond the estimation period, using values of independent variables which 
may or may not be Imown with certainty. This may depend on the nature 
of data or assumptions made on the way the future values of the 
independent variables may be determined. Although most forecasts 
invlove some forms of judgemental values, here we attempt to minimise 
such features and hence derive our forecasts based on econometric 
estimation procedures'. We do not deny the importance of strategic 
judgemental values in forecasting as has been elaborated by Makridakis & 
Gaba (1998: 6). Nevertheless, as has been noted by several reaserchers'. 
mere judgemental strategies may involve human errors and biases which 
could lead to darnaging consequences and mis-represented forecasts. 
Moreover, as has been pointed out by Holden et. al. (1990), although 
decision making on a subjective 'gut feeling' approach may appear to be 
more popular, there is strong evidence that the more formal approach 
based on rational 'objective' models gives better results. ' 
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Second, a distinction may also be made between conditional and 
unconditional forecasts. In an unconditional forecast, values for all the 
explanatory variables in the forecasting equation are known with certainty. 
On the other hand, in a conditional forecast, values for one or more 
explanatory variables are not known with certainty, so that the forecasts 
are conditional to guesses made on such explanatory variables. In 
conducting our forecasts for the GCC, our prediction, in the main, will be 
a conditional forecasting since the future values of our explanatory 
variables will be based upon a set of predetennined guesses/scenarios. In 
most cases, as shall be seen later, macro exogenous variables may be 
forecast on the basis, of autoregressive-moving average method or any 
other time series models. 
5.2 Forecasting: An Overview of Methodological Issues 
The assumption that all the ftiture values of the explanatory variables - in a 
given single equation - are known without error, appears to be unrealistic. 
One may intuitively expect that the stochastic nature of the predicted 
values of the X matrix will lead to forecasts of Y which are less reliable 
than in the case of known X. So, for the test of accuracy of the forecast, a 
series of forecast errors need to be measured. These issues will be 
considered later on. 
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In a general linear form, suppose the model 
y=Xa+e 
where y is a T* I column vector of dependent variable observations, X is a 
T*K matrix of independent variable observations, and e is a T*1 column 
vector of error terms satisýýing all the classical assumptions. Recall that 
the OLS estunate of a. shown as 0, is given by 
a= (X, X)-l X'Y (5.2) 
Suppose one has a new set of observations or even forecasts/guesses for 
the independent variables for period T+n, shown as X*. Assuming that 0 
remains unchanged over time, then the forecast for the dependent variable, 
yF for the entire n period will be given by 
YF , X* (5.3) 
with the forecast error of 
Y* - YF (5.4) 
where the actual values of y denoted by y* will be observed in future. 
Since the actual value of y., y*,, can be written as 
X* 9+e* (5.5) 
where e* is the actual value of the additive error tenn in the forecast 
period, we can then write the forecast error as: 
D=X* D+e*-X* 0 
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+X * 9-X * (X, X)-, ry (5.6) 
Substituting (5.1) into (5.6), we have 
0=+ X* 0- X*(X'X)-'X'(X a+ e) 
=e * -X * 'X -'X"e (5.7) 
Given that the additive eiTor terms are uncoffelated over time [E(ee*)= 0], 
and being homoskedastic [E(ee') = (: re2 I ], then the variance of the forecast 
error can be shown as 
22 -' X *111 C7f '-": CTe [I +X (X'X) (5.8) 
Equation (5.8) implies that the forecast variance depends on the variance 
of the independent variables in the forecast period. This is to say that the 
problem of finding the smallest possible forecast error variance is 
associated with a problem of constrained minimisation using the method of 
2 Lagrange multipliers. * In order to minimise af , one must minimise the 
matrix product on the right-hand side of equation (5.8) subject to X*I=1. 
The Lagrange procedure leads to minimum forecast error variance as' 
Min (Cy 2 )-= Cý (I + I/T) f (5.9) 
In equation (5.9) as T becomes infinitely large, the minimum forecast error 
variance approaches ýhe variance of the error tenn cý; implying that 
infinitely large sample size leads to estimated parameter values 
ap roaching the true parmneter values, so that the only source of forecast TP 
error is the additive error term. 
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Various measures have been proposed for assessing the predictive 
accuracy of forecasting models. Most of these measures are designed to 
evaluate ex post forecasts, that is, forecasts for which the exogenous 
variables do not have to be forecast. The two commonly used such 
measures are (a) root-mean-square error (RMSE) and (b) mean-absolute 
error (MAE), expressed as follows: 
RMSE = I/n 
ýZ02 (5.10) 
NME = I/n Z 10 1 
where n being the size of the forecast period. 
RMSE is the most popular type of 'quadratic loss function', measuring the 
square root of the average of the squared values of the forecast effors, 
which implicitly weights large forecast errors more heavily than small 
ones. This measure is appropriate to situations in which the cost of an 
error increases as the square of that error. Another version of this measure 
is referred to as root-mean-square percent error which simply measures the 
deviation of forecast variable from its actual time path, but relative to the 
actual values of the dependent variable. 
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MAE. on the other hand, measures the absolute values of the forecast 
errors, which may be misleading if large positive errors cancel out large 
negative errors giving a close to zero measure of MAE. Similarly, mean- 
absolute percent error measures the absolute error in relation to the actual 
values of the dependent variable. 
Whether using MAE or RMSE, there is no optimal size for forecast error. 
In a situation when two different models compared or the same model over 
two different periods examined, the correct procedure for establishing 
significant differences in forecast errors is by constrcting an F-statistic as a 
ratio of the two forecast errors: 
F- RMSEI / RMSE2 
In this case if the calculated F exceeds the value of F from the table, then 
this suggests that model 2 is significantly superior to model 1. 
It should be noted that it is entirely possible for an equation that has a very 
good statistical fit to have a very poor simulation fit. In a given estimated 
single equation, such an occuffence is quite likely since the true values of 
the estimated parameters may change even in the short/medium term. So, 
it is appropriate that a test of parameters stability be conducted prior to 
forecasting. In Chapter Four our estimators have all been subjected to 
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stability tests, so that our parameter estimators are expected to remain 
unchanged (or if any changes, these will be statistically insignificant) 
throughout our medium term forecasts. 
5.3 Scenarios and AssumPtions 
Although the quantitative forecasting methods is the main focus of this 
chapter, we are building some scenarios or alternative futures in an attempt 
to allow for uncertainty. As Armstrong (1985: 66) defines a scenario as 
4an account or story about a projected course of action in a possible 
enviromment' here our scenarios are based on as realistic as possible range 
of events which, by and large, have been experienced in the past. As has 
been argued by Holden et al (1991: 135) the intention of scenario building 
is that 'decision makers will be made aware of the inherent uncertainty in 
forecating, so that they will place less confidence in the possibility of any 
one outcome'. 
In order to build a coherent and consistent forecasts of our macro 
indicators, we offer some scenarios on a limited nwnber of the variables in 
our models, given in chapter three. These scenarios are primarily based 
either upon historical values of the variables or on some estimation 
procedure. Our general frwnework wifl be based on two broad scenarios: 
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boom and bust. As most GCC states are concemed, boom times may well 
be associated with higher (than expected) oil prices, leading to higher 
incomes, consumption and hence benefiting other sectors of the economy. 4 
On the other hand, bust periods may be associated with lower (than 
expected) oil prices leading to lower incomes, consumption, government 
spending. 
Depending on the length and the depth of a bust or a boom, these 
economies can be affected differently. For instance, if the oil prices fall 
dramatically and exhibit a medium term downward trend, then one would 
expect to observe acute pressures being exerted on the devaluation of the 
GCC currencies (in particular, against the Yen and the Euro) , 
leading to 
deficits in their balance of payments. 5 The direct effect of oil price 
movements can be seen in a careful examination of the relative prices, 
rather than inflation rates alone; as the latter consists of some small but 
nevertheless significant government subsidies. By the analysis made in 
Chapter Two, the higher the oil prices, the lower will be the relative prices 
and hence leading to improvements in the GCCIs balance of payments. 
This may or may not improve the extent of intra-trade in the GCC, as most 
states have yet to diversify significantly away from oil, hence to enhance 
5 
complementarity and increase their non-oil exports. 
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Ironically, as oil prices in the 1980s and the 1990s stablised/slowed down, 
the GCC on the whole managed to concentrate more heavily on their non- 
oil sectors. As shown in Chapter Two, the contribution of oil to GDP in 
the GCC states was halved between 1970 and 1995. Although a large 
proportion of this share has gone to oil related industries (fertilizers, 
pertochemicals, etc. ), the case for the 'reverse Dutch disease' has been 
verified. 6 Ideally, the fall in the share of oil should have been picked up by 
the traditional sectors of the economy of the GCC, but, as shown in 
Chapter Two, a significant proportion of the share has gone to the building 
and operational activities of oil-allied sectors. 
Although we have used a large number of variables and several models, in 
building our scenarios we only concentrate on four general cases. The 
four scenarios are as follows: 
(I) explanatory variables follow their past pattern; 
(II) oil price shocks; 
(III) US$ shocks; 
(IV) introducing income/corporation tax. 
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Under scenario (1) we assume the future values of some or all our 
explanatory variables are detennined on the basis of their past values. In 
this case we attempt to derive the forecast values of such explanatory 
variables in relation to the findings of the unit root tests shown in Chapter 
Three. For example, if a variable exhibits first-order stationarity, then the 
model upon which the forecasts are based will be of first-order 
autoregressive (ARl) nature. In capturing the error effects, we also 
incorporate a moving average (MA) part in our model. Since there are no 
seasonality effects in our models (annual data used), the appropriate model 
will be of autoregressive-integrated-moving average ARIMA (p, d, q); 
where p, d and q represent the AR, the differencing order and MA orders 
of the model. In elaborating this, suppose that variable X exhibits first 
order stationarity and we wish to forecast its future values based on 
ARIMA (1,1,1). This can'be shown by: 
Axt = ot +ßX, -, + y F, -, + F, 
Where 0 is expected not to be significantly different from one. In the light 
of estimated findings based on unit-root test- offered in Chapter Four - the 
above model tends to match more coherently with our requirement as in 
most cases l(l) was found to go our macro data. 
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Having derived the forecast values of explanatory variables in this way, we 
will then substitute them in their respective estimated models - 
expressions (4.7) to (4. lq) of Chapter Four- to get the forecast values of 
the dependent variables - here being consupintion (C), labour productivity 
money supply (MS) ýnd intra imports (M). 
Under scenario (II) it is assumed that, other things being equal, a shock in 
the oil price (via excess demand or excess supply) initially affecting the 
relative prices in the GCC and then causing different effects on the 
economy via our models. Here we assume three sub-scenarios: 
(a) oil shock caused by excess demand; 
(b) oil shock caused by excess supply; 
(c) no shock. 
In case (a) the sudden increase in demand pushes oil prices up which is 
expected to cause a boom in the GCC states (at least in the short run). in 
case (b) the sudden rise in supply of oil (or fall in demand) causes oil 
prices to fall and hence leýding to a bust (at least in the short run). In case 
(c) we assmne there are no significant oil shocks and hence oil prices 
move in line with their long run pattern. Case (c) is similar to scenario (1) 
where future oil pricesý follow a smooth ARMA structure. In other words, 
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case (c) is redundant here as it has already been taken into consideration 
under scenario (1). 
In scenario (111) we allow for shocks in US$ affecting the GCC economies. 
As established in Chapter Two, the GCC economies are very closely 
linked with US$ via petro-dollars. This is to say that the GCC currencies 
are Exed against US$ and hence any revaluation or devaluation of US$ 
against major currencies could have a directly significant effect on the 
GCC's trade with the rest of the world. Conversely, it can be argued that 
during the period of high oil prices when oil revenues (petro-dollars) have 
increased, the excess supply of US$ in international markets may lead to 
the lowering of the value of US$ and hence causing downward pressures 
on the GCC currencies against the rest of the world. Once again, three 
sub-scenarios may be established here: 
(a) depreciation of US$; 
(b) appreciation of US$; 
(c) no significant change in US$. 
As explained earlier, cases (a) and (b) can either be caused via significant 
changes in the price of oil or can be caused by a whole host of factors in 
international markets. In case (a) the lowering of the value of US$ against 
major currencies will have an adverse effect on the GCC imports from the 
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rest of the world, and hence may lead to improvements in intra-GCC 
trade. Any improvement in the value of US$ can have a positive impact 
on the GCC (at least in the short run) as imports from the rest of the world 
become cheaper. This, on the other hand, may have an adverse effect on 
the price of oil exchanged in US$. Moreover, this may lead to the 
lowering of incentive for intra-GCC trade, as trade with the rest of the 
world becomes economically more attractive. However, if these shocks 
have longer lasting effects on the economy, then intra-GCC trade would be 
affected, otherwise short-term one-off shocks may not necessarily lead to 
such drastic consequences. So, in applying our scenarios, we need to 
establish not only the extent of the shock, but also the duration of the 
shock. For example, the oil shock of the 1973 has been characterised by 
its massive extent (i. e. oil prices trebled within few months) and its long 
lasting effects as the oil prices increased or remain the same (in real terms) 
for several years afterwards. 
Under scenario (IV) we assume that the governments of the GCC 
eventually introduce some form of taxation, here assumed to be 
income/corporation tax. This will have direct effect on incomes, 
consumption and profits. Depending on the size of the multiplier, 
introduction of taxes is expected to lead to a general fall in both inter and 
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intra trade. Depending on the scale of income/corporation tax, adoption of 
this strategy may indeed reduce the attractiveness of working in the Gulf 
states for a large number of expatriates, particularly those nationals of the 
EU and the USA. The underlying reason behind this scenario is that as 
these states attempt to diversify away from oil their general oil revenues 
will be hanipered significantly and hence taxation would be the only 
alternative means of revenue generation available to them. 
5.4 Evaluation of the Findings 
The findings here are presented on the basis of the scenarios given earlier. 
In most cases the forecast margin of effor,, RMSE, fall between 0.25% and 
2%; however, if this measure exceeds the upper limit, it will be reported. 
5.4.1 Scenario I: ygýables follow past pattems 
I 
As explained earlier, under this scenario we derive the forecast values of 
our explanatory variables on the basis of APdMA models. Since most of 
our variables exhibit 'first order stationarity, the appropriate model for 
forecasting will be based on ARMA(1,1, q), with q taking different integers 
depending on the structure of the error terms inherent in our variables. 
The forecast period covers the II year between 2000 and 2010. 
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Table 5.1 presents the estimated results of our forecasts based on ARIMA 
and our structural equations shown in Chapter Three. As explained 
earlier, our explanatory variables (GDP; relative prices, RP; retail price 
index, 1-1) have been forecast on ARIMA and then incorporated into our 
equations to give estimated forecasts for our three dependent variables 
(consumer expenditure, C; intra-GCC imports, M; and money supply, 
MS). In Table 5.1 the forecasts are offered in average annual percentage 
rates for the given variables for each and every GCC member. The period 
1970-79 is shown to have been an inflationary period for all these 
countries (Bahrain and Kuwait somewhat excepted) as both money supply 
and price index have exhibited higher than their historic average growth 
rates. This has also been supported by higher GDP and consumption 
growth rates for the sarne period. Generally, the 1980s and 1990s have 
seen much lower rates of price inflation, money supply, GDP and. 
consumption, being very much in line with those observed in the OECD 
countries over the same period. In the 1980s the GCC countries have 
experienced significant improvements in their intra-trade, averaging at 
around 8-10 percent per annum. However, this growth has been slowed 
down significantly over the 1990s, where the average annual growth rate 
falls to around 1-2 percent. On the contrary, as shown in Chapter Two, 
over this period the GCC's international trade increased significantly. 
131 
The forecast period has been divided into two sub-periods of 2000-2005 
and 2006-2010. According to our forecasts, the GCC countries will 
expect to slow down in growth of GDP, retail price index, money supply 
and consumption. One important finding here is that in all cases, relative 
prices are forecast to fall significantly on annual basis, seemingly 
indicating that these countries will become more competitive at 
international markets. 7 As the relative prices here defined as the ratio of 
export prices (oil price used as a good proxy for the overall exports) to the 
import prices (the OECD industrial import index used), then the fall in 
relative prices may mean that either import prices are expected to rise or 
the crude oil price will fall in real tenns. An inspection of the relative 
prices has suggested that the fall in relative prices in the GCC (UAE 
excepted) may well be due to the latter. Figure 5.1 gives a historical price 
of crude oil agamst its forecast value for the period 1972-2010.11 As the 
forecasts suggest (based on a simple ARMA model) the oil prices are 
expected to fall and that will give rise to fall in relative prices as shown in 
Table 5.1. As the forecasts suggest, these countries will experience further 
deterioration in their intra-trade, as for the entire period the average annual 
growth rates plummit to as little as 2.5 percent. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE tend to exhibit much lower rates of growth in intra-trade than the 
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other three countries over the forecast period. Finally, the forecast period 
is indicative of lower rates of inflation and money supply for all the GCC 
countries, very much in line with the OECD. 
Fig 5.1: Crude Oil Price - Actual vs Forecast 
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5.4.2 Scenaio 11: Oil price shocks 
As mentioned earlier, under this scenario we examme two cases: (a) 
shocks caused by excess demand, hence pushing up oil pnces; and (b) 
shocks caused by excess supply, leading to a fall in oil prices. Both cases 
have been experienced by the GCC states in the past, and the outcomes on 
the economy proved to have been significant. The oil shock of the early 
1970s generated an unexpectedly massive wealth for the GCC states as the 
oil prices were quadrupled within a space of two years. Moreover, during 
the period 1979-1983, oil was priced at much higher rates than its historic 
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 
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average price. The oil prices dropped to around $12-$20 per barrel over 
the period 1985-1996, with a rather worrying adverse effect on the GCC 
economies as the Saudi economy, in particular, had to cope with a 
8 
constrained public budget. All can be said is that since the mid-1980s the 
GDP growth in the GCC has slowed down to that of the OECD level, as 
crude oil price is somewhat stabilised around its real historic average. So, 
it can be said that small changes in oil prices tend not to disturb these 
economies significantly in the short term but could cause more damaging 
effects as these adverse shocks prolong. 
To conduct our forecasts here, we make the following assumptions 
primarily in consideration of the historic oil price data since 1970: 
(i) the shock occurs in the beghming of the year 2000; 
world prices change one year after the shock; 
(iii) by a significant excess demand oil shock we refer to an increase in 
the price of crude oil by as much as 40%; 
(iv) by a significant excess supply oil shock we refer to a decrease in the 
price of crude oil by as much as 25%; 
(V) the shock will be of a one-off case and will last for one calender 
year; 
(vi) oil reserves have no effect on re-stablising the oil price; 
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(vii) we are only interested in effects of shocks on income and 
consumption; and 
(viii) there remains a long run relationship between GDP and the relative 
price. 10 
In consideration of the above assumptions, Tables 5.2 and 5.3 offer 
forecasts of relative price, GDP and consumption under the cases of 
excess demand and of excess supply shocks, respectively. Three main 
points need to be highlighted here. First, under assumption (ii), an 
increase in oil prices is expected to push up the industrial countries' prices 
in the next period, and that in the later years offiet relative prices in the 
GCC either partially or totally. Second, by assumptions (iii) and (iv), 
according to the past experiences, any rises in crude oil price of about 
40% and any falls in crude oil of around 25% can be regarded as highly 
significant in both improving or deteriorating the economies of GCC. 
Finally, the aim of estimating forecasts of GDP, relative price and 
consumption here is to investigate how long it would take the GCC 
economies to return to their initial equilibria following a significant oil 
shock. 
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A careful exan-unation of Table 5.2 reveals the following main points. 
First, in all cases, the relative prices decline between 2.9% (Oman) and 
4.3% (Saudi Arabia) over the forecast period 2000-02. Second, a 40% 
rise in the oil price leads to significant increases in both consumption and 
GDP in all the six countries. Over the forecast period 2000-02, 
conswription rises between 3.2% (Bahrain) and 12.2% (Qatar). GDP, 
however, does not rise as much; nevertheless Qatar experiences a 
staggering GDP growth of around 4.5%. Third, as the results based on 
forecast period 2003-05 show, in most cases, it takes both GDP and 
consumption nearly 3 years to return to their pre- shock growth patterns. 
As for the relative prices, there is no clear cut pattern: Bahrain and Oman 
exhibit rates in forecast period 2003-05 similar to those of pre-shock 
period; where the other four countries fail to return to their original rates. 
On average, however, the GCC exhibits a much lower growth rate in RP in 
2003-05 compared to the pre-shock period. 
An examination of Table 5.3 leads to the following conclusions. First, a 
25% fall in the price of oil leads to the worsening of relative prices in all 
GCC countries over the forecast period 2000-02 in the region of 1.4% - 
3.3%. Second, in all cases conswnption is seen to slow down significantly 
over the first two years, following the shock. The serious cases are 
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experienced by Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, as their pre-shock consumption 
annual growth rates of 6%-10% drops to 0.6%-2.2%. Third, GDP growth 
rates also fall dramatically following the shock in all countries. On 
average, the GCC's GDP growth rate of 2.1 % prior to the shock drops to 
a mere 1% over the forecast period 2000-02. Finally, with the exception 
of Kuwait and UAE, both GDP and consumption are shown to recover 
over the period 2003-05 in the other four countries. The relative prices, 
1DD 
IR, I in all cases shown to 
have improved over the forecast period 2003-05 
as the effect of the oil shock is seen to be fading out. 
On the whole, when considering the findings offered in both Tables 5.2 
and 5.31, it can be said that oil shocks of significant magnitudes can have 
serious impact on the GCC economies lasting up to two years. However, 
as the findings suggest, the effective life of such shocks may not exceed 3- 
years. 
5.4.3 Scenario III: US$ Shocks 
As discussed earlier, two sub scenarios can be thought of here: devaluation 
and revaluation of the US dollar. Since the GCC currencies are tightly tied 
with the US dollar, a 1% devaluation of the US$ is represented by a 1% 
devaluation in any GCC currencies. For paratical purposes here we 
consider one case only: US$ depreciates in value by 10%. The 
137 
assumption made here is that the once-and-for-all shock in the US$ has 
occurred in the beginning of the year 2000. Our main interest here is to 
examine how such a shock in the value of US$ would affect the growth 
rates of the member states and the GCC intra-trade. The forecasts are 
based on the use of the estimated imports function shown in Chapter Four 
as Table 4.7. 
Table 5.4 gives the results of forecasts on growth rate (GDP) and the 
intra-trade (M) when a shock of 10% drop in the value of US$ has 
occurred in the year 2000. Similar to Tables 5.2 and 5.3, in this Table we 
also take the period 1995-99 as our base period and 2000-02 and 2003-05 
as our two forecast periods. The findings in this Table may be interpreted 
as follows. First, all the GCC countries experience lower GDP growth 
following the shock. On average, a 10% fall in the value of US$ would 
lead the lowering of annual GDP growth by three folds in the first two 
years following the shock. Second, the fall in the US$ has varying effects 
on GCC intra trade, experienced by each member. Where Kuwait and 
Oman exhibit marked improvement in their intra. trade, the other members 
experience less significapt changes in their intra. trade. On average, 
however, as the findings suggest, a 10% fall in the US$ would lead to 50% 
annual increase in intra trade amongst the GCC members in the first two 
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years following the shock. Finally, with the exception of Kuwait, other 
members manage to return to their pre-shock growth rates over the 
forecast period 2003-05. This is to say that it will take the GCC members 
somewhere in the region of 34 years to return to their original equilibria 
following a fall of 10% in the US$. 
5.4.4 Scenario IV: Introduction of Income Tax 
As explained earlier, this scenario may appear to be politically 
undesirable, but it has been regarded as a viable option amongst many 
Middle Eastern economists. It has been argued that as the involvement the 
GCC governments in* social welfare programs have markedly increased 
over the past decade or so, then some form of socio-economic correction 
by a means of taxation seems unavoidable. Moreover, as the GCC states 
attempt to effectively diversify away from oil, it is expected that a sharp 
fall in government revenues may force these states to introduce some form 
of taxation as a substitute for oil revenue. 
Considering our estimated econometric models shown in Chapter Four, an 
introduction of income tax would directly reduce disposable incomes and 
consumer spending, and have knock on effects on output and profits. 
Here, based on our estimated consumption function, expression (4.8) and 
Table 4.4. we wish to forecast the future spending (C) and incomes (GDP) 
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as a result of introducing income tax of 10%, uniformally applied in all 
GCC states. Moreover, we wish to forecast the indirect effect of such 
taxation on GCC intra trade (M), using expression (4.10) and Table 4.7. 
The results of such forecasts are offered in Table 5.5. 
The fmdings in Table 5.5 may be summarized as follows. First, an 
introduction of income tax of 10% leads to fall in both incomes and 
consumption by as much as 5%-13% in the first two years after the shock, 
but continue to reduce output and consumption at lower rates. Oman and 
Qatar show much greater rates of decline in their consumption and GDP 
over the forecast period 2000-02 compared to the others. Second, intra 
trade has shown to deteriorate as incomes and consumption fall generally 
in the GCC, the rates of decline varies substantially from one member to 
another. Nevertheless, on average, the GCC intra, trade falls by as much 
as 8% per anntun over the forecast period 2000-02; then at slightly lower 
rate in the following years. 
On arriving at our estimated forecast values we have not measured the 
effects of such taxation on profits. Nevertheless, future values of GDP - 
as a measure of output - to a great extent embeds and includes loss of 
profits resulting from new taxes. 
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5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to measure the future 
perfonnance of the GCC under different conditions and scenarios. In 
achieving this objective, an overview of some relevant forecasting 
techniques was offered. In general, both conditional and unconditional 
types of forecasting were used. In conducting our forecasts four scenarios 
were set: (i) individual macro variables following their past pattern; (ii) 
forecasts in the presence of a significant oil shock; (iii) forecasts based on 
a significant shock to the US$; and (iv) forecasts based on the assumption 
that a fonn of incomekorporation tax being introduced. 
In conducting forecasts based on scenario (i) the auto-regressive integrated 
moving average (ARRVIA) model was applied. Of some important issues 
arising from this type of forecast was that, other thing equal, both GDP 
and inflation rates tend to fall gradually and that the GCC intra, trade 
plummet further in the long run. Both scenarios (ii) and (iii) should be 
treated as external shocks with rather varying impact on different members 
of the GCC. Under scenario (ii) we allowed the oil price to increase by 
40% and decline by 25%, as these values were set on the basis of the 
historical pattern of oil price since 1970. As shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, 
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such one-off oil shocks were found to have serious effects on the overall 
economy and could last for up to 3-4 years. In particular, both relative 
prices and GDP were found to be highly sensitive to such shocks. 
Under scenario (iii) we learnt that a one-off 10% drop in the value of US$ 
can markedly improve the GCC intra. trade somewhere in the region of 
30%-40%, but such shock can seriously reduce GDP growth over the first 
two years following the shock. Once again the effective life of such shocks 
was found to be as long as 2-4 years. Finally, under scenario (iv) we 
learnt that an introduction of 10% income tax could seriously lower GDP 
and consumption growth rates in the short term. The effectiveness of such 
tax will be less marked in the longer term. introduction of income tax was 
shown to be an effective decelerating factor in GCC intra, trade. 
In short, as the overall findings suggest, the one-off shocks can be 
effective in the short term*but in most cases lose effectiveness in the long 
run. Moreover, such shocks are not necessarily effective enough in 
creating sustained improvements in GCC intra trade. Some other forms of 
stimulation is needed in these economies in order that the said objective is 
fully achieved. Some certain aspects of such policies will be discussed in 
the final chapter. 
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Endnotes 
For cxample see MacGrcgor &Armstrong (1994), and Wcbby &O'Connor (1996). 
2. For a summary of different types of cconomic/business forecasting techniques, see Holden ct. al. 
(1990). 
3. For a detailed derivation of forecast error see Intriligator (1972). 
4. This may not always be true as higher oil prices may lead to the so-called 'Dutch disease' where 
one sector in the economy benefits at the expense of the other sectors. For further understanding 
of this concept see Looney (1990). 
The example given here does very much resemble the pcriods 1985-88 and 1990-94 where oil 
prices dropped well below the average historic value causing adverse effects on most GCC 
economies. 
6. As indicated in Chapter One, Bahrain has been the most successful GCC state in achieving this 
objective. 
7. In this case, depression in the leading sector (oil here) may create an environment where other 
sectors of the economy begin to develop or revitalise. In particular, see A]-Gaecd (199 1), and Al- 
Sabah (1988) for the expldnation and testing of the reverse Dutch disease. 
s. It must be noted that changes in oil prices may have significant effect on the relative prices here. 
Our forecasts here, however, assumes (in general) that oil price inflation will be slower than the 
non-oil sector's price index. 
See Saudi Arabia Country Profile, EW, 1997. 
10. In order to determine the direct impact of oil shocks on GDP, we ran a cointcgration test between 
GDP and the relative price. In all cases LR test indicated one cointcgrating equation at the 5% 
level. Consequently the long run GDP-relativc price claticity estimated to vary between -0.1 and 
-0.4. 
1. These findings are very much in line with other forecasts of crude oil prices conducted by 
different think tanks and forecast agencies. 
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TABLE 5.1: Annual Average Growth Rates of selected macro indicators 
Based on ARIMA models 
GCC States 1970 - 2010 
BATIRAIN 
GDP RP rI ms c m 
1970-79 14.7 2.4 5.2 1.1 14.3 32 
1980-89 0.3 -1.3 0.2 5.4 2.1 14 
1990-99 1.4 1.2 2.6 5.2 2.7 -2.6 
2000-05 -0.2 0.4 1.6 2.1 0.5 1.6 
2006-10 0.3 -0.8 0.6 1.1 0.7 11 
RMSE 0.89 2.23 1.22 1.87 1.23 1.23 
KLTWAI 
GDP RP rj ms c m 
1970-79 13.1 -0.4 1.2 28.2 27.7 18.1 
1980-89 1.2 0.2 -1.3 10.1 6.1 6.2 
1990-99 2.6 0.6 2.2 7.4 8.5 -2.1 
2000-05 1.2 -3.4 -1.2 -0.1 10.6 -0.2 
2006-10 1.2 -1.4 -0.6 -0.3 3.4 0.5 
RMSE 2.31 3.21 0.98 2.11 1.87 0.87 
OMAN 
GDP RP rI ms c m 
1970-79 1.6 1.4 15.7 21.2 12.7 38.2 
1980-89 2.2 -2.3 -1.9 18.3 10.1 11.1 
1990-99 1.9 1.2 0.9 4.3 9.5 2.8 
2000-05 0.9 -0.7 0.6 0.8 11.6 2.9 
2006-10 0.5 -0.8 0.5 0.9 3.4 0.5 
RMSE 1.39 0.91 0.48 1.99 2.17 1.07 
QATAR 
GDP RP MS c m 
1970-79 9.4 4.8 7.1 27.7 11.2 15.5 
1980-89 1.7 0.3 -0.5 10.2 8.1 21.5 
1990-99 1.3 1.0 1.3 4.5 12.0 7.7 
2000-05 1.3 -2.1 1.5 1.4 14.2 8.4 
2006-10 1.2 -1.1 0.6 0.8 6.4 3.5 
RMSE 3.09 1.98 0.98 2.09 1.87 2.07 
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S. ARABIA 
GDP RP 11 ms c m 
1970-79 13.2 4.3 5.6 57.4 69.6 8.5 
1980-89 -0.4 -4.1 -3.9 10.3 1.3 2.1 
1990-99 0.5 4.2 3.8 4.6 3.4 0.9 
2000-05 1.9 -2.7 2.6 1.8 1.6 0.5 
2006-10 1.5 -4.2 1.5 1.9 3.0 0.4 
RMSE 1.39 0.91 0.48 1.99 2.17 1.07 
UAE 
GDP RP rI ms c m 
1970-79 23.9 4.6 3.7 33.6 17.4 4.8 
1980-89 2.6 2.4 7.2 17.1 23.4 12.1 
1990-99 3.3 0.5 0.7 7.6 5.2 4.9 
2000-05 0.9 1.7 1.1 3.8 4.6 1.5 
2006-10 0.5 1.2 1.0 2.9 2.3 0.7 
RMSE 1.09 1.12 0.55 0.98 1.34 2.03 
GCC (arithmati c average) 
GDP RP rl ms c m 
2000-05 1.01 -1.13 1.11 1.63 7.18 2.45 
2006-10 0.86 -1.06 0.40 1.21 2.86 2.62 
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TABLE 5.2: Annual Average Growth Rates in selected macro indicators 
as a result of 40% increase in crude oil price 
GCC States 1995-2005 
BABRAIN 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 0.9 1.7 1.2 
2000-02 -3.3 3.2 2.8 
2003-05 0.9 1.3 0.9 
RMSE 0.77 1.33 0.57 
KUWAIT 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 0.8 6.6 2.5 
2000-02 -4.2 6.9 3.9 
2003-05 2.1 4.1 2.1 
RMSE 2.21 1.33 0.99 
OMAN 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 1.1 7.5 2.2 
2000-02 -2.9 8.2 3.5 
2003-05 1.8 5.8 2.1 
RMSE 0.88 1.55 1.09 
QATAR 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 1.4 10.2 2.1 
2000-02 -3.8 12.2 4.4 
2003-05 2.8 8.8 2.3 
RMSE 1.33 1.22 2.38 
S. ARABIA 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 3.6 2.8 0.9 
2000-02 -4.3 3.8 2.1 
2003-05 2.1 2.2 1.1 
RMSE 1.07 1.43 0.99 
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UAE 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 0.8 3.8 3.1 
2000-02 -3.3 4.7 4.3 
2003-05 -1.3 3.9 2.9 
RMSE 1.41 1.02 0.89 
GCC (arithmatic mean) 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 2.3 5.2 2.1 
2000-02 -2.6 6.7 3.4 
2003-05 1.2 3.8 3.7 
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TABLE 5.3: Annual Average Growth Rates in selected macro indicators 
as a result of 25% decrease in crude oil price 
GCC States 1995-2005 
BAHRAIN 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 0.9 1.7 1.2 
2000-02 1.4 0.8 0.7 
2003-05 -1.1 0.9 1.2 
RMSE 0.87 1.12 0.66 
KUWAIT 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 0.8 6.6 2.5 
2000-02 1.5 0.7 0.3 
2003-05 0.4 3.2 1.2 
RMSE 1.55 1.04 0.87 
0 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 1.1 7.5 2.2 
2000-02 2.7 0.6 -0.7 
2003-05 0.9 2.8 1.7 
RMSE 1.38 1.43 1.87 
QATAR 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 1.4 10.2 2.1 
2000-02 3.3 2.2 1.6 
2003-05 0.5 5.5 3.4 
RMSE 1.21 1.87 1.82 
S. ARABI 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 3.6 2.8 0.9 
2000-02 3.2 1.1 0.7 
2003-05 -0.9 3.1 1.6 
RMSE 1.27 1.33 1.11 
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UAE 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 0.8 3.8 3.1 
2000-02 3.1 1.7 1.0 
2003-05 -0.7 2.7 1.8 
RMSE 1.18 1.21 0.91 
GCC (arithmatic mean) 
RP c GDP 
1995-99 2.3 5.2 2.1 
2000-02 2.6 1.2 1.2 
2003-05 -0.2 3.1 1.6 
a 
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TABLE 5.4: Annual Average Growth Rates in selected macro indicators 
as a result of 10% fall in US$ 
GCC States 1990-2005 
BAHRAIN 
GDP m 
1990-99 1.4 -2.6 
2000-02 0.8 -1.1 
2003-05 1.2 -2.0 
RMSE 0.88 1.27 
KUWAIT 
GDP m 
1990-99 2.6 -2.1 
2000-02 0.9 0.5 
2003-05 1.5 -0.8 
RMSE 1.58 1.41 
OMAN 
GDP m 
1990-99 1.9 2.8 
2000-02 0.6 3.4 
2003-05 1.3 3.1 
RMSE 1.55 1.46 
OAT 
GDP m 
1990-99 1.3 7.7 
2000-02 0.7 7.9 
2003-05 1.2 7.5 
RMSE 0.99 1.08 
S. ARABIA 
GDP m 
1990-99 0.5 0.9 
2000-02 -0.7 1.2 
2003-05 0.8 1.2 
RMSE 1.12 1.09 
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UAE 
GDP M 
1990-99 3.3 4.9 
2000-02 1.8 5.1 
2003-05 2.9 5.0 
RMSE 1.07 1.22 
GCC (arithmatic mean) 
GDP M 
1990-99 1.8 2.1 
2000-02 0.5 3.1 
2003-05 1.5 2.6 
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TABLE 5.5: Annual Average Growth Rates in selected macro indicators 
as a result of introduction of 10% income tax 
GCC States 1990-2005 
BAHRAIN 
c GDP m 
1990-99 2.7 1.4 -2.6 2000-02 2.5 1.2 -3.0 2003-05 2.4 1.1 -2.8 
RMSE 1.44 1.52 1.25 
KUWAIT 
c GDP m 
1990-99 8.5 2.6 -2.1 
2000-02 8.0 2.2 -2.4 
2003-05 7.9 2.0 -2.6 
RMSE 1.87 1.54 1.64 
om 
c GDP m 
1990-99 9.5 1.9 2.8 
2000-02 8.1 1.5 1.9 
2003-05 6.5 1.4 1.5 
RMSE 1.08 1.12 0.89 
QATAR 
c GDP m 
1990-99 12.0 1.3 7.7 
2000-02 10.8 0.9 6.5 
2003-05 10.4 0.8 6.2 
RMSE 1.05 1.24 1.54 
S. ARABIA 
c GDP m 
1990-99 3.4 0.5 0.9 
2000-02 3.0 0.4 0.6 
2003-05 2.8 0.4 0.5 
RMSE 0.88 0.76 1.02 
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UAE 
c GDP M 
1990-99 5.2 3.3 4.9 
2000-02 4.8 2.9 4.2 
2003-05 4.6 2.6 4.0 
RMSE 1.21 1.65 1.61 
GCC (arithmatic mean) 
c GDP M 
1990-99 6.7 1.8 2.1 
2000-02 6.2 1.5 1.4 
2003-05 5.9 1.4 1.1 
CHAPTER SIX 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: CURRENT AND FUTURE 
PROSPECTS 
6.1 Introduction 
Since its establishment in 1981, most Middle Eastern regional economists 
have been wondering what form of economic integration would the GCC 
ultimately arrive at. , As discussed earlier, a dominant thesis on the 
formation of GCC places a significant emphasis on the strategic political 
dimension of the GCC., arguing that formation of GCC has been to create 
a strong political front against possible military aggressions by either Iran 
or Iraq on the southern Gulf states. According to this thesis, therefore, 
any initial economic benefits accrued from such a formation is either non- 
existent or limited. Moreover, according to this hypothesis, any future 
economic gains/developments derived from such a formation may only 
be the spill-over effects of a political union amongst few small 
economies. ' 
As has been argued earlier, despite lack of complemenarity amongst these 
economies, some form of economic integration appears to be beneficial 
for such states. This is because there are similarities in language, culture 
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and socio-political backgrounds that form a solid foundation upon which 
the peoples of these states may interact. A good example of such a union 
amongst southern Gulf states took place in 1971 when the seven 
Sheikhdoms (including Dubai and Abu Dhabi) formed a fiill economic 
union of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE enjoys a single 
currency (Dirham) and a central bank which controls the overall 
monetary policy. The President resides in Abu Dhabi (the capital city) 
and the Vice-President in Dubai. The Parliament is formed on the basis 
of the proportional representation of the peoples of these seven 
sheikhdoms. Major government offices and activities are placed in Abu 
Dhabi whilst trade and light manufacturing is centred. around Dubai and 
other smaller sheikhdoms. The success of the UAE over the past few 
decades, according to some Arab economists, has been a driving force 
behind the idea of formation of a larger economic community with Saudi 
Arabia acting as the leader. 
As has been demonstrated in the earlier chapters, 2 to date the economic 
successes of the GCC has been rather limited: intra trade has grown 
slowly; diversification away from oil though successfully achieved by 
Bahrain and the UAE,, it has been slow for Saudi Arabia and other states; 
and finally tariff unification and setting up customs laws is not fully 
completed after nearly two decades of debates and discussions. 
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In the earlier chapters we have investigated the performance of the GCC 
mainly in the light of examining some major macro indicators. In this 
chapter, however, we aim to investigate broadly on some fundamental 
factors determining strengths and weaknesses of the GCC from different 
economic and socio-political angles. Examination of this kind may 
enable us to identify areas in which the GCC can eliminate its weaknesses 
and hence enhance its strengths. 
6.2 Socio-Political Factors 
There remain a large number of factors giving rise to some form of socio- 
political problems in so far as GCC is concerned. Fortunately, a smaller 
and hence less significant number of such factors are external and hence 
outside direct control of the GCC members. First and the most prominent 
external factor lies on the question of leadership in Iraq and its potential 
threat to the region. Both Saudis and Kuwaitis are particularly sensitive 
to Iraq and have so many times openly criticised Saddam. Hussein and 
have urged the Iraqi people to overthrow the Baath regime. Secondly, the 
recent developments and liberalisation. in Iran has meant that to most 
GCC members the Islamic Republic of Iran is no longer of any potential 
threat to their livelihood. The recent visits of President Rafsanjani of Iran 
to Saudi Arabia and the UAE has further improved both political and 
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economic relations of these neighbouring Gulf states. Thirdly, although 
the GCC states have no direct involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
the recent disturbances between Israel and Palestine has led Saudis as 
well as other GCC me; mbers to openly criticise the US peace process in 
the Middle East. 
A large and significant number of problematic factors are internal and 
mostly relate to Saudi Arabia. Whilst other GCC countries have made 
positive efforts in opening up their economies and enhance political 
participation, Saudis have been very slow to political and democratic 
changes. This is mainly because the Saudis regard themselves as the 
leading force in the Islamic world and hence any sudden dramatic change 
away from the Islamic sharia could deeply j eopardise their domestic and 
international stance. 4 Moreover, as Saudis are rapidly developing and 
favouring their domestic industries, they have been most reluctant in 
complying with removal of all customs duties amongst GCC members. 
This form of protectionism has led to further division amongst the GCC 
members. According to the EIU estimates, the Saudis are at least twice 
as protective as the other GCC states and that has made setting up 
5 
common external tariffs an extremely difficult task. 
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6.2.1 Saudi Arabia: in search of a delicate balance 
Saudi Arabia has been governed by an absolute monarchy since 1932. 
King Faisal who resumed power in 1964 is regarded as the leader of the 
modem Saudi Arabia' When the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war broke 
out the US continued to give financial support to Israel, in retaliation 
Saudi Arabia led the other Arab petroleum producing states to cut off oil 
sales to the US and other Western countries. Later in 1974, the US and 
Saudi Arabia signed an economic and military co-operation agreement 
which guaranteed the kingdom support in return for uninterrupted oil 
supplies. 
The domestic politics is centred around three pillars: (i) the Council of 
Ministers; (ii) the Basic Law; and (iii) the Consultative Council. The 
Council of Ministers holds both legislative and executive power. 
Nfinisters are appointed by, and accountable to, the king, who can veto 
any of the council's decisions within 30 days. The Council members are 
chosen from the royal family or close relatives. The Basic Law, 
established in 1992, is the closest approximation to a written constitution, 
apart from the Islamic sharia law, which is considered to be the ultimate 
arbiter of government and state affairs. The Basic Law is divided into 
five main chapters: monarchy; the Saudi family; economic principles; the 
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authorities of the state; and financial affairs. Finally, the Consultative 
Council is similar to the house of representatives but with a major 
difference: the 90 representatives are not elected but appointed by the 
king to serve for four years. Most of the members continue to be current 
or former senior government officials and highly educated individuals 
closely associated with tribal leaders. The council has only an advisory 
function, and its decisions and recommendations are accepted only if they 
comply with those of the Council of Ministers and the king. The council 
may require the king's approval for access to government/official 
documents. In addition, the recent move in establishing of 13 regional 
councils, headed by r6gional governors, has given some, though limited, 
autonomy to the highly populated regions. A large proportion of seats on 
the regional councils, allocated by the king, has gone to local tribal 
leaders and members of prominent merchant families. 
Although Saudi Arabia remains an absolute monarchy, the royal family 
tries to govern by consensus. The ruling family is aware of political 
opposition from various religious elements, liberal business elite, western 
educated citizens, foreign workers, and other politically motivated 
citizens. Amongst the religious factions, the Islamist opposition is the 
most powerful threat to the ruling family. The government anticipates 
that the religious establishment to support its major policy decisions and 
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also expects that the religious leaders and religious scholars can keep the 
more radical clergy under control. The Gulf war in 1991 and 
consequently a greater presence of the US and European forces in Saudi 
Arabia, has led to ever increasing vociferousness of the Islamist 
opposition. It is believed that the two bombing incidences in 1995 and 
1996 near US military bases in Saudi Arabia may have been orchestrated 
and conducted by the Islamist and other religious minority. 7 
Lack of trust and understanding between the Sunni government and the 
Shia minority' has left the latter group deprived from benefits of the oil 
revenue for many years. The tension between the two sects have been 
further intensified folllowing the 1996 bombing, though there has been no 
arrest in connection wit it. 
Western educated businessmen have emerged as the main advocates of 
liberal reforms in the kingdom. Generally, their criticisms of the royal 
family are muted, seen as compromised by their profitable involvement in 
the current economic system. There remains a continued resentment at 
the extent of corruption within the royal family and the privileges enjoyed 
by many junior princes, especially when this spills over into lucrative 
commercial contracts resulting in loss of businesses to the business 
community. 
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On the international front, the US-Saudi relations are primarily based on 
the need of the US for Saudi oil, and the Saudi's need for protection from 
both internal and external enemies. This kind of relationship, therefore, is 
regarded by many members of the government as a mutually dependent 
relationship, helping ease a variety of disagreements - most significantly, 
differing views on Israel. Despite such a close relationship, in many 
occasions the US Congress has blocked sales of advanced US weaponry 
to the kingdom in the fear that it could be used against Israel. 9 
Historically, there has always been warm relations between the kingdom 
and most members of the European Union. As discussed earlier, the 
relations with Iran has improved significantly since the late 1990s, 
enabling the two countries to enter into a multi-dimensional dialogue on 
several political and economic issues. 
Given its size, its political stance, its military capability and its economic 
and strategic importance, Saudi Arabia can and should be regarded as the 
leading force in the GCC. The speed at which the GCC can enter new 
phases of development does very much depend on the propensity and the 
extent of eagerness of the Saudis towards some structural changes 
outlined above. 
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6.2.2 Other Political Issues 
From the OECD point of view, all the GCC states may be regarded as 
non-democratic: there are literally no political parties and lience no 
general elections in these states and a combination of the ruling family or 
powerful ministers control the economy. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the 
king is the supreme power, whereas in the case of UAE, a combination of 
the Federal National Council and the Council of Ministers to some extent 
limit the power of the President. The potential source of internal political 
problems in most of these states has very little to do with their citizens, 
but relates mainly to the question of succession and the ruling interest 
groups. In Saudi Arabia. the next in line to the throne is Crown Prince 
Abdullah who is already in his mid-70s. If Prince Abdullah were to die 
in power, the next in line would be Prince Sultan who is also in his 70s. 
Sultan would, in turn,, be succeeded by one of his brothers whom are 
already in their late 60s and early 70s. The kingdom, therefore, is being 
led by a succession of elderly rulers. The rivalry amongst all those 2000 
Saudi princes can be intensified once there is no clear mechanism for 
establishing seniority in the Saudi royal family. 
Moreover, the question of ruling families and their future roles in Bahrain 
and Kuwait is rather complicated, as the liberal elements in these states 
have already demanded for more fundamental democratic changes. The 
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question of future presidency and distribution of power in the UAE can 
also be quite problematic as there still remains some form of political 
and economic rivalry amongst the emirates - more significantly between 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai. 
On the question of GCC leadership, though no genuine contest has been 
demonstrated against the Saudis, the UAE has always claimed to have 
been on the forefront of GCC formation through different economic 
reforms. There is also a tension amongst the smaller states as there 
appears to be a Saudi-Kuwait-Bahrain axis emerging within the GCC. 
This was clearly pronounced during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait when 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia gave full support to Kuwait, whereas the other 
GCC states remained rather neutral towards Iraq. As well as differing 
approaches to foreign affairs, military co-operation amongst the GCC 
states has also been limited, as the integrated GCC defence force has been 
under discussion for some time. Saudi Arabia can play an important role 
in the integrated GCC defence as her total military force of 105000 
represents well over 70% of the total force of the GCC. 10 
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6.3 Economic Factors 
A large number of economic factors and indicators have been already 
examined in Chapter Two. Here we highlight a rather limited but 
important number of economic factors relevant to the question of GCC 
integration. Moreover, a number of recent developments will also be 
discussed here. 
6.3.1 Infrastructure and Resources 
The most recent estimate indicates that the overall population of the GCC 
stands around 27 million, of which 20 million live in Saudi Arabia. " The 
population is extremely young: 45% under the age of 15 years; 35% 
between 15-39 years and- only 20% over 40, years. Significant efforts 
have been made to settle the nomads and to encourage them into farming 
activities. Currently, the population of nomads stands about 8%-10% of 
the total population of GCC. 12 
A considerable emphasis has been made in the GCC governments' plans 
on improving education. For example, in the 2000 budget, the Saudi 
government has allocated 27% of total expenditure to education, 
representing an increase of 15%. 13 In the other GCC states, according to 
1998 estimates, education has been given the highest priority: the pupil- 
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to-teacher ratio in the overall GCC stands around 15 pupils per teacher 
and that being one of the best performing in the world. 
Health provision and health facilities are generally financed by the 
government in the GCC and currently represent around 12% of total 
expenditure, an increase of 2% in real tenn. In Saudi Arabia alone there 
are nearly 300 hospitals and 2000 primary health centres, enabling 98% 
of the population to 'gain access to these facilities. 14 The ratio of 
population-to-doctor/nurse in the GCC is expected to be around 800, one 
of the lowest in the world. 15 
On transport and communication, road, building and other infrastructure 
programmes have been given priority in all GCC countries over the past 
20 years. There are 14 international airports (handling up to 50 million 
passengers a year) and several seaports in the GCC, mostly located in 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. With the exception of the UAE, 
telecommunication is a fully state-controlled business. Major capacity 
expansion has been under construction in all areas of telecommunication. 
Mobile phone penetration rate in the GCC of around 75% is one of the 
highest in the world. Internet service is now available to public in all 
GCC states. 
16 
165 
6.3.2 Labour Market 
The labour market in GCC is unique in the world in that around 60% of 
its total labour force being non-indigenous. Of the 3.5 million foreign 
workers in the GCC, between 45-55 percent are being engaged in 
activities relating to construction, manufacturing/trade or agriculture. On 
the other hand, of the 2.5 million indigenous work force, nearly 60% are 
employed in the public sector, and only 4-6 percent are engaged in 
manufacturing/construction works. 17 Owing to the fact that economic 
expansion may not be sufficient to absorb the growing labour force of 
GCC nationals, some GCC governments are already making efforts to 
curb the number of expatriates. In some cases this may include the 
deportation of 'overstayers' so that new jobs are filled by the nationals. 18 
Naturally, the Saudis are extremely concerned about this potential 
problem, and have consequently implemented a series of policies at 
curbing the number of foreign workers. This process is referred to as 
'Saudisation' - in the other five states referred to as localisation' - and 
has been brought in the 1995 budget raised the administrative expense of 
recruiting expatriates: work permit and visas fees were increased from 
$95 to nearly $450. Resolution No. 50 issued in 1996 required any 
establishment with 20 or more employees to Saudise at the minimum rate 
of 5% per annum. This target was raised later by 10%. The issue of 
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Saudisation has been clearly defined and elaborated in the Sixth 
Development Plan (1995-99) of Saudi Arabia, as shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Saudisation Target in Sixth Development Plan 1995-99 
(No of workforce) 
Economic Growth 1913.700 
Retirement 148,700 
Replacement of non-Saudis 319,500 
TOTAL 6591,900 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Statcment on the Sixth Plan, 1995-99. 
The scale of foreign workers replacement in the other GCC states is not 
as serious and important as that of Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the UAE 
has already begun following some of the Saudi's policies on deportation 
and raising work permit fees for the new foreign workers. It is estimated, 
that by 2010, the total replacement may reach around one million workers 
in the entire GCC, representing about 30% of the current stock of 
19 
expatriates. The increased availability of free education and training 
explains the growth in the number of Saudi job seekers with secondary 
education qualifications who represent nearly 25% of job seekers in 
1998.20 Despite readily available vocational and technical training in 
most GCC states, according to a survey in the early 1990s, nearly 80% of 
GCC job seekers refused manual work, and 75% prefer high status jobs 
rather than jobs with higher wages. 21 
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As has been argued by Barsalu (1985), in most other parts of the world it 
would be inconceivable to pay a supervisor less than a subordinate simply 
because of nationality, but it is a common practice in Saudi Arabia, and to 
a lesser extent in other GCC states. In some other cases, experienced 
workers may be supervised by a less experienced and better-paid worker 
simply because the latter being a GCC national. This has a knock on 
effect on income distribution. A Saudi survey for 1996 discloses many 
important facts relating to wage differentials between the two groups of 
Saudi and non-Saudi workers. 22 According to this study, an average 
Saudi production manager, for example, receives an annual income of 
US$33,000, whilst his non-Saudi counterpart takes home only 
US$13). 000. Such differentials are shown to be significant across 
different occupations and professions. It is estimated that the mean 
I 
income of US$35,000'for a Saudi worker is highly significantly different 
from US$5,500 earned by a non-Saudi worker. 23 
Localisation is a policy that may potentially disturb the working of 
domestic markets and lead to business losses. As Saudi workers are 
reluctant to work at : the same wage rates offered to their non-Saudi 
counterparts, wages are expected to increase. Loss in revenue product 
from labour may force businesses to move out and seek for new premises 
in other parts of the region. The establishment of the so-called free 
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islands of Quish and Quashm (Iranian islands) may be of attraction to 
businesses moved out of GCC. It has been reported 24 that 63% of firms 
interviewed in the rich region of Medina considered Saudisation policy as 
a negative factor affecting the labour market, pushing up wages in the 
medium term. One-half of such firms that were very heavily geared 
towards recruiting non-Saudi workers admitted that the weak 
commitment of Saudis to work was another main reason forcing them to 
decline Saudi workers. It may be concluded here that as the localisation 
policy gains momentum in the GCC, the local workers may enjoy higher 
wages in the short/medium term. However, as businesses find it difficult 
to maintain reasonable profits in the GCC they may seek investing 
elsewhere. Loss of businesses would force demand for labour to fall and 
that would bring wages down in the longer term. In the longer run, 
therefore, the local workers have to accept the wages determined by their 
local markets. 
6.3.3 The Oil Dilemma 
Since its formation in 1960, OPEC has aimed to promote the interests of 
the main oil exporting countries by co-ordinating their petroleum policies 
on world oil prices. Oman and Bahrain excepted, 25 the other GCC 
countries are active members of the OPEC. In the early 1970s when 
OPEC succeeded in altering the structure of oil prices in favour of 
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producing countries, the GCC states used these revenues to finance 
ambitious programmes of infrastructure, industrial and agricultural 
development. As explained in Chapter Two, heavy reliance on oil, on the 
other hand, led to serious cases of Dutch Disease particularly in Saudi 
Arabia, over the period 1975-85. 
Policies aimed at diversifying away from crude oil production have been 
on top of the GCC agenda for nearly 20 years now. This is not 
necessarily to do with the seemingly depleting oil/gas reserves, but 
primarily related to plans promoting industrial development. In 1979, an 
estimate by OPEC showed that the GCC oil reserves may only last for 
just over 50 years. As shown in Table 6.2, with the further discovery of 
oil in the region, the oil reserves increased from 273 billion barrels in 
1979 to 460 billion barrels in 1989. This means that given the current 
estimate of reserves of around 475 billion barrels, it would take 110 years 
for the GCC to fully deplete its reserves. 
Table 6.2 Crude Oil Reserves and Production in GCC 
(billion barrels) 
1979 1989 1999 
Reserve 273 460 475 
Annual Production 5.1 2.9 4.3 
Depletion rate (years) 53 159 110 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 
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The crude oil market is highly volatile, as changes in the world demand 
necessitate constant check on the supply. Such adjustments may have 
serious short-term effects on the economies of the GCC, as markets may 
not necessarily clear instantaneously. In Table 6.3 such volatility in 
supply and demand has býen demonstrated on annual basis. As this Table 
suggests, in the mid-19R9 there has been a significant excess demand 
responsible for higher priýes of crude oil in that period. The Table shows 
that since then there has been a reverse scenario as the world oil supply 
has been significantly higher than the world demand and that has placed 
pressures on lowering oil prices, around $22 per barrel, significantly 
higher than that of 1998. 
Table 6.3 Crude Oil: Supply and Demand 
(million barrels/day) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 
World Demand 74.0 75.0 75.7 76.9 
World Supply 
OPEC 27.7 26.5 27.9 27.8 
non-OPEC 47.0 47.4 48.7 49.2 
Balance 0.7 -1.1 0.9 0.1 
Oil Price ($US/barrel) 12 18 23 22 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical BulletilL 
171 
Moreover, short-term volatility in oil prices can be quite disturbing for 
economic planners and policy makers. Such volatility has been depicted 
in Figure 6.1, where monthly oil price is shown to have moved erratically 
around its annual mean value. Since nearly 70% of the GCC budget is 
financed by oil revenue, these recent changes in oil price has led to a 
substantial and a rather acute budget deficit. In Saudi Arabia, for 
example, the deficit currently stands around 7% of GDP, a significant 
improvement compared to that of the period 1993-98 where the deficit 
averaged out around 10% of GDP per annum. In an attempt to reduce 
reliance on oil revenues, the Saudi government has already begun 
removing subsidies on a large number of domestic products and public 
services. The UAE has also suffered budget deficit of around 13% of 
GDP over the past three years, and that has triggered discussions over 
how to introduce means of increasing non-oil revenues. 
Fig 6.1: Monthly Movements of Crude Oil Price: 
1999-2000 
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The continual annual deficits in all the GCC states over the past decade or 
so has led to the accumulation of a substantial public debt. VAiilst the 
debt-GDP ratio stands around 20%-30% in the smaller GCC countries, 
Saudi Arabia has reported a colossal debt ratio of 104% in 1999 - one of 
the highest amongst the oil producing countries - with a little hope of 
bringing it down in the near future. 26 As discussed earlier, policies aimed 
at reducing public debt has already taken momentum in Saudi Arabia, but 
such policies are rather restrictive as the economy still being highly 
dependent on oil revenues. In recent years the Saudi authorities have 
opted to finance budget deficit through domestic borrowing, and that has 
resulted in crowding out of the private sector investment, threatening the 
stability of the exchange rate. 27 
According to IMF, the interest payments on the stock of Saudi public 
debt represented 16.4% of total spending in 2000. Major structural fiscal 
reforms need to be introduced to overcome the existing problem. As 
argued in Chapter Five, an introduction of income tax or an extension of 
value added tax appear to be viable economic reforms that the kingdom 
needs to consider, even if such policies prove to have negative effects on 
international and intra GCC trade. 
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6.3.4 Deregulatoly Measures 
The GCC economies have always been in favour of promoting domestic 
private business involvement and foreign direct investment. In so doing, 
several measures of deregulation has been in place since the early 1990s. 
Although the governments of GCC dominate the ownership of the oil 
sector, the authorities -are attempting to encourage greater private sector 
investment in other industrial/manufacturing activities. Moreover, the 
introduction of the new foreign investment regulations issued in April 
I 
2000 were intended to guarantee equal treatment for all investors. Such 
treatments may vary from state to state but in principle foreign investors 
may be allowed to invest directly in the GCC without having to form 
partnership with a GCC national investor. Moreover, foreign-owned 
companies may be eligible for soft loans, which may provide 
concessionary credit of up to 50% of a project's value. 28 Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE appear to be on the forefront of such deregulatory measures. 
Privatisation has been considered seriously by these states. The extent of 
privatisation tends to 'vary significantly from one state to another. For 
example, Oman excepted, electricity and water have been privatised since 
mid-1990s in the other. states. Telecommunication is currently part 
privatised in all the GCC states: 60% in Bahrain, 20% in Qatar, 75% in 
Saudi Arabia, 70% in UAE, 70% in Kuwait, and 10% in Oman. Among 
the most prominent remaining candidates for privatisation are the national 
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airlines and the petrochemical/refinery groups. Some of these have 
already been part privatised in UAE and Bahrain. The largest 
petrochemical group in the GCC, the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation 
(Sabic) is 70% state-owned and operates 16 complexes, some of which 
are joint ventures with international firms. Crude oil activity excepted, it 
is highly expected that by 2010 almost all activities in the Gulf would be 
privatised. 
Although operating at low level of activity and in a limited scale, stock 
markets in the GCC have grown momentum since the early 1990s. Due 
to increasing cases of privatisation and the emergence of new markets, 
number of total stocks exchanged in the GCC has doubled since 1995. 
All the nationals of the GCC states as well as non-GCC full residents are 
allowed to exchange shares in these markets. The Saudi Arabian stock 
market is an over-the-counter market, in which the commercial banks buy 
and sell shares by means of electronic trading. Although the system has 
facilitated transactions, the market remains relatively illiquid, because of 
its narrow range and small number of issuers. Qatar excluded, there are 
more formal stock markets in the other states. Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Oman stock markets ý opened in the late 1980s. The Bahraini stock 
market, for example, comprises of about 40 national companies with a 
market capitalisation of some $10 billion. In the case of Oman stock 
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market, exchange management is controlled by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. By the late 1990s, there were some 90 stocks 
listed in that market with a combined capitalisation of $4 billion. 
Although the UAE has been known as the forefront of privatisation in the 
region, the stock market has yet to develop. There is no formal stock 
exchange though shares in 30 companies are traded informally and 
managed by the National Bank of Abu Dhabi. The government is 
planning ahead with setting up a stock market in UAE, preferably copied 
from Oman. 
6.3.5 Industrialisation and Diversification Polic 
As explained and detailed in Chapter Two, the GCC states have given a 
significant priority to industrialisation and diversification away from oil. 
Having developed its'refining industry and banking and trade, Bahrain 
has been the most successful state amongst the GCC to break away from 
heavy crude oil dependence. Crude oil production in Bahrain currently 
represents around 15% of GDP, compared to 17% back in 1995. In the 
other smaller countries- Oman, Qatar and Kuwait - there have been no 
significant changes in the structure of sectoral shares in the GDP. Of the 
larger states in the GCC, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, exhibit slightly 
different patterns of diversification. As shown in Table 6.4, the share of 
manufacturing (including refining, construction, electricity, gas and 
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water) as % of GDP has risen slightly for the two states. However, the 
UAE demonstrated to have been more successful in reducing its 
dependence on oil by as much as 15% over the period 1995-2000. 
Table 6.4: Sectoral Shares of GDP (%) 
Saudi Arabia and UAE 
Saudi Arabia U AE 
1995 2000 1995 2000 
Manufacturing 21.2 21.5 21.2 23.3 
Oil 32.3 32.2 30.5 25.6 
Trade & Commerce 14.8 14.5 17.1 18.7 
Agriculture 8.2 8.3 2.8 3.4 
Source: Saudi Arabia Monctary Agcncy and UAE Ministry of Plannin& 
The difference in such performance, as shown in this Table, is due to the 
success of the UAE in promoting retail trade, commerce and banking 
over the period. Agriculture sector, though representing a small share of 
GDP in the GCC countries, over the past decade or so significant 
investment has been'promoted and directed towards the sector. As 
offered in Table 6.4, agriculture though representing 8.3% of Saudi 
Arabia's GDP, there has been no relative improvements in this activity 
over the period. 
In short, diversification away from oil, therefore, has been rather limited 
and insignificant in the GCC over the past five years. 
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6.3.6 Intra-GCC Trade 
As explained earlier, GCC is attempting to forge greater regional 
economic co-operation, mainly through the elimination of barriers to the 
free flow of goods, services and factors of production among member 
states. However, progress has been slow. Goods from GCC are exempt 
from all duties, provided at least 40% of their value has been added 
within the GCC, and the producing firm is at least 51% owned by citizens 
of GCC states. The latter issue has been recently relaxed in Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and the UAE. Other recent steps amongst GCC states include: 
deregulatory measures on wholesale trade; authorising GCC nationals to 
engage in certain health service professions across member states; and 
harmonising rules on intellectual property rights and the settlement of 
business disputes. 
The major area of complications and confusion relate to the lack of 
agreement on a common external tariff. Negotiations in 1995 led to 
standardisation of all goods and products, while those in 1996 agreed on 
classification of imports into (i) items to be exempt from tariffs; (ii) 
products/services attracting a standard tariff rate; and (iii) those requiring 
a higher tariff rate for protection of domestic industries. According to 
IMF, there has already been agreement on the common tariff for but 28 
commodities out of total of 1289. In November 1999, the GCC members 
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finally agreed that they would unify and implement their import tariffs at 
between 5.5% and 7.5% by 2005, and such tariff band being the 
maximum allowed under WTO rules. 
The GCC and the EU have been negotiating a free trade pact since 1988. 
Discussions have led to no clear cut solution: the EU insists that GCC 
should harmonise its own customs tariffs as the very basis of future 
negotiations; the GCC requests for the removal of EU tariff and non-tariff 
barriers on GCC petrochemicals as the basis of future negotiations. 
Mainly in the light of this obstacle, the share of trade between the EU and 
GCC has declined since 1985. This is depicted in Table 6.5 when 
direction of international trade for GCC is given. According to this 
Table, Japan has for many years remained the top trading partner of GCC. 
Although the EU was regarded as the second trading partner of GCC in 
1985, it has lost its position to the US, which currently contributes by as 
much as 20% to total trade with GCC. 
Table 6.5: The GCC Direction of Trade 
1985 1995 2000 
JAPAN 52.9 47.4 50.6 
EU 16.3 13.4 11.6 
us 10.9 17.8 20.3 
Intra-trade 8.3 10.6 12.4 
Rest of World 11.6 10.8 6.1 
SOUrCC: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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The Table also indicates that the share of intm-GCC trade has grown 
steadily since 1985, currently standing at 12.4% of total trade. Although 
care has been exercised by data collectors to identify and remove any re- 
exports within the GCC, it is still highly likely that up to nearly 20% of 
intra-GCC trade may include such items, particularly those destined from 
Dubai to the rest of GCC. 
6.4 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we made an attempt to identify and examine those social, 
political and economic factors which may play important roles in the 
future of GCC. Of the socio-political issues, a small and insignificant 
number of factors are external. The question of the role of the ruling 
royal families in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain and lack of 
democratisation have been highlighted as main socio-political issues in 
the region. Whether Ahe royal families in these states are prepared to 
enter into a phase of democratic changes remain to be seen. Due to its 
complex and delicate position in the Arab and Muslim world, it was 
argued that Saudi Arabia, needs to go through such changes more 
dramatically than the other GCC states. 
Of economic factors, reference was made to a series of topical and 
fundamental issues. In particular, the question of how to replace the 
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foreign workers with indigenous work force can be regarded as seriously 
vexing. The costs and benefits of such localisation of labour force was 
examined and it was concluded that in the short term such policy disturbs 
the labour market by, pushing up wages. However, in the longer run 
foreign investment may be forced to seek other places in the region, 
hence causing serious disturbances in all markets. It was also shown that 
due to significant reliance on oil, the diversification and industrialisation 
policies have worked less than satisfactory, placing much greater pressure 
on the authorities to enter into more dramatic policies. 
Finally, when we examined the international trade between GCC and the 
rest of the world., it was noticed that Japan has remained as the main 
trading partner. Moreover, the trade between EU and GCC has been 
diminished due to the obstacle on tariff policies. Intra-GCC trade was 
shown to have slightly improved, but still a long way off the assumed 
target. In short, it can be concluded that due to a whole host of 
problematic issues, it -is rather unlikely to assume dramatic changes to 
take place over the next few years. The best the GCC can come up with 
is to set up its common external tariff as effectively as possible. This 
may facilitate and improve trade amongst the GCC member states as well 
as with the rest of the world. 
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Endnotes 
1. See Chapter Two where several arguments on this issue have been made in the earlier part. 
2. In particular, see Chapter Four. 
3. See EIU Country Profile: Saudi Arabia 2000, pages 11-12; where it is quoted Crown Price Abdullah 
of Saudi Arabia as saying "The USA has failed to pressure Israel into fulfilling its commitments under 
the peace accords". 
4. Islamic shatia is a set of Islamic laws mainly relating to Quranic orders and other set of principles 
relating to both economic (tax collection and other duties) and social (personal and family laws) issues. 
5. See EIU Country Profile: Saudi Arabia 1998. 
6. For full details about the political structure of the Saudi Arabia, see EIU Country Report: Saudi 
Arabia, 2000,2001. 
7. See EIU` Country Profile: Saudi Arabia 1997. 
8. Sunni and Shia are the two prominent sects of Islam. Shia arc in minority in Saudi Arabia, estimated 
to be around 2, maily living in the oil rich eastern province. Since the Iranian revolution of 1979 the 
Saudis have always been fearful of their Shia minority being supported by the Shia government of Iran. 
9. Op. Cit., page 11. 
io. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Me Military Balance, 2000. 
11. See EIU Country Profile, 2000, different issues. 
12. See Al-Mutairi (1998). 
13. Source: Ministry of Planning, Saudi Arabia, 2000. 
14. Op-Cit- 
15. Source: UN Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1999. 
16. See EIU Country Report: Saudi Arabia and UAE, 2000 
17. Source: Ministry of Planning, GCC, different years. 
18. This process has been considered by Saudis as one of the most important economic targets which 
they hope to fully implement by 20 10. 
19. See EIU: Country Profile, Saudi Arabia, 2000. 
20. Source: Ministry of Labour Annual Report, Saudi Arabia, 1999. 
2 1. See Al-Obaid and Ateiah (1994). 
22. Source: Statistical Tables of Households, High Commission for Riyadth Development, 1996. 
23. High Commission for Riyadth Development, op. cit. 
24. Medina Chamber of Commerce, 1998. 
182 
25. These two countries, however, are members of AOPEC - the Arab OPEC organisation 
26. Source: IMF, Staff Report, 1999. 
27. For a thorough theoretical and empirical investigation into relationship between debt and private 
investment see Taghavi (2000) and Alesina and Roubini (1997). 
28. The application of such regulatory measures in Saudi Arabia, for instance, means that foreign firms 
only qualified for local investment incentives if they accepted a Saudi equity stake of at least 25% in 
order to benefit from tax exemptions. Not all sectors will be opened to foreign investment, however. 
The governments retain control over mineral rights, thereby prohibiting participation in the upstream 
oil sector. 
CHAPTERSEVEN 
SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary of the Main Findings 
This research is based on an economic analysis of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), formed in 1981 by six Arab Gulf states: Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain; Qatar, Oman and the UAE. It is believed that the primary 
objective behind the GCC was to promote security and stability in the 
region, particularly through the integration of foreign and security policies. 
Secondary goals are believed to include the co-ordination of economic, 
financial and monetary policies. The power of economic integration is 
clearly outlined in the GCC's November 1981 Unified Economic Agreement 
(UEA), which superseded all previous bilateral and multilateral agreements 
among the members on economic issues. The UEA calls for intra-GCC 
freedom of movement of all factors of production, freedom of trade between 
member states and the building of a common economic infrastructure. In 
practice, however, integration has, until recently, been limited. Moves 
towards tariff unification was agreed in principle in 1993 but follow-up talks 
were slow and marred with disputes over common external tariff. In 
184 
September 1999, however, the six members finally accepted a draft set of 
customs laws and set the deadline for their implementation at March 2005. 
Customs union is a prerequisite for a free trade agreement with the EU. 
The research has aimed to address and then find answers to the following 
two questions: 
1. Has there been any significant improvement in the performance of 
these economies since the formation of the GCC? 
2. Are the overall evidence indicative of any positive moves towards full 
economic integration? 
In an attempt to find answers to these fundamental questions, the research 
has examined some important economic issues relating to the GCC member 
states, offered in Chapter Two. Major characteristics of the GCC economies 
were identified as follows. First, and foremost, the economies of all 
members of the GCC are heavily oil dependent. Second, migrant workers 
represent nearly half of the total working population of the GCC. Third, oil 
revenue is not accrued to factors of production, but earned by the GCC 
governments, and in return, zero income tax and very small value-added tax 
are offered to citizens. Fourth, owing to their massive petro-dollar earnings, 
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the GCC currencies are heavily linked with the US dollar and hence with 
one another, creating a rather stable intra-GCC currency markets. It was 
further argued that Saudi Arabia is the major contributor to the GCC, with 
her GDP and population representing around 60% and 75% of those of the 
total GCC, respectively; giving her a natural potential for leadership. 
AS elaborated in Chapter Two, for the GCC to succeed with its full 
integration plan, diversification away from oil must be deployed rigorously. 
To examine the extent of diversification in the GCC, we considered a large 
quantity of data on sectoral activities. Considering that there has been a 
massive reduction in the share of oil in GDP, the manufacturing seems not to 
have grown as fast as anticipated. Over the period 1975-85, its share grew 
by about 6.5% in the entire GCC, giving a rather disappointing average 
annual growth rate of just above 0.5%. Over the last twenty years 
manufacturing sector has seen to increase its contribution to GDP by about 
3% for the entire period, a somewhat disappointing performance given that 
the oil sector's share has diminished by one-third. On the whole, the UAE 
and Qatar, given their relatively smaller scales of operation, have 
demonstrated much greater rates of growth of manufacturing of 9% and 
8.6% respectively, over the entire period 1975-95, and those being 
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significantly higher than the average GCC. Despite substantial reduction in 
oil dependence over the entire period, GDP in real terms has grown by 
nearly 4% over the twenty year period, giving a long-run average annual 
growth rate of 0.2%. As figures suggest, massive growth in average GDP 
of 6.4% has occurred over 1975-85, and then slowed down since the late 
1980s. On the whole, over the entire period, it appears that the UAE, Oman 
and Bahrain have managed to perform better than the rest. 
Once being the states with healthy budget surpluses back in the 1970s, the 
GCC countries have been experiencing the pain of budget deficit for some 
time. in particular, since the early 1990s, mainly due to world-wide 
recession and depressed oil markets, the Gulf states' balances have 
deteriorated sharply. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the big earners and 
spenders, have been adversely affected, so that together are responsible for 
nearly 85% of total GCC deficit. In relative terms, these can be translated as 
15% of Kuwait's GDP and 6% of Saudi Arabia's GDP. On the whole, given 
their current deficits, though not very significantly out of norm, this is 
somewhat unprecedented for these nations wishing to maintain their massive 
development plans for the future. 
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Finally, as carefully examined in Chapter Two, although the extent of intra- 
GCC trade found to be generally small, it has grown on an average rate of 
0.5% per annum. over the period - exports rising by 6.5% and imports by 2% 
per annum. Bahrain is by far the largest contributor to GCC-intra trade, with 
her shares of imports from and exports to GCC being significantly higher 
than the average values at the 5% level of significance. Moreover, Bahrain's 
total trade with GCC has more than doubled over the last ten years, currently 
standing at around 40% of her total international trade. Oman is also a 
major contributor to total intra-GCC trade: her share of intra-GCC imports 
represents nearly one-quarter of her total imports. It is believed that a large 
proportion of this share is due to re-exports of goods from UAE and 
Bahrain. 
In Chapter Three models of economic integration with a special reference to 
customs union (CU) were discussed. It was argued that the justification for 
any regional economic integration is primarily based on the very assumption 
that such fonnations lead to net positive trade creation at zero/negligible cost 
to the rest of the world. Trade creation, in a sense, refers to the replacement 
of the expensive domestic production by cheaper imports from the partner. 
On the other hand, if the partner's imports are more expensive than those of 
188 
the world's, then trade diversion has occurred. Based on the main 
characteristics of these states, we build a model of customs union for GCC 
in Chapter Three. Given our limited sample size and data, it was argued that 
some simple sectoral models would furnish our objective. In so doing, a 
consumption function, Tor both durable and non-durable products, a log- 
linear production functioý for four different sectors, a log-linear money 
demand, and a log-linear import function were defined and structured. 
Chapter Four has dealt with econometric estimation of the models explained 
in Chapter Three. Prior to such estimation, it was argued that the time series 
properties of our variables need to be established. In so doing, a considerable 
effort was made on applying the hybrid unit root test for stationarity to all 
our variables. Following from the unit root test, it was argued that 
stationary variables of similar order may reveal long run equilibrium within 
a given econometric model. To that end, this chapter conducted tests for 
presence of cointegration in all our models. The general finding was that in 
almost all cases there appeared to exist at least one cointegrating equation 
explaining long run relationship amongst variables within a given model. 
Ac the final estimation - procedure, we included in our econometric models It ILO 
the cointegrating residuals to improve the degree of goodness of fit of our 
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models. In general, most of our models exhibited both functional stability 
and meaningful statistical significance. 
The findings based on consumption behaviour are indicative of rather 
significant contributions to mpc through GCC formation. The estimated 
coefficient of the GCC dummy variables show that, on average, mpc has 
been boosted by around 25% since the formation of GCC in 1981, giving an 
annual growth rate of nearly 1.5%. In so far as labour productivity is 
concerned, the estimated production functions suggest rather limited 
productivity gain being achieved through the CU formation. Productivity 
gains through capital-labour substitution proved to be more pronounced in 
oil and chemical sectors than other sectors of most GCC states. That finding 
was finiher supported by the estimates of factor elasticity. 
The estimated money demand model has indicated that generally the GCC 
states' money markets are less sensitive to interest rates and rather more 
sensitive to their domestic inflation rates. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient of the dummy variable suggests that there is rather limited 
contributions made to money markets in the GCC through the CU formation. 
Finally, in examining the scale of trade creation through GCC formation we 
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have estimated intra-GCC import models for all the six states. Once again, 
the estimated results in Chapter Four show that there has been a rather 
limited and less significant contributions made to intra-GCC trade through 
the CU formation. In short., the size of trade creation has turned out to have 
been rather small since the formation of GCC in 1981. 
In Chapter Five we conducted a simulation, based on the estimated findings 
of Chapter Four, in an attempt to measure the future performance of the 
GCC under different conditions and scenarios. In achieving this objective, 
an overview of some relevant forecasting techniques was offered. In 
conducting our forecasts, four scenarios were set: (i) individual macro 
variables following their past pattern; (ii) forecasts in the presence of a 
significant oil shock; (iii) forecasts based on a significant shock to the US$; 
and (iv) forecasts based on the assumption that a new form of 
income/corporation tax being introduced. 
In conducting forecasts based on scenario (i) an ARIMA model was applied. 
Of some important issues arising from this type of forecast was that, other 
thing equal, both GDP and inflation rates tend to fall gradually and that the 
intra-GCC trade plummet further in the long run. Both scenarios (ii) and 
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(iii) should be treated as external shocks with rather varying impact on 
different members of the QCC. Under scenario (ii) we allowed the oil price 
to increase by 40% and decline by 25%, as these values were set on the basis 
of the historical pattern of oil price since 1970. Such one-off oil shocks 
were found to have serious effects on the overall economy and could last for 
up to 3-4 years. In particular, both relative prices and GDP were found to be 
highly sensitive to such shocks. 
Under scenario (iii) we learnt that a one-off 10% drop in the value of US$ 
can markedly improve the intra-GCC trade somewhere in the region of 30%- 
40%, but such shock can seriously reduce GDP -growth over the first two 
years following the sh&k. 'Once again the effective life of such shocks was 
found to be as long as 2-4 years. Finally, under scenario (iv) we leamt that 
an introduction of 10% income tax could seriously lower GDP and 
consumption growth rates in the short term. The introduction of income tax 
was shown to be an effective decelerating factor in intm-GCC trade. 
In short, as the overall findings from Chapter Five suggest, the one-off 
shocks can be effective in the short term but in most cases lose their 
effectiveness in the long run. Moreover, such shocks are not necessarily 
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effective enough in creating sustained improvements in intra-GCC trade. 
Some other forms of stimulation are needed in these economies in order that 
the above objective is fully achieved. 
Finally, in Chapter SixP' we made an attempt to identify and examine those 
social, political and economic factors which may play important roles in the 
future of GCC, but have not been included in our econometric models. Of 
the socio-political. issues, a small and insignificant number of factors were 
identified to be external. The question of the role of the ruling royal families 
in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain and lack of democratisation have been 
highlighted as main socio-political issues in the region- Whether the royal 
families in these statesý are prepared to proceed with full democratisation 
remains to be seen. Due to its complex and delicate position in the Arab and 
Muslim world, it was argued that Saudi Arabia is left in a dilemma, but 
whatever the changes, they need to be offered to their citizens. Moreover, 
Saudis have emerged as the natural leader of the GCC, meaning that 
democratic changes in Saudi Arabia would have a significant and lasting 
impact on the rest of the GCC. Moreover, some popular and practical socio- 
political policies were highlighted in Chapter Six. 
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Of economic factors, reference was made to a series of topical and 
fundamental issues. In particular, the question of 'localisation' of workers 
was identified as an extremely vexing issue. The costs and benefits of such 
labour replacement examined, and it was concluded that in the short term 
such policy tends to disturb the labour market by pushing up wages. This 
would mean that in the long run both incumbent and potential investors may 
be forced to consider in*vesting elsewhere in the region, as cost of recruiting 
labour in GCC escalates. It was also shown that due to significant reliance 
on oil, the diversification and industrialisation policies have worked less 
than satisfactory, placing much greater pressure on the authorities to adopt 
more dramatic and radical policies. 
Denationalisation and financial liberalisation have proven to be successful in 
the GCC. Privatisation of some utility and infrastructural businesses has led 
to significant growth in business confidence and a call for more structured 
stock markets throughout the GCC. 
Finally, when we examined the trade between GCC and the rest of the 
world, it was noticed that Japan has remained as the main trading partner. 
Moreover, the trade between EU and GCC has been somewhat diminished 
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due to the obstacle on tariff policies. Intra-GCC trade was shown to have 
slightly improved, but still a long way off the assumed target. 
7.2 The Contributions of the Research 
Although an economic investigation of GCC may not necessarily be an 
original piece of research work, this thesis, however, has made an attempt to 
offer some contributions to the main theme from the following angles: 
i) Model Buildin : 
The models of different sectors of the economy offered in Chapter 
Three may appear to be rather simplistic, but in practice have shown 
to be suitable CU models for the GCQ as they do incorporate the 
main features of such economies. 
ii) Data Collection: 
The research has made a comprehensive search in collecting and 
collating relevant micro and macro data (both primary and secondary 
information). In particular, data relating to 1970-75 have been rather 
difficult to obtain, as serious data collection and compilation 
conducted by GCC agencies only dates back to the early 1970s. The 
research has conducted, in some areas, a double checking process for 
the quality of data offered by different agencies. In particular, in the 
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presence of subsidies in most GCC states, the research has made an 
effort in removing the subsidies from the published price series, in 
order that the true piýture of markets to emerge. Despite this, it is still 
believed that data gn some prices may be contaminated by such 
subsidies and other fonns of state intervention. Moreover, the data for 
consumer spending is generally offered in totality and only for some 
years considered to distinguish between durable and non-durable 
goods. In this research we have, for some states and some periods, 
derived and estimated such data residually. 
iii) Time Series Properties: 
In all cases we applied the method of testing for non-stationarity using 
the unit root test. Moreover, in search of long run equilibria, we 
conducted tests for cointegration applied to all our models. The 
findings, as shown in Chapter Four, were overwhelmingly supportive 
of cointegration a'pplication. 
iv) Diversification and Trade: 
number of research work on GCC have concentrated on measuring 
the extent of diversification or of trade creation by different means. 
Here, amongst Other things, we have demonstrated the extent of 
interaction between diversification and intra-trade and the likely 
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effects on the rest of the economy. In particular, in all our models a 
dummy variable has been added to measure the extent of the change 
between the pre and post GCC fonnation. 
V) Forecasts: - 
Based on both estimated models - Chapter Four -and different viable 
scenarios, we conducted a series of forecasts for each and every GCC 
member state. The forecasts reveal some interesting results which 
may well be of use to policy makers, businesses and researchers. 
vi) Qualitative Issues: 
In Chapter Six we made an attempt to search -for and elaborate on 
some qualitative and yet fundamental social, political and economic 
issues which had been excluded from our econometric models for a 
variety of reasons. It was critically argued that unless such changes 
are made, it would be hard to imagine that the GCC unification may 
ever function properly. 
7.3 The Limitations of the Research 
in this research our aim has been to build and apply a suitable and yet 
workable model of the GCC economies. Despite that, there still remain a 
number of limitations attached to this research work which may be 
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summarised as follows: 
i) Data Reliability and Sample Size: 
Although macroeconomic data reported by the member states and 
endorsed by international agencies appear to be reliable, there are 
some degrees of reservation about the calculation of price indices, as 
they include subsidised goods and services. It is anticipated that if 
such subsidies are identified and removed from these series, general 
price indices in the GCC would be very much in line with that of the 
OECD. At micro level, however, the, extent of reliability is rather 
limited, as different states adopt different methods and definitions for 
these indicators. The data is based on annual series and only goes 
back to 1970, giving a relatively small sample size to Play with. 
Moreover, on most activities, quarterly data are not available, though 
in most recent years such data on major economic indicators are 
published. 
ii) Econometric Models: 
As explained earlier, the methods and models developed in Chapter 
Three and estimated results of such models in Chapter Four are based 
on assumptions most relevant to the economies of the GCC states. 
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The major drawback of the study may be associated with the import 
fiinction being on aggregated and rather simplistic form. Ideally, in 
examining the extent of intra-trade one needs to apply the model to a 
large number of products/services markets. This will enable one to 
identify the areas/markets in which trade creation may occur due 
either to cost reduction or to significant complementarity. Due to 
unavailability of consistent data on intra-trade at the product level, the 
research was confined to the use of aggregate import function. 
Moreover, the production function applied and estimated here is rather 
simple, as it does not distinguish between skilled and unskilled labour 
and their shares from production. This was mainly due to lack of data 
in this area. 
iii) Non-economic Factors: 
On the whole, the analytical framework presented in this research is 
one of economic integration, looking primarily at market relationships 
among goods and factors of production. The research, therefore, has 
overlooked the relevance of institutional and political forces in the 
model of economic integration. Some important non-economic issues 
have been raised and examined in Chapter Six, but have not been 
included in our econometric models. The findings derived from these 
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models, therefore, reveal only a small part of the story, and need to be 
considered in relation to other non-economic issues. 
7.4 Conclusions 
Research on regional integration has been on the agenda of social scientists 
for well over fifty years. Whilst political scientists have examined the 
factors giving rise to political uncertainty within a defined region, 
economists have considered integration as formation of a union which can 
potentially generate trade and improve welfare of the community. This 
research is primarily based on an economic investigation of integration 
amongst. the six small ý oil producing Arab Gulf countries - the GCC. 
Nevertheless, some relevant socio-political and institutional issues have been 
raised and related to the findings derived from our economic models. 
Though the initial objective of the GCC has been to form a political or an 
inter-governmental union, the research has examined areas in which a 
workable and a viable economic integration may 
be considered fruitful. 
As has been elaborated by Mattli (1999: 189-93) both demand and supply 
conditions must be met in order to proceed with 
integration. If demand for 
and supply of integration 
(reforms leading to full integration) are significant 
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in a given region, then the region would enjoy a great chance of success. 
Where demand for integration may come from all economic and political 
actors in the region, the supply of integration is primarily determined by the 
willingness of politicians ýo sacrificing/limiting their internal power at the 
expense of the union. Currently in the EU, for example, demand for 
integration - e. g. complementarity and scale economies - is highly 
significant. However, due to lack of full commitment by a few political 
members of the EU, the progress has been relatively slow. In the case of 
GCC, however, as both demand and supply were found to be rather limited, 
it was argued that at this stage a form of customs union may prove 
applicable. The full economic integration within the GCC may then rest on 
the extent of trade creation through economic diversification, once the CU is 
operational. In the early 1980s when the threat of Iran-Iraq war on GCC had 
escalated and the presence of the US naval forces in the Gulf had become 
eminent, then demand for some form of integration was evident. Moreover, 
the suppliers of such integration - the governments of the GCC states - were 
also willing to speed up* with the signing of a pact which would secure these 
nations against their potential enemies. 
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An offshoot of this integration was the signing of an economic agreement - 
Unified Economic Agreement (UEA) - back in November 1981 - 
pronouncing the willingness of these nations to participate in an economic 
integration. As argued, earlier, since the early 1990s when such threat has 
become less of an issue, there has been very little willingness and direction 
in the GCC, as the suppliers have become less eager in pursuing this policy. 
Ac shown in Chapter Two, intra-GCC trade as percentage of total trade, 
though has grown at the average rate of around 0.5% per annum since 1985, 
it currently represents only 13% of total trade - much lower compared to 
those of intra-EU at 65% and intra-NAFTA at 50%. 
Considering all the findings derived from both the data and econometric 
estimation, one can summarise that diversification, industrialisation and 
general economic innovations have been rather limited in the GCC over the 
past two decades. As mentioned earlier, successful economic integration 
rests primarily upon the idea of trade complementarity and evidence of scale 
economies, both of which shown to have been limited and growing slowly. 
In short, it can be concluded that due to a whole host of problematic issues, 
it is rather unlikely to assume dramatic changes to take place over the next 
few years. The best the GCC can come up with is to set up its common 
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external tariff in line with the WTO recommendation as effectively as 
possible. This may facilitate and improve trade amongst the GCC member 
states as well as with the rest of the world, providing that the GCC 
governments are willing to proceed with the reforms/changes outlined 
above. 
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